Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ducey v. Argo Sales Co.green2 sentences2018BAKER, J., Dissenting Sufficiently regular use of a personal vehicle for travel to perform employment duties, where it confers a substantial incidental benefit on an employer, can properly support application of the vehicle-use exception even if the vehicle was not required for such duties "at the time of the accident," as the majority today holds. ( Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297 , 302-303, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 718 [evidence that "[d]uring 2005, the year of the accident, [the employee] visited customer sites [using his own car only] five times or fewer" is sufficient to support a conclus 2018BAKER, J., Dissenting Sufficiently regular use of a personal vehicle for travel to perform employment duties, where it confers a substantial incidental benefit on an employer, can properly support application of the vehicle-use exception even if the vehicle was not required for such duties "at the time of the accident," as the majority today holds. ( Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297 , 302-303, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 718 [evidence that "[d]uring 2005, the year of the accident, [the employee] visited customer sites [using his own car only] five times or fewer" is sufficient to support a conclus | 2 | 2 |
Lobo v. Tamcogreen2 sentences2018BAKER, J., Dissenting Sufficiently regular use of a personal vehicle for travel to perform employment duties, where it confers a substantial incidental benefit on an employer, can properly support application of the vehicle-use exception even if the vehicle was not required for such duties "at the time of the accident," as the majority today holds. ( Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297 , 302-303, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 718 [evidence that "[d]uring 2005, the year of the accident, [the employee] visited customer sites [using his own car only] five times or fewer" is sufficient to support a conclus 2018BAKER, J., Dissenting Sufficiently regular use of a personal vehicle for travel to perform employment duties, where it confers a substantial incidental benefit on an employer, can properly support application of the vehicle-use exception even if the vehicle was not required for such duties "at the time of the accident," as the majority today holds. ( Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297 , 302-303, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 718 [evidence that "[d]uring 2005, the year of the accident, [the employee] visited customer sites [using his own car only] five times or fewer" is sufficient to support a conclus | 1 | 2 |
Yu Qin Zhu v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.green2 sentences2018Appeals Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1031 , 1041, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 ["[employee's] transit bestowed a direct benefit on [employer], as [employer] knew that [employee] had to transit between homes to service more than one home a day"]; compare, e.g., Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne Internat. 2018Appeals Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1031 , 1041, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 ["[employee's] transit bestowed a direct benefit on [employer], as [employer] knew that [employee] had to transit between homes to service more than one home a day"]; compare, e.g., Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne Internat. | 1 | 2 |
Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne Internat. Drilling Co. CA5green2 sentences2020Appellants suggest there is a variation of the vehicle use exception which focuses on whether the employer derives an incidental benefit from the employee’s use of the vehicle.2 We question whether this is an independent basis for the exception (see Pierson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 625 [phrase “incidental benefit exception” is used as the equivalent of the required- vehicle exception]), rather than merely a factor to be considered 2 Kaiser argues appellants did not raise the incidental benefit argument in the trial court. 2020Appellants suggest there is a variation of the vehicle use exception which focuses on whether the employer derives an incidental benefit from the employee’s use of the vehicle.2 We question whether this is an independent basis for the exception (see Pierson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 625 [phrase “incidental benefit exception” is used as the equivalent of the required- vehicle exception]), rather than merely a factor to be considered 2 Kaiser argues appellants did not raise the incidental benefit argument in the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Burl D. Pilgrim and Martha Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Company, Inc.green1 sentence2016(Cf. Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., Inc. (5th Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 982, 986-987 [jury's verdict overturned; no respondeat superior liability for employer where employer and employee testified the employer did not control the transport of the drilling crew, despite payment of a per diem].) 4 Our division of the vehicle-use exception for purposes of this summary judgment motion should not be read as implying that this division is required, or even helpful, when presenting the scope of employment issue to a jury. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boynton v. McKales
green
2 sentences2016The broad formulation of the vehicle-use exception in CACI No. 3725 correctly informs the jury that the issue of ultimate fact—namely, the scope of employment—may be proven in different ways. 5 A slightly longer description of the special errand exception was provided in Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777 [ 294 P.2d 733 ] (McKales): “If the employee is not simply on his way from his home to his normal place of work or returning from said place to his home for his own purpose, but is coming from his home or returning to it on a special errand either as part of his regular' duties or a 2016The broad formulation of the vehicle-use exception in CACI No. 3725 correctly informs the jury that the issue of ultimate fact—namely, the scope of employment—may be proven in different ways. 5 A slightly longer description of the special errand exception was provided in Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777 [ 294 P.2d 733 ] (McKales): “If the employee is not simply on his way from his home to his normal place of work or returning from said place to his home for his own purpose, but is coming from his home or returning to it on a special errand either as part of his regular' duties or a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Gittelson v. McKnight
neutral
1 sentence1987Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1926) 76 Cal.App. 165 [ 243 P. 892 ].) Another exception to the going-and-coming rule recognized in both tort and workers’ compensation cases is the vehicle-use exception. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Sun Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
neutral
1 sentence1987Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1926) 76 Cal.App. 165 [ 243 P. 892 ].) Another exception to the going-and-coming rule recognized in both tort and workers’ compensation cases is the vehicle-use exception. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.