Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
43 California opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Weingreen2 sentences1963People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [ 326 P.2d 457 ], says • '“The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence' and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham. ’ ’! . 1963People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [ 326 P.2d 457 ], says • '“The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence' and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham. ’ ’! . | 15 | 18 |
Haraguchi v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566 [discretion is abused when the court exceeds the bounds of reason]; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 712 [arbitrary and capricious test for an abuse of discretion].) B. 2025(Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566 [discretion is abused when the court exceeds the bounds of reason]; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 712 [arbitrary and capricious test for an abuse of discretion].) B. | 2 | 2 |
Denham v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566 [discretion is abused when the court exceeds the bounds of reason]; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 712 [arbitrary and capricious test for an abuse of discretion].) B. 2025(Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566 [discretion is abused when the court exceeds the bounds of reason]; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 712 [arbitrary and capricious test for an abuse of discretion].) B. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Carrerasgreen2 sentences1970“The handling of the defense will not be declared inadequate merely because of the failure to call certain witnesses.” (People v. Carreras (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 807, 810 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 436 ].) Appellate courts do not usually second-guess trial counsel’s tactical choices. 1970“The handling of the defense will not be declared inadequate merely because of the failure to call certain witnesses.” (People v. Carreras (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 807, 810 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 436 ].) Appellate courts do not usually second-guess trial counsel’s tactical choices. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Fordgreen2 sentences1963In People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [ 326 P.2d 457 ], the court held that the handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice would be declared inadequate only “in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham. ’ ” In the subsequent case of People v. Ford (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 905, 914 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 758 ], the rule of the Wein case was held to apply also to counsel appointed for the accused. 1963In People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [ 326 P.2d 457 ], the court held that the handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice would be declared inadequate only “in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham. ’ ” In the subsequent case of People v. Ford (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 905, 914 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 758 ], the rule of the Wein case was held to apply also to counsel appointed for the accused. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Reddengreen2 sentences1962“The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ [Citations.]’’ (People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [ 326 P.2d 457 ] ; see also People v. Redden, 187 Cal.App.2d 275, 279 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 368 ].) We feel that the above test of the inadequacy of counsel applies to counsel appointed for the accused as well as to counsel of the accused’s own choice. 1962“The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ [Citations.]’’ (People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [ 326 P.2d 457 ] ; see also People v. Redden, 187 Cal.App.2d 275, 279 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 368 ].) We feel that the above test of the inadequacy of counsel applies to counsel appointed for the accused as well as to counsel of the accused’s own choice. | 2 | 2 |
Marion Taylor v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1958(U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a “farce or a sham.” (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. 1958(U. S. Const., 14th Amend., §1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert, denied, 353 U. S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Schnecklothgreen2 sentences1958(U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a “farce or a sham.” (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. 1958(U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a “farce or a sham.” (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Axilrod v. Minnesotagreen2 sentences1958(U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a “farce or a sham.” (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. 1958(U. S. Const., 14th Amend., §1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert, denied, 353 U. S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ricksgreen2 sentences1963(People v. Ricks, 161 Cal.App.2d 674 [ 327 P.2d 209 ].) Appellant also claims he was denied a speedy trial. 1963(People v. Ricks, 161 Cal.App.2d 674 [ 327 P.2d 209 ].) Appellant also claims he was denied a speedy trial. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Robillardgreen2 sentences1963The controlling rule in a matter of this kind is stated by the Supreme Court in People v. Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 167 , 358 P.2d 295 ], at page 97: “The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a farce or a sham. 1963The controlling rule in a matter of this kind is stated by the Supreme Court in People v. Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 167 , 358 P.2d 295 ], at page 97: “The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a farce or a sham. | 1 | 2 |
