multiplicity doctrine in Delaware

2025Based on this evidence, 12 “The multiplicity doctrine, which is rooted in the prohibition against double jeopardy, prohibits the State from dividing one crime into multiple counts by splitting it ‘into a series of temporal or spatial units.’” Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1668 (Del. 2019) (quoting Spencer v. State, 868 A.2d 821, 823 (Del. 2005)). 13 Id. 14 11 Del.

2024C. § 206, and is satisfied 248 White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 249 Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1169 (Del. 2019). 250 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 2006). 251 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 66 where an inquiry into the statutes demonstrates “each requires proof of at least one element that is not required to prove the others.”252 McGuiness rests her argument that Counts I and IV violated the multiplicity doctrine on the jury instructions in this case.

2024That issue implicates the multiplicity doctrine, which is rooted in the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Delaware and United States Constitutions.8 Those clauses protect defendants against “(i) successive prosecutions; (ii) multiple charges under separate statutes; and (iii) being charged multiple times under the same statute.”9 Multiplicity is the “charging of a single offense in more than one count of 7 Counts I-IV, as amended, in ID Nos. 2106004632B; 2106004704B; 2107000514B; and 2107000202B. 8 Patrick, 2021 WL 4347744 , at *4. 9 Zugehoer v. State, 980 A. 2d 1007, 1013 (Del. 2009) (citing Wil

2023R. 35(a) Mot. at 2. 21 Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1192 (Del. 2019) (finding “theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft are the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes”); Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Del. 2002) (finding the multiplicity doctrine applies where a defendant does not “formulate two separate intents to distribute cocaine even though he separated the cocaine into different caches”); Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. 2003) (finding “the General Assembly intended for Aggravated Menacing to be a lesser-included offense of Robbery in the First Degree” and concl

2019See Williams , 796 A.2d at 1286-87 (adopting a test for possession with intent to deliver cocaine based on whether " 'the possessions are sufficiently differentiated by time, location or intended purpose ' " and stating that "[t]his test consists of factors a court may use in determining, under the circumstances, whether two violations of same statute have occurred" (quoting Rashad v. Burt , 108 F.3d 677 , 681 (6th Cir. 1997) ); Feddiman , 558 A.2d at 288-89 (weighing the timing and location of separate acts of sexual assault to determine whether multiple counts of sexual assault were permissi

2003In Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288 (Del.1989), however, this Court upheld the defendant's convictions for eight counts of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree as not violating the multiplicity doctrine.

2024Apr. 21, 2023). 3 See Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1189 (Del. 2019 (explaining that “[i]n the theft context, . . . where property belonging to different owners is taken at the same time and place as a single or continuous act or transaction, that taking constitutes a single criminal offense” under the multiplicity doctrine (internal quotation omitted)); see also id. (stating that the single theft rule “applies with equal force when the items are stolen from the same owner”). 2 (4) Yelardy’s claims involve questions of law.

2024Apr. 21, 2023). 3 See Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1189 (Del. 2019 (explaining that “[i]n the theft context, . . . where property belonging to different owners is taken at the same time and place as a single or continuous act or transaction, that taking constitutes a single criminal offense” under the multiplicity doctrine (internal quotation omitted)); see also id. (stating that the single theft rule “applies with equal force when the items are stolen from the same owner”). 2 (4) Yelardy’s claims involve questions of law.

2025Based on this evidence, 12 “The multiplicity doctrine, which is rooted in the prohibition against double jeopardy, prohibits the State from dividing one crime into multiple counts by splitting it ‘into a series of temporal or spatial units.’” Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1668 (Del. 2019) (quoting Spencer v. State, 868 A.2d 821, 823 (Del. 2005)). 13 Id. 14 11 Del.

2025Based on this evidence, 12 “The multiplicity doctrine, which is rooted in the prohibition against double jeopardy, prohibits the State from dividing one crime into multiple counts by splitting it ‘into a series of temporal or spatial units.’” Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1668 (Del. 2019) (quoting Spencer v. State, 868 A.2d 821, 823 (Del. 2005)). 13 Id. 14 11 Del.

