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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 464 [“a more specific statute controls over a more general one”]; Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1118, 1148 [“This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general.”].) The more specific provisions of Assembly Bill No. 1X 26, sections 34161 and 34171, subdivision (d)(2) taken together establish that the parking agreement is unenforceable. 2012(Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 464 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 , 940 P.2d 311 ] [“a more specific statute controls over a more general one”]; Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1118, 1148 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 , 842 P.2d 48 ] [“This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general.”].) This is particularly persuasive given the absence of any evidence the Legislature intended the 1994 and 2001 enactments to apply to international commercial arbitrations. c. | 2 | 2 |
Lake v. Reedgreen2 sentences2015(Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 464 [“a more specific statute controls over a more general one”]; Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1118, 1148 [“This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general.”].) The more specific provisions of Assembly Bill No. 1X 26, sections 34161 and 34171, subdivision (d)(2) taken together establish that the parking agreement is unenforceable. 2012(Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 464 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 , 940 P.2d 311 ] [“a more specific statute controls over a more general one”]; Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1118, 1148 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 , 842 P.2d 48 ] [“This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general.”].) This is particularly persuasive given the absence of any evidence the Legislature intended the 1994 and 2001 enactments to apply to international commercial arbitrations. c. | 2 | 2 |
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimagreen2 sentences2009This violates the fundamental rule that the moving papers shall respond to the “material facts” of the complaint. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) “The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 604-605 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ].) “The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381 2009This violates the fundamental rule that the moving papers shall respond to the “material facts” of the complaint. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) “The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 604-605 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ].) “The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381 | 1 | 1 |
Andalon v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009This violates the fundamental rule that the moving papers shall respond to the “material facts” of the complaint. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) “The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 604-605 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ].) “The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381 2009This violates the fundamental rule that the moving papers shall respond to the “material facts” of the complaint. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) “The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 604-605 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ].) “The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tannergreen2 sentences1992This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general. (2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) ง 51.02, p. 121.) As this court recently reiterated, "`A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision, even though the general provision standing alone would be broad enough to include the subject to which the specific provision relates.'" ( Woods v. Young, supra, 53 Cal.3d 315, 325 , quoting People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 521 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ].) I 1992This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general. (2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) ง 51.02, p. 121.) As this court recently reiterated, "`A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision, even though the general provision standing alone would be broad enough to include the subject to which the specific provision relates.'" ( Woods v. Young, supra, 53 Cal.3d 315, 325 , quoting People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 521 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ].) I | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tracy First v. City of Tracy
green
1 sentence2014(Tracy First v. City of Tracy (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 912, 934-935 .) Failure to properly lay out the evidence forfeits the substantial evidence challenge. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Woods v. Young
green
2 sentences1992This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general. (2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) § 51.02, p. 121.) As this court recently reiterated, “ ‘A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision, even though the general provision standing alone would be broad enough to include the subject to which the specific provision relates.’” (Woods v. Young, supra, 53 Cal.3d 315, 325 , quoting People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 521 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ].) In 1992This violates the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict the more specific statute controls over the more general. (2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) ง 51.02, p. 121.) As this court recently reiterated, "`A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision, even though the general provision standing alone would be broad enough to include the subject to which the specific provision relates.'" ( Woods v. Young, supra, 53 Cal.3d 315, 325 , quoting People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 521 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ].) I | 1 | 1992–1992 |