unambiguous rule in California

2020(Muggill, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 240 .) We said that the “settled interpretation” of section 16600 created an unambiguous rule: “This section invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor after completion of his employment . . . .” (Muggill, at pp. 243, 242).

2020(Id. at p. *15.) 4 4 Flynn, supra, 809 F.Supp.2d 1175 , the other case Salyers disagreed with, involved an employee who never became insured under a life insurance policy because he never completed his employer’s enrollment process and in fact cancelled his application; although premiums had been deducted from his paycheck prior to his cancellation, they were never sent to the insurer and were returned to the employee by the employer.

2020(Id. at p. *15.) 4 4 Flynn, supra, 809 F.Supp.2d 1175 , the other case Salyers disagreed with, involved an employee who never became insured under a life insurance policy because he never completed his employer’s enrollment process and in fact cancelled his application; although premiums had been deducted from his paycheck prior to his cancellation, they were never sent to the insurer and were returned to the employee by the employer.

2006In our earlier opinion, we dismissed Gursey's appeal, holding that the arbitration agreement contained an unambiguous waiver of appellate rights following arbitration, and that any ambiguity created by inconsistent references to contractual and judicial arbitration did not affect the parties' broad waiver of the right to appeal "any judgment" or "any order." ( Id. at p. 1110, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 695 .) The issue presented in Gursey's earlier appeal is not the issue presented in this case, and the decision provides no support for plaintiff's position here.

2006It is well-settled that cases are not authority for issues not considered. ( McDowell & Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs (1960) 54 Cal.2d 33, 38 , 4 Cal.Rptr. 176 , 351 P.2d 344 .) In any event and contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the fact that the retainer agreement in Pratt, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 specified that claims "`arising out of this agreement or the performance of services pursuant thereto'" shall be subject to binding arbitration does not reasonably tend to show that the new arbitration provision now before us was intended to apply solely to fees, not per

2006It is well-settled that cases are not authority for issues not considered. ( McDowell & Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs (1960) 54 Cal.2d 33, 38 , 4 Cal.Rptr. 176 , 351 P.2d 344 .) In any event and contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the fact that the retainer agreement in Pratt, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 specified that claims "`arising out of this agreement or the performance of services pursuant thereto'" shall be subject to binding arbitration does not reasonably tend to show that the new arbitration provision now before us was intended to apply solely to fees, not per

2006It is well-settled that cases are not authority for issues not considered. ( McDowell & Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs (1960) 54 Cal.2d 33, 38 , 4 Cal.Rptr. 176 , 351 P.2d 344 .) In any event and contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the fact that the retainer agreement in Pratt, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 specified that claims "`arising out of this agreement or the performance of services pursuant thereto'" shall be subject to binding arbitration does not reasonably tend to show that the new arbitration provision now before us was intended to apply solely to fees, not per

1999(See U.S. v. $150,000 in Currency (E.D.Va. 1988) 686 F.Supp. 133, 134 .) 15 In this situation, California law, in the form of Evidence Code section 300, furnishes the unambiguous rule by which we are constrained to decide the issue before us.

1999We see no reason to ignore the application of this statute simply because both probable cause in the federal arena and standing in the state arena have been said to be “predicate” (U.S. v. $150,000 in Currency, supra, 686 F.Supp. at p. 132 ) or “threshold” (People v. $241,600 United States Currency, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1107 ) determinations.

1999Nothing we have said raises an inconsistency between the forfeiture law and the Code of Civil Procedure. (§ 11488.5, subd. (c)(3).) Moreover, the unambiguous rule of Evidence Code section 300 must take precedence over the merely “instructive” (People v. $28,500 United States Currency, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 463 ) federal cases which address a concept, “probable cause,” that is not relevant under subdivision (g) of section 11488.4.

1999Finally, the notion that forfeiture statutes must be “ ‘strictly construed in favor of the persons against whom they are sought to be imposed’” (People v. $28,500 United States Currency, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 463 ) does not require the construction of a statute in a manner contrary to its clear language (see People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 622 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 , 927 P.2d 713 ] [rule of lenity does not apply where statute is not ambiguous), and, in any event, section 300 of the Evidence Code is not a part of the forfeiture law.

1999We see no reason to ignore the application of this statute simply because both probable cause in the federal arena and standing in the state arena have been said to be “predicate” (U.S. v. $150,000 in Currency, supra, 686 F.Supp. at p. 132 ) or “threshold” (People v. $241,600 United States Currency, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1107 ) determinations.

1998(See, e.g., Morales, supra, 85 F.3d at pp. 1389-1391; Siripongs v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 1308, 1317-1318 ; cf. Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 761-765 [for the same reason finding Dixon bar (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) inadequate for cases appealed prior to Harris].) The fate of post-Clark cases remains uncertain, although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’s discussion in Morales does not augur well: “Neither the Standards [Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions] themselves nor California cases construing those Standards, create an unamb

1998(See, e.g., Morales, supra, 85 F.3d at pp. 1389-1391; Siripongs v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 1308, 1317-1318 ; cf. Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 761-765 [for the same reason finding Dixon bar (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) inadequate for cases appealed prior to Harris].) The fate of post-Clark cases remains uncertain, although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’s discussion in Morales does not augur well: “Neither the Standards [Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions] themselves nor California cases construing those Standards, create an unamb

1998(See, e.g., Morales, supra, 85 F.3d at pp. 1389-1391; Siripongs v. Calderon (9th Cir.1994) 35 F.3d 1308, 1317-1318 ; cf. Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir.1997) 125 F.3d 757, 761-765 [for the same reason finding Dixon bar ( In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756 , 264 P.2d 513 ) inadequate for cases appealed prior to Harris]. ) The fate of post- Clark cases remains uncertain, although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussion in Morales does not augur well: "Neither the Standards [Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions] themselves nor California cases construing those Standards create an unambigu

1998(See, e.g., Morales, supra, 85 F.3d at pp. 1389-1391; Siripongs v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 1308, 1317-1318 ; cf. Fields v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 757, 761-765 [for the same reason finding Dixon bar (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756 [ 264 P.2d 513 ]) inadequate for cases appealed prior to Harris].) The fate of post-Clark cases remains uncertain, although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’s discussion in Morales does not augur well: “Neither the Standards [Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions] themselves nor California cases construing those Standards, create an unamb

1998Further, because the California Supreme Court does not provide reasons for its denials of petitions of habeas corpus on timeliness grounds, it is equally difficult to discern what criteria the state court applies when ruling on the timeliness of a petition filed beyond the ... 90 day period." ( Morales, supra, 85 F.3d at p. 1390 .) Although the standards provide that a habeas corpus petition should be filed "without substantial delay," "[n]either the Standards nor [case authority] established what amount of delay the court would consider `substantial,' nor did either set out criteria for deter

1998Further, because the California Supreme Court does not provide reasons for its denials of petitions of habeas corpus on timeliness grounds, it is equally difficult to discern what criteria the state court applies .when ruling on the timeliness of a petition filed beyond the . . . 90 day period.” (Morales, supra, 85 F.3d at p. 1390 .) Although the standards provide that a habeas corpus petition should be filed “without substantial delay,” “[njeither the Standards nor [case authority] established what amount of delay the court would consider ‘substantial,’ nor did either set out criteria for det