second peremptory challenge in California

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2005After Zakaria peremptorily challenged the trial judge originally assigned, Avital filed a peremptory challenge against the judge who replaced him, supported by the declaration of Avitals attorney that Avital maintained his own innocence "as opposed to that of his codefendant Joseph Zakaria," had entered into an agreement with the district attorney to testify against Zakaria, and could furnish particulars in an in camera hearing. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 170 Cal. Rptr. 588 .) In reversing the trial courts denial of the second peremptory challenge, the Court of Appeal concluded that Avital had sati

2016The NCAA also argues, citing Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273-1274 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 66 ], that we should not grant McNair’s writ petition because extraordinary relief sought by a petition for writ of mandate ‘“is appropriate only” where the trial court’s decision is both clearly erroneous as a matter of law and “ ‘substantially prejudices’ ” the petitioner.

2016The NCAA also argues, citing Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273-1274 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 66 ], that we should not grant McNair’s writ petition because extraordinary relief sought by a petition for writ of mandate ‘“is appropriate only” where the trial court’s decision is both clearly erroneous as a matter of law and “ ‘substantially prejudices’ ” the petitioner.

2016However, when, as here, the ‘“statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 718 P.2d 119 ]; see Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1939, 1945 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ] [if legislative history gives rise to conflicting inferences as to legislation’s purposes or intended consequences, then departure from clear language of the statute is unjustified].) The second sentence of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) clearly

2016However, when, as here, the ‘“statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 718 P.2d 119 ]; see Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1939, 1945 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ] [if legislative history gives rise to conflicting inferences as to legislation’s purposes or intended consequences, then departure from clear language of the statute is unjustified].) The second sentence of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) clearly

2016Co. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 490, 496 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 ]; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 ] [statutory construction unnecessary where statute’s language is clear and unambiguous].) A second peremptory challenge is not available to an appellant who secured the reversal of an interim order.

2016Co. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 490, 496 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 ]; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 ] [statutory construction unnecessary where statute’s language is clear and unambiguous].) A second peremptory challenge is not available to an appellant who secured the reversal of an interim order.

2016(Casden, at p. 421.) It authorizes a party or side to exercise a postappeal peremptory challenge ‘“regardless of whether that party or side has previously done so” and “'[notwithstanding [section 170.6,] paragraph (4).” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) The Legislature added the second sentence in 1998 to overrule an appellate court decision concerning the number of permissible peremptory challenges, and ‘“nothing more.” (Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 761, 766 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ] (Pfeiffer).) The NCAA has already used its one peremptory challenge in 2011, and s

2016(Casden, at p. 421.) It authorizes a party or side to exercise a postappeal peremptory challenge ‘“regardless of whether that party or side has previously done so” and “'[notwithstanding [section 170.6,] paragraph (4).” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) The Legislature added the second sentence in 1998 to overrule an appellate court decision concerning the number of permissible peremptory challenges, and ‘“nothing more.” (Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 761, 766 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ] (Pfeiffer).) The NCAA has already used its one peremptory challenge in 2011, and s

2016Co. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 490, 496 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 ]; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 ] [statutory construction unnecessary where statute’s language is clear and unambiguous].) A second peremptory challenge is not available to an appellant who secured the reversal of an interim order.

2016Co. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 490, 496 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 ]; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 ] [statutory construction unnecessary where statute’s language is clear and unambiguous].) A second peremptory challenge is not available to an appellant who secured the reversal of an interim order.

2016(See Stegs, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 576 [peremptory challenge available where a single issue is left to be retried after appeal].) A second peremptory challenge was not available to the NCAA because our opinion did not reverse a 'final judgment.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) The trial court erred as a matter of law in accepting the NCAA’s second peremptory challenge and disqualifying itself.

2016However, when, as here, the ‘“statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 718 P.2d 119 ]; see Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1939, 1945 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ] [if legislative history gives rise to conflicting inferences as to legislation’s purposes or intended consequences, then departure from clear language of the statute is unjustified].) The second sentence of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) clearly

2016However, when, as here, the ‘“statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 718 P.2d 119 ]; see Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1939, 1945 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ] [if legislative history gives rise to conflicting inferences as to legislation’s purposes or intended consequences, then departure from clear language of the statute is unjustified].) The second sentence of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) clearly

2016(Da Vinci Group v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc. Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 24, 28 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 461 ]; cf. Casden, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 423 [second challenge a narrow exception to general rule].) We are mindful that “ ‘courts of this state have been vigilant to enforce the statutory restrictions on the number and timing of the [challenges] permitted’ ” under section 170.6, because a peremptory challenge “presents the potential for abuse and judge-shopping—on the part of either or both parties. . . . ‘ “We cannot permit a device intended for spare and protective use to be convert

2016(Da Vinci Group v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc. Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 24, 28 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 461 ]; cf. Casden, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 423 [second challenge a narrow exception to general rule].) We are mindful that “ ‘courts of this state have been vigilant to enforce the statutory restrictions on the number and timing of the [challenges] permitted’ ” under section 170.6, because a peremptory challenge “presents the potential for abuse and judge-shopping—on the part of either or both parties. . . . ‘ “We cannot permit a device intended for spare and protective use to be convert

2016(Da Vinci Group v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc. Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 24, 28 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 461 ]; cf. Casden, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 423 [second challenge a narrow exception to general rule].) We are mindful that “ ‘courts of this state have been vigilant to enforce the statutory restrictions on the number and timing of the [challenges] permitted’ ” under section 170.6, because a peremptory challenge “presents the potential for abuse and judge-shopping—on the part of either or both parties. . . . ‘ “We cannot permit a device intended for spare and protective use to be convert

2016(Da Vinci Group v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc. Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 24, 28 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 461 ]; cf. Casden, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 423 [second challenge a narrow exception to general rule].) We are mindful that “ ‘courts of this state have been vigilant to enforce the statutory restrictions on the number and timing of the [challenges] permitted’ ” under section 170.6, because a peremptory challenge “presents the potential for abuse and judge-shopping—on the part of either or both parties. . . . ‘ “We cannot permit a device intended for spare and protective use to be convert

2016(See Casden v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 417, 422 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 474 ] (Casden) [language of § 170.6, subd. (a)(2) clearly and unambiguously allows a second peremptory challenge after a successful appeal].) Generally, only one peremptory challenge may be filed by a party, or a side if there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants in an action, ‘“[e]xcept as provided in this section.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4); see Casden, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 421 .) The second sentence of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) expresses the only exception to the general rule of one peremptory chall

2016(See Casden v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 417, 422 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 474 ] (Casden) [language of § 170.6, subd. (a)(2) clearly and unambiguously allows a second peremptory challenge after a successful appeal].) Generally, only one peremptory challenge may be filed by a party, or a side if there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants in an action, ‘“[e]xcept as provided in this section.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4); see Casden, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 421 .) The second sentence of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) expresses the only exception to the general rule of one peremptory chall

2016The two sentences of the second paragraph of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) state the applicable circumstances in differing terms: the first sentence authorizes a first challenge ‘“following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s decision, or following reversal *1234 on appeal of a trial court’s final judgment, ” whereas the second sentence authorizes a second challenge following “the reversal of a final judgment" and makes no reference to trial court decisions. (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) “When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or prov

2016The two sentences of the second paragraph of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) state the applicable circumstances in differing terms: the first sentence authorizes a first challenge ‘“following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s decision, or following reversal *1234 on appeal of a trial court’s final judgment, ” whereas the second sentence authorizes a second challenge following “the reversal of a final judgment" and makes no reference to trial court decisions. (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) “When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or prov