Charles William Proffitt v. Louie L. Wainwright, Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Offender Rehab., 706 F.2d 311 (11th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Charles William Proffitt v. Louie L. Wainwright, Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Offender Rehab., 706 F.2d 311 (11th Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases · …necessarily limited to the facts of the case before us, ✓
100 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Askari Abdullah Muhammad v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (ca11, 2013-09-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Askari Abdullah Muhammad v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (5×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
The majority insists that this conclusion in Proffitt was merely dicta and that by limiting its holding, in a subsequent addendum to the opinion, to cases involving the admission of psychiatric reports, this court clarified that it did not create a categorical bar to hearsay at capital sentencing hearings. 3 See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Askari Abdullah Muhammad v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
The majority insists that this conclusion in Proffitt was merely dicta and that by limiting its holding, in a subsequent addendum to the opinion, to cases involving the admission of psychiatric reports, this court clarified that it did not create a categorical bar to hearsay at capital sentencing hearings. 3 See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alvin Mercer, Jr. v. State
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Although Mercer is correct in contending that an attorney cannot waive 12 a defendant’s presence at trial, see Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Circ. 1983), we again note that the hearing on the motion to recuse was not a trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alvin Mercer, Jr. v. State
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Although Mercer is correct in contending that an attorney cannot waive a defendant‘s presence at trial, see Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Circ. 1983), we again note that the hearing on the motion to recuse was not a trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Fields (2×)
5th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
In a footnote in Proffitt, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "Our decision that the right of cross-examination of adverse witnesses is extended to capital sentencing proceedings is necessarily limited to the facts of the case before us, involving psychiatric reports." 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir. 1983) (on petition for rehearing).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fugate v. Commonwealth (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ky. · 2001 · confidence medium
Within ten (10) days of that time, the court shall hold another hearing to determine whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial. (2) If the court finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial but there is no substantial probability he will attain competency in the foreseeable future, it shall conduct an involuntary hospitalization proceeding under KRS Chapter 202A or 202B. (emphasis added). [13] Majority Opinion at 62 S.W.3d 15, 18 (2001) ("Appellant does not contest the accuracy of this statement and does not claim that his attorney was acting without authorization."). [14] See…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) George Earl Larson v. Robert Tansy, Warden
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Gordon, 829 F.2d at 124-26 (defense counsel’s request, as a tactical position, that jury voir dire take place in defendant’s absence insufficient to waive defendant’s right of presence); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 , 1003, 104 S.Ct. 508 , 509, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 , 698 (1983) (court rejected argument defense counsel waived defendant’s right to be present at competency hearing); Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629, 631-33 (D.C.Cir.1963) (defense counsel’s assertion defendant did not wish to attend trial insufficient to waive defendant…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Wainwright
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Although the panel in Proffitt initially reached that conclusion, see 685 F.2d at 1257-58 , on rehearing the panel stated that “[w]e need not decide the issue of whether presence at a capital trial ever is waivable, however, for here, even if we assume that the right to presence in a capital case may be waived, no knowing and voluntary and, therefore, no effective waiver was made.” 706 F.2d at 312 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Wainwright
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Although the panel in Proffitt initially reached that conclusion, see 685 F.2d at 1257-58 , on rehearing the panel stated that "[w]e need not decide the issue of whether presence at a capital trial ever is waivable, however, for here, even if we assume that the right to presence in a capital case may be waived, no knowing and voluntary and, therefore, no effective waiver was made." 706 F.2d at 312 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Campbell
11th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1257-58 (11th Cir.1982), modified, 706 F.2d 311 (1983); see also Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 775-76 (11th Cir.1984) (reading Proffitt as prohibiting a capital defendant from waiving his right to be present, but remanding for further development of record regarding waiver of right to be present).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Tipton
4th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir.1983) (on rehearing) (noting that earlier non-waivability holdings of the Supreme Court have not been expressly overruled, and reserving decision on the issue).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Richard Tipton, A/K/A Whittey, (Two Cases). United States of America v. Cory Johnson, A/K/A \O\"
unknown court · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir.1983) (on rehearing) (noting that earlier non-waivability holdings of the Supreme Court have not been expressly overruled, and reserving decision on the issue).
discussed Cited "see" William Neal Moore v. Walter Zant (2×)
11th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See 706 F.2d at 312 . .Because Teague only addresses retroactive application of new law, see 109 S.Ct. at 1070, Moore argues that Teague does not bar consideration of the merits of his Smith claim by reason of non-retroactivity. .
cited Cited "see" Charles William Proffitt v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Florida Dept. Of Offender Rehabilitation
11th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Proffitt, 706 F.2d at 312 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Rice (2×)
Wash. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir.) (noting the Supreme Court's reluctance in Drope to address this issue and then following suit in resolving the issue on other grounds), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 , 1003 (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reginald Lacroix Poole v. United States
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 F.2d 311 , 312 & n. 46 (11th Cir.1983), modifying on reh’g 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir.1982) (not deciding whether presence is waivable by defense attorney), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 , 104 S.Ct. 508 , 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983); Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 775-76 (11th Cir.1984) (remand for further development of record regarding waiver of right to be present), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107 , 105 S.Ct. 2344 , 85 L.Ed.2d 858 (1985); id. at 780-85 (Hill, J., concurring) (arguing that Proffit should be interpreted to hold that a defendant may waive his right…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles William PROFFITT, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation, Respondent-Appellee
80-5997.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
May 31, 1983.
706 F.2d 311
1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27251
Kathryn Emmett, David Golub, Stamford, Conn., Deborah Fins, New York City, for petitioner-appellant., Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for respondent-appellee.
Kravitch.
Cited by 61 opinions  |  Published