2024That issue implicates the multiplicity doctrine, which is rooted in the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Delaware and United States Constitutions.8 Those clauses protect defendants against “(i) successive prosecutions; (ii) multiple charges under separate statutes; and (iii) being charged multiple times under the same statute.”9 Multiplicity is the “charging of a single offense in more than one count of 7 Counts I-IV, as amended, in ID Nos. 2106004632B; 2106004704B; 2107000514B; and 2107000202B. 8 Patrick, 2021 WL 4347744 , at *4. 9 Zugehoer v. State, 980 A. 2d 1007, 1013 (Del. 2009) (citing Wil

2020Second, he argues that his Conspiracy Second Degree and Conspiracy First Degree convictions all merge into one count because they concern an ongoing conspiratorial relationship which he claims is “subsumed under the continuing conspiracy envisioned by the conspiracy to commit racketeering charge.”61 Where a criminal defendant presents a multiplicity argument not raised below, this Court reviews it for plain error.62 “A multiplicity violation may constitute plain error.”63 Plain error review in a multiplicity challenge not contesting the facts is effectively de novo.64 60 Mills v. State, 201 A.

2024Aug. 19, 2014). 6 Id. 7 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 8 See Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1189 (Del. 2019) (explaining that “[i]n the theft context, … where property belonging to different owners is taken at the same time and place as a single or continuous act or transaction, that taking constitutes a single criminal offense” under the multiplicity doctrine). 3 for aggravated menacing must merge with his sentences for first-degree robbery.

2023“Although robbery involves the taking of property, the legislature’s concern in enacting the robbery statute was with violence and 19 Id.

2020Second, he argues that his Conspiracy Second Degree and Conspiracy First Degree convictions all merge into one count because they concern an ongoing conspiratorial relationship which he claims is “subsumed under the continuing conspiracy envisioned by the conspiracy to commit racketeering charge.”61 Where a criminal defendant presents a multiplicity argument not raised below, this Court reviews it for plain error.62 “A multiplicity violation may constitute plain error.”63 Plain error review in a multiplicity challenge not contesting the facts is effectively de novo.64 60 Mills v. State, 201 A.

2020Second, he argues that his Conspiracy Second Degree and Conspiracy First Degree convictions all merge into one count because they concern an ongoing conspiratorial relationship which he claims is “subsumed under the continuing conspiracy envisioned by the conspiracy to commit racketeering charge.”61 Where a criminal defendant presents a multiplicity argument not raised below, this Court reviews it for plain error.62 “A multiplicity violation may constitute plain error.”63 Plain error review in a multiplicity challenge not contesting the facts is effectively de novo.64 60 Mills v. State, 201 A.

2024C. § 206, and is satisfied 248 White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 249 Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1169 (Del. 2019). 250 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 2006). 251 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 66 where an inquiry into the statutes demonstrates “each requires proof of at least one element that is not required to prove the others.”252 McGuiness rests her argument that Counts I and IV violated the multiplicity doctrine on the jury instructions in this case.

2024C. § 206, and is satisfied 248 White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 249 Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1169 (Del. 2019). 250 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 2006). 251 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 66 where an inquiry into the statutes demonstrates “each requires proof of at least one element that is not required to prove the others.”252 McGuiness rests her argument that Counts I and IV violated the multiplicity doctrine on the jury instructions in this case.

2024Mar. 8, 1996); see Neal v. State, 3 A.3d 222, 224 (Del. 2010) (affirming a defendant’s convictions for robbery counts involving store owners where the defendant intimidated the store owners before taking the store’s money from other employees). 10 Yelardy v. State, 2024 WL 1954299 (Del.

2024C. § 206, and is satisfied 248 White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 249 Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1169 (Del. 2019). 250 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 2006). 251 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 66 where an inquiry into the statutes demonstrates “each requires proof of at least one element that is not required to prove the others.”252 McGuiness rests her argument that Counts I and IV violated the multiplicity doctrine on the jury instructions in this case.

2023R. 35(a) Mot. at 2. 21 Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1192 (Del. 2019) (finding “theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft are the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes”); Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Del. 2002) (finding the multiplicity doctrine applies where a defendant does not “formulate two separate intents to distribute cocaine even though he separated the cocaine into different caches”); Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. 2003) (finding “the General Assembly intended for Aggravated Menacing to be a lesser-included offense of Robbery in the First Degree” and concl

2023R. 35(a) Mot. at 2. 21 Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1192 (Del. 2019) (finding “theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft are the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes”); Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Del. 2002) (finding the multiplicity doctrine applies where a defendant does not “formulate two separate intents to distribute cocaine even though he separated the cocaine into different caches”); Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. 2003) (finding “the General Assembly intended for Aggravated Menacing to be a lesser-included offense of Robbery in the First Degree” and concl

