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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roffinella v. Sheriniangreen2 sentences2015(Roffinella v. Sherinian (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 230, 238-239 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 502 ] (Roffinella)-, Szabo v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 839, 843 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] (Szabo)-, see Code Civ. 2015(Roffinella v. Sherinian (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 230, 238-239 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 502 ] (Roffinella)-, Szabo v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 839, 843 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] (Szabo)-, see Code Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Szabo v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(Roffinella v. Sherinian (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 230, 238-239 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 502 ] (Roffinella)-, Szabo v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 839, 843 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] (Szabo)-, see Code Civ. 2015(Roffinella v. Sherinian (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 230, 238-239 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 502 ] (Roffinella)-, Szabo v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 839, 843 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] (Szabo)-, see Code Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2015The Doctrine of Merger by Deed Did Not Extinguish the Disclosure Obligation The general rule, long recognized in California, is that “ ‘where a deed is executed in pursuance of a contract for the sale of land, all prior proposals and stipulations are merged, and the deed is deemed to express the final and entire contract between the parties.’ ” (Bryan v. Swain (1880) 56 Cal. 616, 618 ; see Riley v. North Star Mining Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 549, 556 [ 93 P. 194 ]; Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 827, 836 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] [stating rule but recognizing exception “whe 2015The Doctrine of Merger by Deed Did Not Extinguish the Disclosure Obligation The general rule, long recognized in California, is that “ ‘where a deed is executed in pursuance of a contract for the sale of land, all prior proposals and stipulations are merged, and the deed is deemed to express the final and entire contract between the parties.’ ” (Bryan v. Swain (1880) 56 Cal. 616, 618 ; see Riley v. North Star Mining Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 549, 556 [ 93 P. 194 ]; Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 827, 836 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] [stating rule but recognizing exception “whe | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. North Star Mining Co.green2 sentences2015The Doctrine of Merger by Deed Did Not Extinguish the Disclosure Obligation The general rule, long recognized in California, is that “ ‘where a deed is executed in pursuance of a contract for the sale of land, all prior proposals and stipulations are merged, and the deed is deemed to express the final and entire contract between the parties.’ ” (Bryan v. Swain (1880) 56 Cal. 616, 618 ; see Riley v. North Star Mining Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 549, 556 [ 93 P. 194 ]; Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 827, 836 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] [stating rule but recognizing exception “whe 2015The Doctrine of Merger by Deed Did Not Extinguish the Disclosure Obligation The general rule, long recognized in California, is that “ ‘where a deed is executed in pursuance of a contract for the sale of land, all prior proposals and stipulations are merged, and the deed is deemed to express the final and entire contract between the parties.’ ” (Bryan v. Swain (1880) 56 Cal. 616, 618 ; see Riley v. North Star Mining Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 549, 556 [ 93 P. 194 ]; Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 827, 836 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] [stating rule but recognizing exception “whe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Benfordgreen2 sentences1966In People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 8-10 [ 345 P.2d 928 ], it is said; “The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that ‘ Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations. ’ [Citation.] In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly-stated grounds of ‘sound public policy’ and ‘good morals.’ [Citations.] The precise nature of this public policy has not been spelled out in any California majority opinion concerning entrapment, but obviously California has recog 1966In People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 8-10 [ 345 P.2d 928 ], it is said; “The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that ‘ Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations. ’ [Citation.] In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly-stated grounds of ‘sound public policy’ and ‘good morals.’ [Citations.] The precise nature of this public policy has not been spelled out in any California majority opinion concerning entrapment, but obviously California has recog | 1 | 1 |
People v. Braddockgreen2 sentences1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. 1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. | 1 | 1 |
Casey v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. 1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. | 1 | 1 |
Sorrells v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. 1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cahangreen2 sentences1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Terrygreen2 sentences1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. 1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Makovskygreen2 sentences1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gallaghergreen2 sentences1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Barkdollgreen2 sentences1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Mooregreen2 sentences1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bryan v. Swain
green
1 sentence2015The Doctrine of Merger by Deed Did Not Extinguish the Disclosure Obligation The general rule, long recognized in California, is that “ ‘where a deed is executed in pursuance of a contract for the sale of land, all prior proposals and stipulations are merged, and the deed is deemed to express the final and entire contract between the parties.’ ” (Bryan v. Swain (1880) 56 Cal. 616, 618 ; see Riley v. North Star Mining Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 549, 556 [ 93 P. 194 ]; Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 827, 836 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] [stating rule but recognizing exception “whe | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance
green
1 sentence1964In Califorma at least, the Comunale decision established breach of an implied covenant, that is, breach of contract, as the theoretical basis of the claim. ( 50 Cal.2d at p. 659 .) That Arnold’s claim against the insurer was incomplete at the time of the attempted transfer to Mrs. Critz is not crucial, in our view. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Sherman v. United States
green
2 sentences1959The theoretical basis of the defense, according to the United States Supreme Court, is that “Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.” (Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 372 .) In California recognition of the defense is said to rest upon the broadly stated *9 grounds of “sound public policy” and “good morals.” (People v. Makovsky (1935), 3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [4] [ 44 P.2d 536 ] ; People v. Gallagher (1930), 107 Cal.App. 425, 529 [ 290 P. 504 ]; In re Moore (1924), 70 Cal.App. 483, 487 [6] [ 233 P. 805 1959(See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States (1958), supra, 356 U.S. 369, 380 ; the minority opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 454-455 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] [quoted with approval in the opinions of Presiding Justice Shinn adopted as dissents in People v. Braddock (1953), 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], and People v. Terry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 371, 377 [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ]; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Casey v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 413, 423 [ 48 S.Ct. 373 , 72 L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Hulse v. Consolidated Quicksilver Mining Corp.
green
2 sentences1950Corp., 65 Idaho 768 [ 154 P.2d 149 ].) The theoretical basis of the rule is that the delay or refusal is a nonfeasance, the nonperformance of a duty owed to the principal only because of the existing agency relation, not a misfeasance or malfeasance, the breach of a duty owed individually to third parties independent of such agency relation. 1950Corp., 65 Idaho 768 [ 154 P.2d 149 ].) The theoretical basis of the rule is that the delay or refusal is a nonfeasance, the nonperformance of a duty owed to the principal only because of the existing agency relation, not a misfeasance or malfeasance, the breach of a duty owed individually to third parties independent of such agency relation. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.