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5 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rinaldi
green
2 sentences2009"A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry." State v. Burney, 288 Conn. 548, 565 , 954 A.2d 793 (2008). "[T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 355 , 599 A.2d 1 (1991). 2009"A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry." State v. Burney, 288 Conn. 548, 565 , 954 A.2d 793 (2008). "[T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 355 , 599 A.2d 1 (1991). | 3 | 2008–2009 |
STRANO v. Commissioner of Correction
green
1 sentence2015These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jur[ors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provides may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the [opposing party], having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680, 696 , 981 A. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Perez v. D AND L TRACTOR TRAILER SCHOOL
green
2 sentences2015These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jur[ors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provides may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the [opposing party], having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680, 696 , 981 A. 2015These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jur[ors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provides may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the [opposing party], having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680, 696 , 981 A. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. FOURTIN
green
1 sentence2015These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jur[ors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provides may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the [opposing party], having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680, 696 , 981 A. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2010This is so, he contends, because the increase from one year to three years in duration of suspension suggests “serious bases for the suspensions which was highly likely to be interpreted by the jury as alcohol related.” “A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry. . . . [T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done.” (Citation omitte 2010This is so, he contends, because the increase from one year to three years in duration of suspension suggests “serious bases for the suspensions which was highly likely to be interpreted by the jury as alcohol related.” “A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry. . . . [T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done.” (Citation omitte | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Garcia
green
1 sentence2010This is so, he contends, because the increase from one year to three years in duration of suspension suggests “serious bases for the suspensions which was highly likely to be interpreted by the jury as alcohol related.” “A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry. . . . [T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done.” (Citation omitte | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction
green
1 sentence2010This is so, he contends, because the increase from one year to three years in duration of suspension suggests “serious bases for the suspensions which was highly likely to be interpreted by the jury as alcohol related.” “A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry. . . . [T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done.” (Citation omitte | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Burney
green
2 sentences2009"A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry." State v. Burney, 288 Conn. 548, 565 , 954 A.2d 793 (2008). "[T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 355 , 599 A.2d 1 (1991). 2009"A determination regarding undue prejudice is a highly fact and context-specific inquiry." State v. Burney, 288 Conn. 548, 565 , 954 A.2d 793 (2008). "[T]he determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and is subject to reversal only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 355 , 599 A.2d 1 (1991). | 1 | 2009–2009 |