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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center
green
2 sentences2001He cites Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1379 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 , for the proposition that the Shapiro rule does not apply to subsequent oral modifications of written contracts. 2001He cites Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1379 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 , for the proposition that the Shapiro rule does not apply to subsequent oral modifications of written contracts. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Cohen v. Stevanovich
green
1 sentence2014(See GFL, supra, 272 F.3d at pp. 207– 208.) Indeed, it was essential to the reset trades that “a manipulator act[] as both the buyer and seller in order to give the false appearance of actual trades without assuming any actual risk.” (Cohen, supra, 722 F.Supp.2d at p. 424 .) 30 Whether a fail to deliver actually “creates” a phantom share or merely gives the appearance of extra supply—an issue Merrill raises—is not relevant to Shapiro’s analysis, as the supply and demand model is based on appearances. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brasier v. Sparks
neutral
2 sentences2013A section 1102.6 Transfer Disclosure Statement is not "part of the purchase contract or a separate contract containing conditions upon which the formation of the primary contract is based." (Brasier v. Sparks (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1760 .) Appellants assert that the statutory disclosure requirements (§ 1102 et seq.) are a term of the purchase agreement but that does not change the Shapiro analysis. 2013A section 1102.6 Transfer Disclosure Statement is not "part of the purchase contract or a separate contract containing conditions upon which the formation of the primary contract is based." (Brasier v. Sparks (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1760 .) Appellants assert that the statutory disclosure requirements (§ 1102 et seq.) are a term of the purchase agreement but that does not change the Shapiro analysis. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984L.Rev. 187; Note, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: a Common Ground for the Torts of Wrongful Discharge from Employment (1981) 21 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1111; Diamond; The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at all, Should it be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions (1981) 64 Marq.L.Rev. 425.) 8 The Pugh court stated that when “the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.” ( 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 330 .) 9 The Pugh court also held that plaintiff’s evid 1984L.Rev. 187; Note, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: a Common Ground for the Torts of Wrongful Discharge from Employment (1981) 21 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1111; Diamond; The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at all, Should it be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions (1981) 64 Marq.L.Rev. 425.) 8 The Pugh court stated that when “the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.” ( 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 330 .) 9 The Pugh court also held that plaintiff’s evid | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.