youth-related mitigating factors in California

2022Guerrero is entitled to a sentencing decision made in the exercise of informed discretion by the sentencing court, and we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would not be different if she were present at the 1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated. 2 hearing and she and her counsel had a fair opportunity to provide information concerning the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 (Gutierrez).

2022(See Guerrero I, at p. 20; see also Gutierrez, at p. 1390 [when sentencing a juvenile homicide offender under section 190.5, subdivision (b), the trial court “must consider all relevant evidence bearing on the ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ discussed in Miller and how those attributes ‘diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders’”].) 4 We reached the same conclusion in People v. Ochoa mitigating factors that may diminish a juvenile’s culpability and suggest a capacity for reform. 4 The youth-related mitigating factors identified in Mille

2022Defense counsel stated he would “rest on that, except I would like to add a couple of things.” Guerrero’s counsel emphasized some of the youth-related mitigating factors he believed weighed in Guerrero’s favor, including her youth and susceptibility to 8 The court stayed the fines, fees and assessments it had previously imposed. 9 Individuals convicted of a controlling offense committed before the person was 18 years old and sentenced to life without parole are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 25th year of incarceration, transforming a life without parole sentence to on

2020(See People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 .) However, that legislation did not alter the section 190.3 requirement, as interpreted in Gutierrez, requiring a sentencing court to consider the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller before imposing life without parole, rather than a 25-year-to-life sentence on a youth offender under section 190.5, subdivision (b).

2022Guerrero is entitled to a sentencing decision made in the exercise of informed discretion by the sentencing court, and we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would not be different if she were present at the 1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated. 2 hearing and she and her counsel had a fair opportunity to provide information concerning the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 (Gutierrez).

2022Guerrero and the People agree, and the record is clear that, notwithstanding our directions, the trial court failed to consider the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller, supra, 10 567 U.S. 460 .

2022Proc., § 170.1, subd. (c); see Peracchi v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1262 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, and the matter remanded for the court to conduct a new sentencing hearing in which Guerrero is present (unless Guerrero waives her presence in accordance with section 1193) and to consider the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 when selecting the appropriate sentence under section 190.5, subdivision (b).

2020Where the Record Is Ambiguous, the Trial Court’s Understanding of Its Discretion Cannot Be Presumed The People alternatively argue the trial court did consider the youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing or, more precisely, that we must presume it did so on this “silent record.” (See People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 867 [“if the record is silent” on the court’s awareness of its discretionary authority in sentencing, we must presume the court understood the scope of its discretion and affirm]; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527 [“in light of the presumption on a

2020Where the Record Is Ambiguous, the Trial Court’s Understanding of Its Discretion Cannot Be Presumed The People alternatively argue the trial court did consider the youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing or, more precisely, that we must presume it did so on this “silent record.” (See People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 867 [“if the record is silent” on the court’s awareness of its discretionary authority in sentencing, we must presume the court understood the scope of its discretion and affirm]; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527 [“in light of the presumption on a