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8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanchez v. Herreragreen2 sentences2004Noting that we had given effect to an unambiguous clause providing that medical payments coverages could not be stacked in Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155 , 783 P.2d 465 (1989), we indicated that it may be possible to give effect to a truly unambiguous antistacking clause, provided it plainly notifies the insured that only one premium has been charged for one insurance coverage, that the coverage provides personal accident insurance that cannot be stacked regardless of the number of vehicles covered by the policy, and that the insured should bear this feature in mind when purchasing insurance 2004Noting that we had given effect to an unambiguous clause providing that medical payments coverages could not be stacked in Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155 , 783 P.2d 465 (1989), we indicated that it may be possible to give effect to a truly unambiguous antistacking clause, provided it plainly notifies the insured that only one premium has been charged for one insurance coverage, that the coverage provides personal accident insurance that cannot be stacked regardless of the number of vehicles covered by the policy, and that the insured should bear this feature in mind when purchasing insurance | 2 | 3 |
State v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2017See Majority Op. ¶¶ 11, 15; see also 19 State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-009, ¶ 8 , 149 N.M. 242 , 247 P.3d 1127 (recognizing 14 1 that interpretation of a Supreme Court rule is a question of law and the plain meaning 2 rule applies where the language of the rule is “clear and unambiguous” (internal 3 quotation marks and citation omitted)). 4 {20} The issue that concerns me is whether our Supreme Court simultaneously 5 intended to create a rule requiring the polling of the jury while also providing for 6 case-by-case exceptions to polling—where this Court then attempts to interpret 7 questions and 2017See Majority Op. ¶¶ 11, 15; see also 19 State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-009, ¶ 8 , 149 N.M. 242 , 247 P.3d 1127 (recognizing 14 1 that interpretation of a Supreme Court rule is a question of law and the plain meaning 2 rule applies where the language of the rule is “clear and unambiguous” (internal 3 quotation marks and citation omitted)). 4 {20} The issue that concerns me is whether our Supreme Court simultaneously 5 intended to create a rule requiring the polling of the jury while also providing for 6 case-by-case exceptions to polling—where this Court then attempts to interpret 7 questions and | 2 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Windsor Insurancegreen2 sentences2003Thus, exclusions in insurance policy coverage provisions that are clear and unambiguous and that do not conflict with public policy expressed by statute will be enforced.” (citation omitted)); see also Payne, 466 S.E.2d at 168 (“[P]ublic policy is satisfied when there is liability insurance sufficient ... to meet minimum requirements of our financial responsibility law.”); cf. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. at 133 , 879 P.2d at 765 (stating that an insurer can limit its stacking liability contractually through “a truly unambiguous antistacking clause” relating to uninsured motorist coverage (emphasis omi 2003Thus, exclusions in insurance policy coverage provisions that are clear and unambiguous and that do not conflict with public policy expressed by statute will be enforced.” (citation omitted)); see also Payne, 466 S.E.2d at 168 (“[P]ublic policy is satisfied when there is liability insurance sufficient ... to meet minimum requirements of our financial responsibility law.”); cf. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. at 133 , 879 P.2d at 765 (stating that an insurer can limit its stacking liability contractually through “a truly unambiguous antistacking clause” relating to uninsured motorist coverage (emphasis omi | 1 | 3 |
Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Societygreen2 sentences2018See Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 9 Soc., 2011-NMCA-094, ¶¶ 26-28, 49 , 150 N.M. 669 , 265 P.3d 720 (discussing 10 California cases that “support the view that an agent’s authority to bind a principal to 11 arbitration does not have to be specifically or separately granted” and holding, in 12 keeping with that view, that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motion 13 to compel arbitration where the person who signed the agreement containing the 14 arbitration clause had the authority to do so). 15 {18} Given that it is undisputed that Dr. Fries was authorized to 2018See Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 9 Soc., 2011-NMCA-094, ¶¶ 26-28, 49 , 150 N.M. 669 , 265 P.3d 720 (discussing 10 California cases that “support the view that an agent’s authority to bind a principal to 11 arbitration does not have to be specifically or separately granted” and holding, in 12 keeping with that view, that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motion 13 to compel arbitration where the person who signed the agreement containing the 14 arbitration clause had the authority to do so). 15 {18} Given that it is undisputed that Dr. Fries was authorized to | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Westongreen1 sentence2003Thus, exclusions in insurance policy coverage provisions that are clear and unambiguous and that do not conflict with public policy expressed by statute will be enforced.” (citation omitted)); see also Payne, 466 S.E.2d at 168 (“[P]ublic policy is satisfied when there is liability insurance sufficient ... to meet minimum requirements of our financial responsibility law.”); cf. