lex loci doctrine in Connecticut

2019We recognize that, in Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp. , supra, 277 Conn. at 640 , 894 A.2d 240 , we held that unjust enrichment was a tort for choice of law purposes, and, therefore, "we apply the law of the state in which the plaintiff was injured, unless to do so would produce an arbitrary or irrational result." As this court recently clarified, however, "we have completely abandoned the lex loci test in tort actions" and adopted "the most significant relationship test outlined in §§ 6 (2) and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws [as] the proper test to apply i

2019We recognize that, in Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp. , supra, 277 Conn. at 640 , 894 A.2d 240 , we held that unjust enrichment was a tort for choice of law purposes, and, therefore, "we apply the law of the state in which the plaintiff was injured, unless to do so would produce an arbitrary or irrational result." As this court recently clarified, however, "we have completely abandoned the lex loci test in tort actions" and adopted "the most significant relationship test outlined in §§ 6 (2) and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws [as] the proper test to apply i

2019We recognize that, in Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp. , supra, 277 Conn. at 640 , 894 A.2d 240 , we held that unjust enrichment was a tort for choice of law purposes, and, therefore, "we apply the law of the state in which the plaintiff was injured, unless to do so would produce an arbitrary or irrational result." As this court recently clarified, however, "we have completely abandoned the lex loci test in tort actions" and adopted "the most significant relationship test outlined in §§ 6 (2) and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws [as] the proper test to apply i

2016In its appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court "abused its discretion in denying the [plaintiff's request for] punitive damages, reducing the amount of attorney's fees and refusing to award it certain costs," and that the trial "court erred in declining to award it prejudgment interest." Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., supra, 146 Conn.App. at 176 , 78 A.3d 167 .

2016In its appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court "abused its discretion in denying the [plaintiff's request for] punitive damages, reducing the amount of attorney's fees and refusing to award it certain costs," and that the trial "court erred in declining to award it prejudgment interest." Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., supra, 146 Conn.App. at 176 , 78 A.3d 167 .

2013Our Supreme Court reached the similar conclusion in Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791 , 830 A.2d 752 (2003), that employing lex loci delicti would produce an irrational, arbitrary result, such that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was employed.

2013Our Supreme Court reached the similar conclusion in Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791 , 830 A.2d 752 (2003), that employing lex loci delicti would produce an irrational, arbitrary result, such that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was employed.

1990Hence, I will decide the issue The plaintiff relies on the case of O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632 (1986), wherein the Connecticut , Supreme Court refused to apply the lex loci rule.

1986Such an obligation, or right of action, as a general rule, becomes vested, and will be enforced here precisely as if the obligation or right of action had accrued or arisen in this jurisdiction.” Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 405-406 , 130 A. 794 (1925).

1986Such an obligation, or right of action, as a general rule, becomes vested, and will be enforced here precisely as if the obligation or right of action had accrued or arisen in this jurisdiction.” Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 405-406 , 130 A. 794 (1925).

1986See Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268 , 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Thomas v. Hanmer, 109 App. Div. 2d 80, 489 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1985); Wilcox v. Wilcox, supra. Applying the same rationale, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has refused to adhere to the lex loci doctrine in a case where the plaintiffs, Connecticut residents, were killed in an airplane crash in West Virginia.

1986Justice Cardozo, describing the vested rights theory in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110 , 120 N.E. 198 (1918), stated: “A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to an obligation, which, if transitory, ‘follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be found .... [I]t is a principle of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected’ (Beale, [Conflict of Laws], § 51).” In one of the earliest Connecticut decisions to recognize the lex loci doctrine, this court held: “The right of action for the injury is inseparable from its extent, hen

1986Justice Cardozo, describing the vested rights theory in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110 , 120 N.E. 198 (1918), stated: “A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to an obligation, which, if transitory, ‘follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be found .... [I]t is a principle of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected’ (Beale, [Conflict of Laws], § 51).” In one of the earliest Connecticut decisions to recognize the lex loci doctrine, this court held: “The right of action for the injury is inseparable from its extent, hen

1986We held that application of the lex loci rule in these circumstances afforded an “unsatisfactory resolution” to the choice of law problem; id., 29 ; noting that to employ the rule “would bestow upon temporary visitors injured in Connecticut all the relief which the Con necticut compensation act affords, but deny that same relief to Connecticut residents injured while on temporary business outside the state, even when all other incidents of employment . . . are in Connecticut.” Id., 29-30 .

1986We held that application of the lex loci rule in these circumstances afforded an “unsatisfactory resolution” to the choice of law problem; id., 29 ; noting that to employ the rule “would bestow upon temporary visitors injured in Connecticut all the relief which the Con necticut compensation act affords, but deny that same relief to Connecticut residents injured while on temporary business outside the state, even when all other incidents of employment . . . are in Connecticut.” Id., 29-30 .

1986The court expressly based its decision on this court’s opinion in Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407 , 374 A.2d 1061 (1977), our most recent decision affirming the doctrine that the nature and extent of tort liability is governed by the place of injury, hereinafter referred to as “lex loci delicti” or “lex loci.” When judgment was subsequently rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which, like the trial court, considered itself bound by this court’s past adherence to the lex loci doctrine.

1986The court expressly based its decision on this court’s opinion in Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407 , 374 A.2d 1061 (1977), our most recent decision affirming the doctrine that the nature and extent of tort liability is governed by the place of injury, hereinafter referred to as “lex loci delicti” or “lex loci.” When judgment was subsequently rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which, like the trial court, considered itself bound by this court’s past adherence to the lex loci doctrine.