multiplicity test in Wisconsin

2020Heinrich attempts to distinguish these cases on the grounds that he was charged with violating a single “no new crimes” condition in a single 4 See State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739 , 751–53, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998) (“We use four factors to determine legislative intent in a multiplicity analysis: 1) statutory language; 2) legislative history and context; 3) the nature of the proscribed conduct; and 4) the appropriateness of multiple punishments.”). 7 No. 2018AP2124-CR bond.

2020Heinrich attempts to distinguish these cases on the grounds that he was charged with violating a single “no new crimes” condition in a single 4 See State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739 , 751–53, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998) (“We use four factors to determine legislative intent in a multiplicity analysis: 1) statutory language; 2) legislative history and context; 3) the nature of the proscribed conduct; and 4) the appropriateness of multiple punishments.”). 7 No. 2018AP2124-CR bond.

2020State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159 , 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992).

2013"An analysis of this third factor requires essentially the same analysis as whether the offenses are different in fact under the multiplicity test's first prong." Warren, 229 Wis. 2d at 186-87 ; see also Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 165 .

2022See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶99 ; State v. Selmon, 175 Wis. 2d 155, 159, 165-67 , 498 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting a multiplicity challenge to a defendant’s convictions for second-degree sexual assault of a child and second-degree sexual assault with the use of force because the legislature had recognized two distinct groups of victims—those assaulted through the use of force and those assaulted due to age). 4 In multiplicity analyses, oftentimes the analysis of the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of multiple punishments overlap.

2021“Whether a multiplicity violation exists in a given case, which requires a determination of legislative intent, is a question of law subject to independent appellate review.” State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶15 , 263 Wis. 2d 145 , 666 N.W.2d 1 . ¶10 “Multiplicity arises where the defendant is charged in more than one count for a single offense.” Id., ¶34 (citation omitted).

1998As the supreme court concluded in Sauceda , analysis under the first prong of the multiplicity test is the same "regardless of whether the offenses are contained within the same or separate statutory sections." State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 495 , 485 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1992).

1998As the supreme court concluded in Sauceda , analysis under the first prong of the multiplicity test is the same "regardless of whether the offenses are contained within the same or separate statutory sections." State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 495 , 485 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1992).

1991The majority correctly begins its analysis with State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48 , 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after reviewing prior double jeopardy/multiplicity case law, set out the methodology for addressing a multiplicity claim.

1991The majority correctly begins its analysis with State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48 , 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after reviewing prior double jeopardy/multiplicity case law, set out the methodology for addressing a multiplicity claim.

1991He explicitly argues in his brief that "the Legislature clearly did not intend cumulative punishment under these two statutes." Second, in State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155 , 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985), the supreme court admonished the court of appeals for failing to conduct the second prong of the multiplicity analysis, concluding that it was "erroneous not to apply the two-element test of [State v.] Rabe [, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 63 , 291 N.W.2d 809, 816 (1980)]" to that case.

1991He explicitly argues in his brief that "the Legislature clearly did not intend cumulative punishment under these two statutes." Second, in State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155 , 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985), the supreme court admonished the court of appeals for failing to conduct the second prong of the multiplicity analysis, concluding that it was "erroneous not to apply the two-element test of [State v.] Rabe [, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 63 , 291 N.W.2d 809, 816 (1980)]" to that case.

2023See id., ¶47. ¶15 The first prong of the multiplicity test “involves a determination of whether the charged acts are ‘separated in time or are of a significantly different nature.’” State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶31 , 248 Wis. 2d 259 , 635 N.W.2d 838 (citation omitted).

2023See id., ¶47. ¶15 The first prong of the multiplicity test “involves a determination of whether the charged acts are ‘separated in time or are of a significantly different nature.’” State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶31 , 248 Wis. 2d 259 , 635 N.W.2d 838 (citation omitted).

2023“Whether a multiplicity violation exists in a given case is a question of law subject to independent appellate review.” State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶52 , 252 Wis. 2d 54 , 643 N.W.2d 437 . ¶10 We review multiplicity claims pursuant to a well-established, two-part methodology.

2023“Whether a multiplicity violation exists in a given case is a question of law subject to independent appellate review.” State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶52 , 252 Wis. 2d 54 , 643 N.W.2d 437 . ¶10 We review multiplicity claims pursuant to a well-established, two-part methodology.

2019As only the first part of the multiplicity test implicates the constitutional double jeopardy provisions, id. , we address his multiplicity argument no further.

2002The State refers us to State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶ 22 , 244 Wis. 2d 523 , 628 N.W.2d 801 , however, in which this court noted that it is only the first part of the multiplicity test that involves the constitutional double jeopardy provisions.

2006Id. at 656 , 558 N.W.2d 126 .

2006Id. at 656 , 558 N.W.2d 126 .

2022See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶99 ; State v. Selmon, 175 Wis. 2d 155, 159, 165-67 , 498 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting a multiplicity challenge to a defendant’s convictions for second-degree sexual assault of a child and second-degree sexual assault with the use of force because the legislature had recognized two distinct groups of victims—those assaulted through the use of force and those assaulted due to age). 4 In multiplicity analyses, oftentimes the analysis of the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of multiple punishments overlap.

2022See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶99 ; State v. Selmon, 175 Wis. 2d 155, 159, 165-67 , 498 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting a multiplicity challenge to a defendant’s convictions for second-degree sexual assault of a child and second-degree sexual assault with the use of force because the legislature had recognized two distinct groups of victims—those assaulted through the use of force and those assaulted due to age). 4 In multiplicity analyses, oftentimes the analysis of the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of multiple punishments overlap.

2021See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶12 . 5 The amended information charged Whitaker with fifteen counts including nine counts of first-degree reckless endangerment with a dangerous weapon, five counts of discharging a firearm from a vehicle towards a vehicle or building, and one count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. 6 No exception to mootness applies.

2018See State v. Steinhardt , 2017 WI 62 , ¶13, 375 Wis. 2d 712 , 896 N.W.2d 700 .

2018See State v. Steinhardt , 2017 WI 62 , ¶13, 375 Wis. 2d 712 , 896 N.W.2d 700 .

2013See Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶ 30 .

2006LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.6(a), at 230-32 (2d ed. 1999). 5 LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 230-31 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970)).

2002See Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1396 . 10 In State v. Hamilton, 146 Wis. 2d 426, 438-39 , 432 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals discussed the legislative intent component of the multiplicity test in the context of Wis. Stat. § 943.37 , the statute criminalizing the alteration of serial numbers.

2002See Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1396 . 10 In State v. Hamilton, 146 Wis. 2d 426, 438-39 , 432 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals discussed the legislative intent component of the multiplicity test in the context of Wis. Stat. § 943.37 , the statute criminalizing the alteration of serial numbers.

2002See Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1396 . 10 In State v. Hamilton, 146 Wis. 2d 426, 438-39 , 432 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals discussed the legislative intent component of the multiplicity test in the context of Wis. Stat. § 943.37 , the statute criminalizing the alteration of serial numbers.