Shin v. Ahngreen1 sentence2023(See Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12 .) Best Rest’s brief is also very carefully written. | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence2007With respect to the area of the living room floor that had ‘given way,’ DeLaCruz warned that ‘[ejxtreme caution should be exercised during the opening of the floor as this section of the substructure is [sic\ imminent danger of collapse.’ (Italics added.)” (Jordan I, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210, fn. 2 .) 4 We held in Jordan I that under the policy, the term “entire collapse” meant an actual collapse, not an imminent one. | 1 | 1 |
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurancegreen2 sentences2004Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 580-581, fn. 10 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 510 P.2d 1032 ].) “The claims file is a unique, contemporaneously prepared history of the company’s handling of the claim; in an action [for bad faith] the need for the information in the file is not only substantial but overwhelming.” (Reavis v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. 2004Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 580-581, fn. 10 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 510 P.2d 1032 ].) “The claims file is a unique, contemporaneously prepared history of the company’s handling of the claim; in an action [for bad faith] the need for the information in the file is not only substantial but overwhelming.” (Reavis v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. | 1 | 1 |
D'AMICO v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1994(D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 *1460 P.2d 10].) Therefore, this court’s task is to determine whether the trial court properly held the insurer’s handling of the claim was reasonable, regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion. 1994(D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 *1460 P.2d 10].) Therefore, this court’s task is to determine whether the trial court properly held the insurer’s handling of the claim was reasonable, regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion. | 1 | 1 |
Rizzi v. Blue Cross of Southern Californiagreen2 sentences1989California (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 380, 392-396 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 541 ].) By his first amended complaint, appellant Charles Lambert sought, inter alia, damages against respondent Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (Pacific Mutual), among other defendants, alleging fraud and bad faith in the handling of his claim for benefits under his stepfather’s employer’s group insurance plan. 1989California (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 380, 392-396 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 541 ].) By his first amended complaint, appellant Charles Lambert sought, inter alia, damages against respondent Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (Pacific Mutual), among other defendants, alleging fraud and bad faith in the handling of his claim for benefits under his stepfather’s employer’s group insurance plan. | 1 | 1 |
| Bird v. American Surety Co. of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hopkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Barrerasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Comstockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wrengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dupreegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Moselygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Atchleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Abramsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2023The court held that the claim was one on the policy, which included actions “grounded upon a failure to pay policy benefits.” And the court added, “one-year limitations provisions have been broadly applied to both contract and tort actions, including claims based on allegations relating to the handling of a claim or the manner in which it was investigated, adjusted, or processed.” (Id., at pp. 1414−1415, citing Velasquez, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 .) And as Velasquez itself noted, after surveying California law, “where [a] bad faith action is based on allegations relating to the handling 2023The court held that the claim was one on the policy, which included actions “grounded upon a failure to pay policy benefits.” And the court added, “one-year limitations provisions have been broadly applied to both contract and tort actions, including claims based on allegations relating to the handling of a claim or the manner in which it was investigated, adjusted, or processed.” (Id., at pp. 1414−1415, citing Velasquez, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 .) And as Velasquez itself noted, after surveying California law, “where [a] bad faith action is based on allegations relating to the handling | 2 | 1991–2023 |
United States Ex Rel. Feeley v. Ragen
green
2 sentences1958Feeley v. Ragen [7th Cir.], 166 F.2d 976, 980-981 ; Hendrickson v. Overlade [N.D. 1958Feeley v. Ragen [7th Cir.] 166 F.2d 976, 980-981 ; Hendrickson v. Overlade [N.D. | 2 | 1958–1958 |
Charles H. Lunce and John R. Reynolds v. J. Ellis Overlade, Warden of the Indiana State Prison
green
2 sentences1958(U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare eases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a “farce or a sham.” (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. 1958(U. S. Const., 14th Amend., §1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused’s own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ (Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110 ; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414 , cert, denied, 353 U. S. 938 [ 77 S.Ct. 817 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 ]; United States ex rel. | 2 | 1958–1958 |
People v. Greg F.
