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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Margolin v. Regional Planning Commissiongreen2 sentences2016From these differences, the Mountjoys draw the conclusion that “[i]f Mr. Gaddis was worth $260 an hour, Ms. Henderson was worth far more.” We find no merit in this argument. “ ‘[A] reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors ...[:] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case.’ ” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 145 ], quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. 2016From these differences, the Mountjoys draw the conclusion that “[i]f Mr. Gaddis was worth $260 an hour, Ms. Henderson was worth far more.” We find no merit in this argument. “ ‘[A] reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors ...[:] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case.’ ” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 145 ], quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. | 4 | 4 |
Ketchum v. Mosesgreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [court may not take judicial notice of truth of hearsay statements in court files].) Because no request for judicial notice was made, the issue was not raised or resolved. 5 The lodestar by its nature accounts for the lawyer’s accomplishments. “[T]he ‘“reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case.”’ [Citation.]” 2015(Boldface omitted.) They essentially assert that the trial court should not have credited the evidence submitted by Habitat regarding the reasonableness of the requested rates and instead should have credited evidence submitted by the City and the Regents that they believe showed that the requested rates were “significantly inflated . . . .” “[T]he ‘ “reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirabili | 1 | 5 |
Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.green2 sentences2019(DP Pham LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 674 [party forfeits argument by failing to adequately support it with argument and relevant legal authority].) 22 “In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other 2019(DP Pham LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 674 [party forfeits argument by failing to adequately support it with argument and relevant legal authority].) 22 “In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other | 1 | 1 |
DP Pham LLC v. Cheadlegreen1 sentence2019(DP Pham LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 674 [party forfeits argument by failing to adequately support it with argument and relevant legal authority].) 22 “In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Wraxallgreen1 sentence2015(See, e.g., Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [court may not take judicial notice of truth of hearsay statements in court files].) Because no request for judicial notice was made, the issue was not raised or resolved. 5 The lodestar by its nature accounts for the lawyer’s accomplishments. “[T]he ‘“reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case.”’ [Citation.]” | 1 | 1 |
Fracasse v. Brentgreen2 sentences2007(See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 ] [“the ‘ “reasonable hourly rate ... is the product of a multiplicity of factors ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ” (italics added)]; Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 792 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 494 P.2d 9 ] [“one of the significant factors in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. is *577 ‘the amount involved and the result obtained’ ”]; Contractors Labor Pool, 2007(See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 ] [“the ‘ “reasonable hourly rate ... is the product of a multiplicity of factors ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ” (italics added)]; Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 792 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 494 P.2d 9 ] [“one of the significant factors in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. is *577 ‘the amount involved and the result obtained’ ”]; Contractors Labor Pool, | 1 | 1 |
Contractors Labor Pool, Inc. v. Westway Contractors, Inc.green2 sentences2007(See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 ] [“the ‘ “reasonable hourly rate ... is the product of a multiplicity of factors ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ” (italics added)]; Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 792 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 494 P.2d 9 ] [“one of the significant factors in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. is *577 ‘the amount involved and the result obtained’ ”]; Contractors Labor Pool, 2007(See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 ] [“the ‘ “reasonable hourly rate ... is the product of a multiplicity of factors ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ” (italics added)]; Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 792 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 494 P.2d 9 ] [“one of the significant factors in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. is *577 ‘the amount involved and the result obtained’ ”]; Contractors Labor Pool, | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc.green2 sentences2006Because Google’s uncontroverted evidence established the baseline for the award of fees, any departure from the amount requested had to be based on some evidence in the record suggesting the fee was unreasonable, not (as Google puts it) on a “wholesale rejection of the evidence in favor of the self-interested and unsupported claim of opposing counsel.” (Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 538, 543 [the opponent’s time is not an immutable yardstick of reasonableness]; Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery (11th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d 1292, 1305, fn. 3 [th 2006Because Google's uncontroverted evidence established the baseline for the award of fees, any departure from the amount requested had to be based on some evidence in the record suggesting the fee was unreasonable, not (as Google puts it) on a "wholesale rejection of the evidence in favor of the self-interested and unsupported claim of opposing counsel." ( Shaw v. AAA Engineering Drafting, Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 538 , 543 [the opponent's time is not an immutable yardstick of reasonableness]; Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery (11th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d 1292 , 1305 , fn. 3 [ | 1 | 1 |
Mattie Norman, Clara Marshall, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. The Housing Authority of the City of Montgomerygreen2 sentences2006Because Google’s uncontroverted evidence established the baseline for the award of fees, any departure from the amount requested had to be based on some evidence in the record suggesting the fee was unreasonable, not (as Google puts it) on a “wholesale rejection of the evidence in favor of the self-interested and unsupported claim of opposing counsel.” (Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 538, 543 [the opponent’s time is not an immutable yardstick of reasonableness]; Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery (11th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d 1292, 1305, fn. 3 [th 2006Because Google's uncontroverted evidence established the baseline for the award of fees, any departure from the amount requested had to be based on some evidence in the record suggesting the fee was unreasonable, not (as Google puts it) on a "wholesale rejection of the evidence in favor of the self-interested and unsupported claim of opposing counsel." ( Shaw v. AAA Engineering Drafting, Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 538 , 543 [the opponent's time is not an immutable yardstick of reasonableness]; Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery (11th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d 1292 , 1305 , fn. 3 [ | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1976(See, e.g., Harris v. United States (1971) 404 U.S. 1232 , 1236 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 25 , 29, 92 S.Ct. 10 ]; Cohen v. United States (1961) 7 L.Ed.2d 13 [ 82 S.Ct. 8 , 9]; Bandy v. United States (1960) 5 L.Ed.2d 218 [ 81 S.Ct. 197 , 198]; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (b).) 