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6 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ramunno v. Cawleygreen1 sentence2020Delaware courts follow settled principles of statutory interpretation, which require giving effect to the plain language of an unambiguous rule or statute.28 When a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory interpretation is not needed as courts “have no authority to vary the terms . . . or ignore mandatory provisions.”29 A statute only is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”30 Rule 23 state | 1 | 1 |
Pfeffer v. Redstonegreen1 sentence2020Delaware courts follow settled principles of statutory interpretation, which require giving effect to the plain language of an unambiguous rule or statute.28 When a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory interpretation is not needed as courts “have no authority to vary the terms . . . or ignore mandatory provisions.”29 A statute only is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”30 Rule 23 state | 1 | 1 |
National Data Payment Systems, Inc v. Meridian Bank Corestates Financial Corporationgreen1 sentence2020App’x at 728 (holding that bankruptcy court, even as court of equity, could not “use its equitable power . . . to ignore the parties’ contractual agreements” where the parties did not agree to extend a deadline); Vintage Rodeo, 2019 WL 1223026 , at *3 (declining to avoid the “startling conclusion” that a party missed a firm deadline by one day despite “having vigorously negotiated” the provision); Nat’l Data, 212 F.3d at 855 (noting a firm deadline was the product of “substantial negotiations” and declining to excuse a party’s “failure to focus on this unambiguous clause in the contract”). 234 | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Cahillgreen1 sentence2020Delaware courts follow settled principles of statutory interpretation, which require giving effect to the plain language of an unambiguous rule or statute.28 When a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory interpretation is not needed as courts “have no authority to vary the terms . . . or ignore mandatory provisions.”29 A statute only is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”30 Rule 23 state | 1 | 1 |
Ovens v. Danberggreen1 sentence2020Delaware courts follow settled principles of statutory interpretation, which require giving effect to the plain language of an unambiguous rule or statute.28 When a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory interpretation is not needed as courts “have no authority to vary the terms . . . or ignore mandatory provisions.”29 A statute only is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”30 Rule 23 state | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Delaware courts follow settled principles of statutory interpretation, which require giving effect to the plain language of an unambiguous rule or statute.28 When a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory interpretation is not needed as courts “have no authority to vary the terms . . . or ignore mandatory provisions.”29 A statute only is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”30 Rule 23 state | 1 | 1 |
Board of Adjustment of Sussex County v. Verleysengreen1 sentence2020Delaware courts follow settled principles of statutory interpretation, which require giving effect to the plain language of an unambiguous rule or statute.28 When a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory interpretation is not needed as courts “have no authority to vary the terms . . . or ignore mandatory provisions.”29 A statute only is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”30 Rule 23 state | 1 | 1 |
Norton v. K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P.green1 sentence2020If the SMP Agreement’s drafters wished to exempt members from the fiduciary duty of loyalty, they could do so only with express disclaimer language, not “by implication.”314 Plaintiffs have alleged member fiduciaries took a “bad faith action to injure [SMP] for [their] own personal advantage.”315 This allegation implicates the “core aspect of the duty of loyalty,” which the “sole discretion” controller’s “sole discretion” approval right was inconsistent with the duties a controlling shareholder would owe under corporate law principles). 311 CelestialRX, 2017 WL 416990 , at *18 (interpreting si | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 , 154–55 (Del. 1996) (stating the corporate opportunity doctrine applies when a fiduciary usurps an opportunity within the corporation’s line of business, that the corporation is financially able to exploit, in which 38 Accordingly, as already stated here, it is not reasonably conceivable that Cookeville Corridor’s acquisition of the Preferred Interest, standing alone, constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ortiz v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kennerly v. State
green
2 sentences1995Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). 1995Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pajewski v. Perry
green
2 sentences1995Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). 1995Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Cates
green
2 sentences1995Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). 1995Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.