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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coxgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226 (Williams).) “The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution’s reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation about the eventual fates of unjoined perpetrators. [Citation.]” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 446 .) Another purpose for the instruction “is to focus the jury’s attention on an individualized evaluation of the evidence against the person on 2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou | 3 | 4 |
People v. Pricered2 sentences2016There, the defendant argued that the trial court should not have given CALJIC No. 2.11.5, contending the “instruction erroneously told the jurors they could not discuss or consider the fact that prosecution witnesses had been granted immunity.” {Price, at p. 446.) We observed that a challenged instruction cannot be read in isolation but must be “considered in light of the entire charge.” {Ibid) Reading CALJIC No. 2.11.5 in that context, we concluded that “a reasonable juror would not have understood it as precluding the jury from considering the immunity granted to prosecution witnesses in ass 2014(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226 (Williams).) “The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution’s reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation about the eventual fates of unjoined perpetrators. [Citation.]” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 446 .) Another purpose for the instruction “is to focus the jury’s attention on an individualized evaluation of the evidence against the person on | 2 | 4 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou 2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sullygreen2 sentences2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou 2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou | 2 | 2 |
People v. Caingreen2 sentences2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou 2002As we said in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 34-35, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 : "We previously rejected this specific claim under substantially similar circumstances. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ].) In so doing, we explained: `The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation abou | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lawleygreen2 sentences2016(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 148-149 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 281 P.3d 924 ]; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ].) *987 As in those cases, defendant’s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including the existence of any “bias, interest, or other motive” on the part of the witness. 2016(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 148-149 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 281 P.3d 924 ]; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ].) *987 As in those cases, defendant’s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including the existence of any “bias, interest, or other motive” on the part of the witness. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valdezgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 148-149 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 281 P.3d 924 ]; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ].) *987 As in those cases, defendant’s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including the existence of any “bias, interest, or other motive” on the part of the witness. 2016(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 148-149 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 281 P.3d 924 ]; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ].) *987 As in those cases, defendant’s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including the existence of any “bias, interest, or other motive” on the part of the witness. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brasuregreen2 sentences2016(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 148-149 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 281 P.3d 924 ]; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ].) *987 As in those cases, defendant’s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including the existence of any “bias, interest, or other motive” on the part of the witness. 2016(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 148-149 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 281 P.3d 924 ]; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ].) *987 As in those cases, defendant’s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including the existence of any “bias, interest, or other motive” on the part of the witness. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carreragreen1 sentence2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226 (Williams).) “The purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution’s reasons for not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation about the eventual fates of unjoined perpetrators. [Citation.]” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 446 .) Another purpose for the instruction “is to focus the jury’s attention on an individualized evaluation of the evidence against the person on 2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hardygreen2 sentences2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili 2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cornwellgreen1 sentence2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili 2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Doolin
green
1 sentence2014(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 190 (Hardy); People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313 (Carrera); People v. 3 Even applying the harmless error standard under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 , we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. 7 Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1113 (Jones).) Giving CALJIC No. 2.11 .5 in such a case can be misleading because “[w]hen an accomplice . . . testifies, the instruction might suggest to the jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the credibili | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2002Claimed collateral estoppel effect of Brian Seabourn's acquittal of first degree murder charge Defendant argues that, under the collateral estoppel principles articulated in People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686 , 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 527 P.2d 622 , his conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances and conspiracy to commit murder must be reversed because his criminal liability was predicated on the actions of the actual killer, Brian Seabourn, who, after defendant's trial, was convicted of only second degree murder (and thus implicitly was acquitted of first degree murder). [24] I 2002Claimed collateral estoppel effect of Brian Seabourn's acquittal of first degree murder charge Defendant argues that, under the collateral estoppel principles articulated in People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686 , 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 527 P.2d 622 , his conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances and conspiracy to commit murder must be reversed because his criminal liability was predicated on the actions of the actual killer, Brian Seabourn, who, after defendant's trial, was convicted of only second degree murder (and thus implicitly was acquitted of first degree murder). [24] I | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.