2023R. 35(a) Mot. at 2. 21 Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1192 (Del. 2019) (finding “theft of a motor vehicle and felony theft are the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes”); Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Del. 2002) (finding the multiplicity doctrine applies where a defendant does not “formulate two separate intents to distribute cocaine even though he separated the cocaine into different caches”); Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. 2003) (finding “the General Assembly intended for Aggravated Menacing to be a lesser-included offense of Robbery in the First Degree” and concl

2022C. § 4205A(a)(2). 13 Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del. 2016) (invalidating statute that allowed judge, rather than jury, to find sufficient aggravating circumstances to impose a death sentence.). 14 App. to Opening Br. at A1008 (“In order the find Defendant guilty of dangerous crime against a child, you must find . . . [that] the child was less than 14 years of age at the time of the charged offense.”); Clark, 2021 WL 244335 , at *2. 7 Fifth Amendment, which provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]”15 The Double

2021Ct. Aug 20, 2020). -7- affords any protection beyond the federal Constitution.33 Thus, the Court must necessarily examine the Constitution of the United States before it can determine if Delaware protections go further.34 The Double Jeopardy Clauses in the Delaware and United States Constitutions appear in “virtually identical” terms,35 so this is a case where examination of the Delaware Constitution must necessarily be the final step. (11) Mr. Ryle posits that conviction and sentencing of an offense included in another offense charged in the same indictment implicates the multiplicity doctrin

2021Ct. Aug 20, 2020). -7- affords any protection beyond the federal Constitution.33 Thus, the Court must necessarily examine the Constitution of the United States before it can determine if Delaware protections go further.34 The Double Jeopardy Clauses in the Delaware and United States Constitutions appear in “virtually identical” terms,35 so this is a case where examination of the Delaware Constitution must necessarily be the final step. (11) Mr. Ryle posits that conviction and sentencing of an offense included in another offense charged in the same indictment implicates the multiplicity doctrin

2020C. § 4204(k)(1). 55 App. to Op. Br. at A254–55 (Sentencing Hearing). 56 Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 529 (Del. 2016) (quoting Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006)). 57 See U.S. Const. amend. 5 (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”); Del.

2020C. § 4204(k)(1). 55 App. to Op. Br. at A254–55 (Sentencing Hearing). 56 Morales v. State, 133 A.3d 527, 529 (Del. 2016) (quoting Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006)). 57 See U.S. Const. amend. 5 (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”); Del.

2020Mills, 201 A.3d at 1169 (“Because this is a pure statutory interpretation issue, the standard of review is effectively de novo.”) (citing Patrick v. State, 922 A.2d 415 , 2007 WL 773387, at *2 (Del. 2007) (TABLE)).

2020Mills, 201 A.3d at 1169 (“Because this is a pure statutory interpretation issue, the standard of review is effectively de novo.”) (citing Patrick v. State, 922 A.2d 415 , 2007 WL 773387, at *2 (Del. 2007) (TABLE)).

2019See Williams , 796 A.2d at 1286-87 (adopting a test for possession with intent to deliver cocaine based on whether " 'the possessions are sufficiently differentiated by time, location or intended purpose ' " and stating that "[t]his test consists of factors a court may use in determining, under the circumstances, whether two violations of same statute have occurred" (quoting Rashad v. Burt , 108 F.3d 677 , 681 (6th Cir. 1997) ); Feddiman , 558 A.2d at 288-89 (weighing the timing and location of separate acts of sexual assault to determine whether multiple counts of sexual assault were permissi

2008The court found that Carletti could be convicted for "each separate and distinct act," but "dissect[ing] a statute, apply[ing] a single act to the subparts, and permit[ing] multiple counts of the same statute based on one act violated the multiplicity doctrine. [3] Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 362 (Del. 1998). [4] Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 909 (Del. 2002). [5] State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992). [6] U.S. CONST. amend.

2008The court found that Carletti could be convicted for "each separate and distinct act," but "dissect[ing] a statute, apply[ing] a single act to the subparts, and permit[ing] multiple counts of the same statute based on one act violated the multiplicity doctrine. [3] Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 362 (Del. 1998). [4] Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 909 (Del. 2002). [5] State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992). [6] U.S. CONST. amend.

2008The court found that Carletti could be convicted for "each separate and distinct act," but "dissect[ing] a statute, apply[ing] a single act to the subparts, and permit[ing] multiple counts of the same statute based on one act violated the multiplicity doctrine. [3] Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 362 (Del. 1998). [4] Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 909 (Del. 2002). [5] State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992). [6] U.S. CONST. amend.