9 If a defendant can demonstrate that the likelihood of his flight is minimal in light of these criteria, he should be considered as having presented at least a prima facie case for release pending appeal. 1976(See, e.g., Harris v. United States (1971) 404 U.S. 1232, 1236 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 25 , 29, 92 S.Ct. 10 ]; Cohen v. United States (1961) 7 L.Ed.2d 13 [ 82 S.Ct. 8 , 9]; Bandy v. United States (1960) 5 L.Ed.2d 218 [ 81 S.Ct. 197 , 198]; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (b).) 9 If a defendant can demonstrate that the likelihood of his flight is minimal in light of these criteria, he should be considered as having presented at least a prima facie case for release pending appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Call v. Alcan Pacific Co.green2 sentences1970Where the question is one of judgment, the promisor’s determination that he is not satisfied, when made in good faith, has been held to be a defense to an action on the contract. [Citations.]” In Call v. Alcan Pacific Co., 251 Cal.App.2d 442, 447 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 763 ], the subcontractor was required to supply skilled workmen to the satisfaction of the general contractor. 1970Where the question is one of judgment, the promisor’s determination that he is not satisfied, when made in good faith, has been held to be a defense to an action on the contract. [Citations.]” In Call v. Alcan Pacific Co., 251 Cal.App.2d 442, 447 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 763 ], the subcontractor was required to supply skilled workmen to the satisfaction of the general contractor. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019(DP Pham LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 674 [party forfeits argument by failing to adequately support it with argument and relevant legal authority].) 22 “In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dolores J. Copeland, Individually and on Behalf of the Class of All Others Similarly Situated v. F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor
green
1 sentence2016Cir. 1980) 205 U.S. App.D.C. 390 [ 641 F.2d 880, 892 ].) Here, in arguing that the trial court undervalued Henderson’s services by applying an hourly rate of $260 to those services, the Mountjoys point to only two relevant factors: years in practice and trial experience. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino
green
1 sentence2015(Boldface omitted.) They essentially assert that the trial court should not have credited the evidence submitted by Habitat regarding the reasonableness of the requested rates and instead should have credited evidence submitted by the City and the Regents that they believe showed that the requested rates were “significantly inflated . . . .” “[T]he ‘ “reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirabili | 1 | 2015–2015 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1978An example of a case dealing with a basic underlying wrong is Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 556 P.2d 750 ], 2 where once a fraudulent scheme against homeowners in a tract was proven, each homeowner in the class would be able to establish his particular monetary damages, As the court put it, at pages 363-364, contrasting this case with City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447 : “The issues presented therein were complex: the questions of liability and damage to each parcel varied since the characteristics of the parcels were d | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1978An example of a case dealing with a basic underlying wrong is Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 556 P.2d 750 ], 2 where once a fraudulent scheme against homeowners in a tract was proven, each homeowner in the class would be able to establish his particular monetary damages, As the court put it, at pages 363-364, contrasting this case with City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447 : “The issues presented therein were complex: the questions of liability and damage to each parcel varied since the characteristics of the parcels were d 1978An example of a case dealing with a basic underlying wrong is Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 556 P.2d 750 ], 2 where once a fraudulent scheme against homeowners in a tract was proven, each homeowner in the class would be able to establish his particular monetary damages, As the court put it, at pages 363-364, contrasting this case with City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447 : “The issues presented therein were complex: the questions of liability and damage to each parcel varied since the characteristics of the parcels were d | 1 | 1978–1978 |
In Re Brumback
green
2 sentences1976The Brumback court emphasized that a trial judge "should recognize that the primary purpose of bail, before or after conviction, is practical assurance that defendant will attend upon the court when his presence is required." ( 46 Cal.2d at p. 813 .) As numerous out-of-state authorities indicate, a multiplicity of factors relate to the likelihood that an individual defendant will "jump bail": (1) the defendant's ties to the community, including his employment, the duration of his residence, his family attachments and his property holdings; (2) the defendant's record of appearance at past court 1976The Brumback court emphasized that a trial judge “should recognize that the primary purpose of bail, before or after conviction, is practical assurance that defendant will attend upon the court when his presence is required.” ( 46 Cal.2d at p. 813 .) As numerous out-of-state authorities indicate, a multiplicity of factors relate to the likelihood that an individual defendant will “jump bail”: (1) the defendant’s ties to the community, including his employment, the duration of his residence, his family attachments and his property holdings; (2) the defendant’s record of appearance at past court | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. James
green
2 sentences1976(See, e.g., Harris v. United States (1971) 404 U.S. 1232 , 1236 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 25 , 29, 92 S.Ct. 10 ]; Cohen v. United States (1961) 7 L.Ed.2d 13 [ 82 S.Ct. 8 , 9]; Bandy v. United States (1960) 5 L.Ed.2d 218 [ 81 S.Ct. 197 , 198]; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (b).) 9 If a defendant can demonstrate that the likelihood of his flight is minimal in light of these criteria, he should be considered as having presented at least a prima facie case for release pending appeal. 1976(See, e.g., Harris v. United States (1971) 404 U.S. 1232, 1236 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 25 , 29, 92 S.Ct. 10 ]; Cohen v. United States (1961) 7 L.Ed.2d 13 [ 82 S.Ct. 8 , 9]; Bandy v. United States (1960) 5 L.Ed.2d 218 [ 81 S.Ct. 197 , 198]; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (b).) 9 If a defendant can demonstrate that the likelihood of his flight is minimal in light of these criteria, he should be considered as having presented at least a prima facie case for release pending appeal. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.