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5 California opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barrett v. Board of Osteopathic Examinersgreen1 sentence2022In any event, section 19876, subdivision (a) provides that the Commission has power to “deny, revoke, suspend, condition, or limit any [gambling] license . . . .” While Swallow argues that a license is a vested property interest that cannot be taken away based on conduct preceding the issuance of the license (see Barrett v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 135, 139 [right to practice medicine a vested property right]), a gambling license is expressly a revocable privilege, not a vested property right. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cooksongreen1 sentence2016(Sem, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189 .) “Cookson . . . determined that, even though probation cannot be revoked without a prior violation and a nonwillful failure to pay is not a revocable violation, a nonwillful failure to pay the full amount of restitution is a change in circumstances authorizing a court to modify probation by extending it. ( Cookson, supra, at pp. 1095, 1098 .) Cookson upheld an order extending the 11 probationary period from three years to five to assure that restitution would be made. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Palacio v. Jan & Gail's Care Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019(See Palacio , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 , 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 .) It is axiomatic that " 'cases are not authority for propositions not considered.' " ( City of Bellflower v. Cohen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 438 , 452, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 .) The only reasonable reading of Palacio 's statement is that if a care home meets the requirements of subdivision 11(E) it does not also need to comply with the portion of subdivision 11(A) governing waivers of off-duty meal periods , not subdivision 11(A) as a whole. 2019(See Palacio , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 , 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 .) It is axiomatic that " 'cases are not authority for propositions not considered.' " ( City of Bellflower v. Cohen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 438 , 452, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 .) The only reasonable reading of Palacio 's statement is that if a care home meets the requirements of subdivision 11(E) it does not also need to comply with the portion of subdivision 11(A) governing waivers of off-duty meal periods , not subdivision 11(A) as a whole. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
City of Bellflower v. Cohen
green
2 sentences2019(See Palacio , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 , 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 .) It is axiomatic that " 'cases are not authority for propositions not considered.' " ( City of Bellflower v. Cohen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 438 , 452, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 .) The only reasonable reading of Palacio 's statement is that if a care home meets the requirements of subdivision 11(E) it does not also need to comply with the portion of subdivision 11(A) governing waivers of off-duty meal periods , not subdivision 11(A) as a whole. 2019(See Palacio , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 , 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 .) It is axiomatic that " 'cases are not authority for propositions not considered.' " ( City of Bellflower v. Cohen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 438 , 452, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 .) The only reasonable reading of Palacio 's statement is that if a care home meets the requirements of subdivision 11(E) it does not also need to comply with the portion of subdivision 11(A) governing waivers of off-duty meal periods , not subdivision 11(A) as a whole. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Heng Sem
green
2 sentences2016(Sem, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189 .) “Cookson . . . determined that, even though probation cannot be revoked without a prior violation and a nonwillful failure to pay is not a revocable violation, a nonwillful failure to pay the full amount of restitution is a change in circumstances authorizing a court to modify probation by extending it. ( Cookson, supra, at pp. 1095, 1098 .) Cookson upheld an order extending the 11 probationary period from three years to five to assure that restitution would be made. 2016(Id. at pp. 1093.)” ( Sem, supra, at p. 1190 .) Defendant correctly relies on Cookson as establishing that it would exceed a court’s jurisdiction to modify probation based on the same facts underlying the initial probation grant. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Swim v. Bergland
green
2 sentences1990None of these sources supports their assertion of a property interest in the permits.” (Swim v. Bergland (9th Cir. 1983) 696 F.2d 712, 719 , paragraphing deleted.) Since the grazing permit does not create any interest in federal forest lands, defendant’s claim that he is an owner of an “interest in real property” within the meaning of section 846 must fail. 1990None of these sources supports their assertion of a property interest in the permits." ( Swim v. Bergland (9th Cir.1983) 696 F.2d 712, 719 , paragraphing deleted.) Since the grazing permit does not create any interest in federal forest lands, defendant's claim that he is an owner of an "interest in real property" within the meaning of section 846 must fail. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.