green
1 sentence2025Policy considerations “In interpreting a statute, courts are obligated to ‘adopt a common sense construction over one leading to mischief or absurdity.’ [Citation.]” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 410 .) Here, the superior court premised its refusal to allow S.C. to amend the factual allegations of the complaint pursuant to section 473, subdivision (a)(1) on the certificates-of-merit requirement’s function as “a procedural safeguard against unmeritorious cases.” The court’s handling of this requirement not only lacks support in the statutory text but also produces “absurd and unreasonab | 1 | 2025–2025 |
PD Doe v. San Diego-Imperial Council
green
1 sentence2025Policy considerations “In interpreting a statute, courts are obligated to ‘adopt a common sense construction over one leading to mischief or absurdity.’ [Citation.]” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 410 .) Here, the superior court premised its refusal to allow S.C. to amend the factual allegations of the complaint pursuant to section 473, subdivision (a)(1) on the certificates-of-merit requirement’s function as “a procedural safeguard against unmeritorious cases.” The court’s handling of this requirement not only lacks support in the statutory text but also produces “absurd and unreasonab | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 36 .) For this reason, we have not addressed the parties’ arguments regarding the handling of the claim. 17 a declaration that contradicts its prior deposition testimony. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Velasquez v. Truck Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2023The court held that the claim was one on the policy, which included actions “grounded upon a failure to pay policy benefits.” And the court added, “one-year limitations provisions have been broadly applied to both contract and tort actions, including claims based on allegations relating to the handling of a claim or the manner in which it was investigated, adjusted, or processed.” (Id., at pp. 1414−1415, citing Velasquez, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 .) And as Velasquez itself noted, after surveying California law, “where [a] bad faith action is based on allegations relating to the handling 2023The court held that the claim was one on the policy, which included actions “grounded upon a failure to pay policy benefits.” And the court added, “one-year limitations provisions have been broadly applied to both contract and tort actions, including claims based on allegations relating to the handling of a claim or the manner in which it was investigated, adjusted, or processed.” (Id., at pp. 1414−1415, citing Velasquez, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 .) And as Velasquez itself noted, after surveying California law, “where [a] bad faith action is based on allegations relating to the handling | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Weinberg v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America
green
1 sentence2012(Weinberg, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087 .) Weinberg disagreed, stating: “ ‘It certainly can be expected that when a husband or wife is injured in an uninsured motorist accident and the claim for that accident is wrongfully denied by their insurer, both husband and wife will incur expenses not necessarily limited to attorney fees, and that each may suffer varying degrees of emotional distress.’ ” (Ibid.) Since the husband and wife “did not have a single, indivisible injury,” the defendant’s unapportioned joint offer was invalid and it could not recover expert witness fees under section 998 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Reavis v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance
green
1 sentence2004Co. (S.D.Cal. 1987) 117 F.R.D. 160, 164 .) The importance of claims files is underscored by regulations promulgated by the California Insurance Commissioner that require all insurance companies investigate each filed claim, and maintain claims files containing all documents, notes and work papers pertaining to each claim. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cancino v. Farmers Insurance Group
green
1 sentence1999That case involved an insurance company’s alleged failure to deal “fairly and in good faith” with a party purporting to be both an insured and a claimant under an uninsured motorist provision of a liability policy issued to another party. ( 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 337 .) The complaint had alleged that the claimant/plaintiff “ ‘was an express “insured” under the terms and conditions of said insurance policy,’ by virtue of the fact that he ‘was loading’ the ‘insured’ ‘motor vehicle’ at the time he was struck by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist.” (Ibid.) The main issue in Cancino was whe | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
green
1 sentence1996(Id. at pp. 1099-1100.) In dissent, Justice McDaniel relied on Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d 654 , to argue that the employee plaintiff was challenging the employer’s drug testing policy to vindicate his personal interests, not those of the public and, thus, not could not state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. ( Semore, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1107-1110.) Indeed, the dissenting justice observed, “[I]t could reasonably be argued that employees who refuse to participate in drug testing do so in derogation of the public interest, and employe | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lawrence v. Western Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1991Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 319 ], and Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 530 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 565 ], hold that where the bad faith action is based on allegations relating to the handling of a claim or the manner in which it is processed, it is an action “on the policy” and, therefore, subject to the limitations bar. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Estate of Coate
green
2 sentences1983Recognizing the body of law that interprets insurance contracts more favorably to insureds when a conflict arises, (e.g., Estate of Coate (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 982 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]; Healy Tibbits Constr. 1983Recognizing the body of law that interprets insurance contracts more favorably to insureds when a conflict arises, (e.g., Estate of Coate (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 982 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]; Healy Tibbits Constr. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Glacier General Assurance Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1980Assurance Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 836 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 435 ], argues that any communication between the insurer and the attorney which concerns the handling of the claim against the insured is necessarily a “matter of common interest,” giving rise to the application of section 962. 1980Assurance Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 836 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 435 ], argues that any communication between the insurer and the attorney which concerns the handling of the claim against the insured is necessarily a “matter of common interest,” giving rise to the application of section 962. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Cohn v. Smith green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Hopkins neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| People v. Morton green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Ynostroza green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Kirk green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Gilbert green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Lennox green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Miller green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Dushane v. Benedict green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.