legitimacy principle in Connecticut

2003Giordano v. Giordano , 39 Conn. App. 183 , 206 (1995).

2000The applicant need not prove that the claim will definitely succeed at trial but only that there is probable cause to sustain the legitimacy of the claim, Giordano v. Giordano , 39 Conn. App. 183 , 206 (1995).

2017In Lewis v. New Orleans, supra, 415 U.S. 135 , Justice Powell, in concurrence, suggested that ‘‘a prop- erly trained [police] officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court later recognized the legitimacy of this principle, observing that the fighting words excep- tion ‘‘might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer’’ for the reason articulated by Justice Powell.8 Houston

2017In Lewis v. New Orleans , supra, 415 U.S. at 135 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , Justice Powell, in concurrence, suggested that "a properly trained [police] officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court later recognized the legitimacy of this principle, observing that the fighting words exception "might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer" for the reason articulated by Justice Powell

2017In Lewis v. New Orleans , supra, 415 U.S. at 135 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , Justice Powell, in concurrence, suggested that "a properly trained [police] officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court later recognized the legitimacy of this principle, observing that the fighting words exception "might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer" for the reason articulated by Justice Powell

2017In Lewis v. New Orleans , supra, 415 U.S. at 135 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , Justice Powell, in concurrence, suggested that "a properly trained [police] officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court later recognized the legitimacy of this principle, observing that the fighting words exception "might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer" for the reason articulated by Justice Powell

2017In Lewis v. New Orleans , supra, 415 U.S. at 135 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , Justice Powell, in concurrence, suggested that "a properly trained [police] officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court later recognized the legitimacy of this principle, observing that the fighting words exception "might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer" for the reason articulated by Justice Powell

2017In Lewis v. New Orleans , supra, 415 U.S. at 135 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , Justice Powell, in concurrence, suggested that "a properly trained [police] officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court later recognized the legitimacy of this principle, observing that the fighting words exception "might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer" for the reason articulated by Justice Powell

2000For purposes of § 52-578d, probable cause is "a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a person of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in advancing the action," Tyler v. Schnabel , 34 Conn. App. 216 , 219 (1994), It "is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false," Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 (1994).

2000For purposes of § 52-578d, probable cause is "a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a person of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in advancing the action," Tyler v. Schnabel , 34 Conn. App. 216 , 219 (1994), It "is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false," Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 (1994).