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.

(Opinion September 10, 1982, 11 Cir., 1982, 685 F.2d 1227).

Before VANCE, KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

The panel opinion, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir.1982), is hereby modified as follows:

1. A reference to a new footnote 40a is added at the end of section IV.C.l. at the end of page 1255, with the footnote to read:

[*312] Our decision that the right of cross-examination of adverse witnesses is extended to capital sentencing proceedings is necessarily limited to the facts of the case before us, involving psychiatric reports.

2. The text beginning with the second complete paragraph on page 1257 (beginning “The state argues that even ... ”) and continuing through the first full paragraph on page 1258, ending with footnote 46, is deleted and the following is substituted therefore:

The state argues that even if appellant was entitled to attend the hearing, his attorney waived that right. We reject this argument.

Early Supreme Court cases held that the right to presence in capital cases is so fundamental that the defendant cannot waive it. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455, 32 S.Ct. 250, 253, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579, 4 S.Ct. 202, 204, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884). Accord Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir.1963).43 More recently, commentators have interpreted dictum in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), as authorizing a limited exception to the no-waiver rule for defendants who wilfully disrupt their trials, 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 723 (Supp.1980 at 754 n. 28); 8 B.J. Moore, Federal Practice H43.02[2] at 43-02[2] at 43-9 (2d ed. 1981).44 The state does not claim that appellant disrupted or hindered any part of his trial, however; hence such exception would be inapplicable to this case. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 182, 95 S.Ct. 896, 909, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the Supreme Court indicated that the issue of waiver of presence in a capital case may be subject to reconsideration, but did not expressly overrule its decisions in Diaz and Hopt.

We need not decide the issue of whether presence at a capital trial ever is waivable, however, for here, even if we assume that the right to presence in a capital case may be waived, no knowing and voluntary and, therefore, no effective waiver was made.45 Appellee does not deny that appellant was neither apprised of the hearing with Dr. Coffer nor afforded an opportunity to assert his right to a hearing; hence appellant did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his right to presence.46

3. An additional paragraph is to be added on page 1270 at the end of the majority opinion which reads:

The Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in a case which may have an impact on the analysis of the aggravating circumstances issue. Barclay v. Florida, 411 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1982), cert. granted,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 340, 74 L.Ed.2d 382 (1982). Following the procedure set forth in the majority opinion of the en banc court in Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 at 807 (11th Cir.1983), on remand the district court is to consider the effect that Barclay may have on the grant of habeas corpus relief and the procedure that is to be used in the district court while the Barclay case is pending in the Supreme Court.

The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED.