exception to municipal immunity in Connecticut

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2009Only the first exception is at issue in this appeal. 4 The principal cases cited by the trial court were Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 108-10 , 931 A.2d 859 (2007); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759, 764 , 873 A.2d 175 (2005); Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998); and Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 5 The trial court also considered, but rejected, the possibility that the plaintiff could recover under the exception to municipal immunity for certain governmental proprietary acts.

2002The Connecticut Supreme Court has never extended this exception to municipal immunity for the negligent performance of discretionary duties to harms other than physical injury except where a statute specifically required the municipality to protect property in a defined situation Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 524-25 (1979) (Conn. Gen.

2001In Evon v. Andrews , supra, 211 Conn. 508 , however, the Supreme Court held that this exception to municipal immunity did not apply.

2001There, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs, "possible victims of an unspecified fire that may occur at some unspecified time in the future" were not a group of "identifiable persons" within the meaning of Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 153-54 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).

2001There, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs, "possible victims of an unspecified fire that may occur at some unspecified time in the future" were not a group of "identifiable persons" within the meaning of Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 153-54 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).

2000Section 52-557n exempting municipalities where there is malice or wilful misconduct, Evon v. Andrews, supra, contains an exception to municipal immunity as described.

2000The plaintiff has stated a cause of action in her allegations under either or both of the two exceptions cited in Evon v. Andrews, supra. The Court is required to view the motion in a manner most CT Page 11999 favorable to the non moving party.

1994In King v. Board of Education, 203 Conn. 324 , 326 1987) our Supreme Court stated: [T]he legislature intended to make indemnification available to aboard of education employee for losses sustained from claims or suits for damages, injunctive relief or both, resulting from any act of the employee performed in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of employment or under the direction of such board . . . .