restrictive federal rule in California

2017If, for example, the time allowed is 15 minutes but the activity takes 25 minutes, the time to be added to other working time would be limited to 15 minutes." (Italics added.) California law, as embodied in various wage orders, including Wage Order 4, applies a broader standard, requiring compensation when an employee is subject to the control of an employer. ( Mendiola , supra , 60 Cal.4th at pp. 839-840, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 124 , 340 P.3d 355 ; Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 , 578-579, 588-594, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 , 995 P.2d 139 ( Morillion ).) Plaintiffs contend they are subj

2017If, for example, the time allowed is 15 minutes but the activity takes 25 minutes, the time to be added to other working time would be limited to 15 minutes." (Italics added.) California law, as embodied in various wage orders, including Wage Order 4, applies a broader standard, requiring compensation when an employee is subject to the control of an employer. ( Mendiola , supra , 60 Cal.4th at pp. 839-840, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 124 , 340 P.3d 355 ; Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 , 578-579, 588-594, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 , 995 P.2d 139 ( Morillion ).) Plaintiffs contend they are subj

1975Past cases make clear that under section 526a “no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” (e.g., Crowe v. Boyle (1920) 184 Cal. 117, 152 [ 193 P. 111 ]); indeed, as we recently stated in Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 , 45 A.L.R.3d 1206 ], “[t]he primary purpose of [section 526a] ... is to ‘enable a large body of the *765 citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.’ [Citation.]” Thus, we must proceed to the merits of this case an

1975Past cases make clear that under section 526a “no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” (e.g., Crowe v. Boyle (1920) 184 Cal. 117, 152 [ 193 P. 111 ]); indeed, as we recently stated in Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 , 45 A.L.R.3d 1206 ], “[t]he primary purpose of [section 526a] ... is to ‘enable a large body of the *765 citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.’ [Citation.]” Thus, we must proceed to the merits of this case an

1975Neither case reaches the question of the constitutionality of the actual intelligence-gathering operation at issue; as the Laird court stated in summarizing its holding: “[O]ur conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this record the respondents have not presented a case for resolution by the [federal] courts.” ( 408 U.S. at p. 15 [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 164 ].) As explained above, the principles of justiciability in taxpayer’s suits under section 526a differ fundamentally from the restrictive federal doctrine articulated in Laird .

1975Neither case reaches the question of the constitutionality of the actual intelligence-gathering operation at issue; as the Laird court stated in summarizing its holding: “[O]ur conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this record the respondents have not presented a case for resolution by the [federal] courts.” ( 408 U.S. at p. 15 [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 164 ].) As explained above, the principles of justiciability in taxpayer’s suits under section 526a differ fundamentally from the restrictive federal doctrine articulated in Laird .

1975Past cases make clear that under section 526a “no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” (e.g., Crowe v. Boyle (1920) 184 Cal. 117, 152 [ 193 P. 111 ]); indeed, as we recently stated in Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 , 45 A.L.R.3d 1206 ], “[t]he primary purpose of [section 526a] ... is to ‘enable a large body of the *765 citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.’ [Citation.]” Thus, we must proceed to the merits of this case an

1975Past cases make clear that under section 526a “no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” (e.g., Crowe v. Boyle (1920) 184 Cal. 117, 152 [ 193 P. 111 ]); indeed, as we recently stated in Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 , 45 A.L.R.3d 1206 ], “[t]he primary purpose of [section 526a] ... is to ‘enable a large body of the *765 citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.’ [Citation.]” Thus, we must proceed to the merits of this case an