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. at 133 , 879 P.2d at 765 (stating that an insurer can limit its stacking liability contractually through “a truly unambiguous antistacking clause” relating to uninsured motorist coverage (emphasis omi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeArmond v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Cf. DeArmond v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 2003-NMCA-148, ¶¶ 4 , 2 8-10, 23, 134 N.M. 630 (holding that where one party challenged the very existence 3 of an arbitration agreement and established an absence of proof that an agreement was 4 ever formed for lack of acceptance and mutual assent, the district court erred by 5 compelling arbitration without first resolving the factual dispute regarding formation). 6 We thus hold that the district court properly granted Makwa’s motion to compel 7 arbitration. 8 CONCLUSION 9 {19} For the foregoing reasons, we quash Highlands’ interlocutory appe 2018Cf. DeArmond v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 2003-NMCA-148, ¶¶ 4 , 2 8-10, 23, 134 N.M. 630 (holding that where one party challenged the very existence 3 of an arbitration agreement and established an absence of proof that an agreement was 4 ever formed for lack of acceptance and mutual assent, the district court erred by 5 compelling arbitration without first resolving the factual dispute regarding formation). 6 We thus hold that the district court properly granted Makwa’s motion to compel 7 arbitration. 8 CONCLUSION 9 {19} For the foregoing reasons, we quash Highlands’ interlocutory appe | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Romero v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance
green
2 sentences2010But as emphasized in our discussion of Pielhau in Romero, 2010-NMCA-024, ¶ 20 , 148 N.M. 97 , 230 P.3d 844 , “[t]he lack of a requirement that a policy contain UM/UIM coverage in a specific amount does not obviate the statute’s unambiguous requirement that insurers must offer UM/UIM coverage and that they must offer such coverage at a level equal to the liability limits of the policy.” (Emphasis added.) As in Romero, we conclude in this ease that Pielhau is not controlling. {13} We also acknowledge that our Supreme Court recently accepted certification from Progressive Northwestern Insurance C 2010But as emphasized in our discussion of Pielhau in Romero, 2010-NMCA-024, ¶ 20 , 148 N.M. 97 , 230 P.3d 844 , “[t]he lack of a requirement that a policy contain UM/UIM coverage in a specific amount does not obviate the statute’s unambiguous requirement that insurers must offer UM/UIM coverage and that they must offer such coverage at a level equal to the liability limits of the policy.” (Emphasis added.) As in Romero, we conclude in this ease that Pielhau is not controlling. {13} We also acknowledge that our Supreme Court recently accepted certification from Progressive Northwestern Insurance C | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Progressive Northwestern Insurance v. Weed Warrior Services
neutral
1 sentence2010But as emphasized in our discussion of Pielhau in Romero, 2010-NMCA-024, ¶ 20 , 148 N.M. 97 , 230 P.3d 844 , “[t]he lack of a requirement that a policy contain UM/UIM coverage in a specific amount does not obviate the statute’s unambiguous requirement that insurers must offer UM/UIM coverage and that they must offer such coverage at a level equal to the liability limits of the policy.” (Emphasis added.) As in Romero, we conclude in this ease that Pielhau is not controlling. {13} We also acknowledge that our Supreme Court recently accepted certification from Progressive Northwestern Insurance C | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Allstate Insurance v. Stone
green
2 sentences2003In Stone, the Court considered an anti-stacking clause to be “clear and unambiguous” although it held the clause to be in irreconcilable conflict with a provision purporting to grant stacking. 116 N.M. at 466-67 , 863 P.2d at 1087-88 . 2003In Stone, the Court considered an anti-stacking clause to be “clear and unambiguous” although it held the clause to be in irreconcilable conflict with a provision purporting to grant stacking. 116 N.M. at 466-67 , 863 P.2d at 1087-88 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2003To the extent the statement is considered dicta, we have been admonished to give such dicta “adequate deference and not disregard it summarily.” State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001 , ¶ 16, 130 N.M. 6 , 15 P.3d 1233 . {32} The Rodriguez Court pointed out that, in Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 160 , 783 P.2d 465, 470 (1989), it “gave effect to an unambiguous clause providing that medical payments coverages could not be stacked.” Rodriguez, 118 N.M. at 133 , 879 P.2d at 765 . 2003To the extent the statement is considered dicta, we have been admonished to give such dicta “adequate deference and not disregard it summarily.” State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001 , ¶ 16, 130 N.M. 6 , 15 P.3d 1233 . {32} The Rodriguez Court pointed out that, in Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 160 , 783 P.2d 465, 470 (1989), it “gave effect to an unambiguous clause providing that medical payments coverages could not be stacked.” Rodriguez, 118 N.M. at 133 , 879 P.2d at 765 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Insurance
green
2 sentences1994Despite the strength of the judicial policy mentioned at the beginning of this opinion and as discussed in, e.g., Jimenez, 107 N.M. at 324-26 , 757 P.2d at 794-96 , it may be possible to give effect to a truly unambiguous antistacking clause, provided it plainly notifies the insured that only one premium has been charged for one insurance coverage, that the coverage provides personal accident insurance that cannot be stacked regardless of the number of vehicles covered by the policy, and that the insured should bear this feature in mind when purchasing insurance. 1994Despite the strength of the judicial policy mentioned at the beginning of this opinion and as discussed in, e.g., Jimenez, 107 N.M. at 324-26 , 757 P.2d at 794-96 , it may be possible to give effect to a truly unambiguous antistacking clause, provided it plainly notifies the insured that only one premium has been charged for one insurance coverage, that the coverage provides personal accident insurance that cannot be stacked regardless of the number of vehicles covered by the policy, and that the insured should bear this feature in mind when purchasing insurance. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.