Perkins standard (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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Perkins standard in Connecticut

5 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2001 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Chairman, Criminal Justice Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission green
conn · 1991
2 sentences

2001The Perkins standard ‘does not signal a return to the invocation of a balancing test, which we explicitly rejected in Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, [ 217 Conn. 193, 200-201 , 585 A.2d 96 (1991)].’ Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 175.” Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 85.

2001The Perkins standard ‘does not signal a return to the invocation of a balancing test, which we explicitly rejected in Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, [ 217 Conn. 193, 200-201 , 585 A.2d 96 (1991)].’ Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 175.” Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 85.

21997–2001
Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission green
conn · 2001
2 sentences

2001III The department argues that in Director, Retirement and Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission , 256 Conn. 764 , CT Page 17221 775 A.2d 981 (2001), released only three months after Rocque , the Supreme Court redefined the Perkins test.

2001III The department argues that in Director, Retirement and Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission , 256 Conn. 764 , CT Page 17221 775 A.2d 981 (2001), released only three months after Rocque , the Supreme Court redefined the Perkins test.

12001–2001
Youngquist v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, No. Cv95 0554601 (Feb. 18, 1997) green
connsuperct · 1997
2 sentences

1999In Youngquist , the court, presented with similar evidence, found: "It would hardly be a narrow construction of invasion of personal privacy, especially under the Perkins test, to find the disclosure of home addresses of state employees; in contravention of their purely subjective desires, to constitute an objective highly offensive invasion of privacy." Youngquist v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, Superior Court, 19 Conn. L.

1999In Youngquist , the court, presented with similar evidence, found: "It would hardly be a narrow construction of invasion of personal privacy, especially under the Perkins test, to find the disclosure of home addresses of state employees; in contravention of their purely subjective desires, to constitute an objective highly offensive invasion of privacy." Youngquist v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, Superior Court, 19 Conn. L.

11999–1999
Department of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission green
conn · 1997
2 sentences

1997Our Supreme Court recently reviewed the burden in Department of Public Safety v. FOIC, 242 Conn. 79 , 84-85 (1997) noting: It bears emphasis that the Perkins standard imposes two separate burdens on a person seeking to prove the right to an exemption on the ground of "an invasion of personal privacy." Recognizing the interests of the public, Perkins limits the exemption to cases in which the person resisting disclosure proves that the challenged information does not relate to "legitimate matters of public concern." Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 175 .

1997Our Supreme Court recently reviewed the burden in Department of Public Safety v. FOIC, 242 Conn. 79 , 84-85 (1997) noting: It bears emphasis that the Perkins standard imposes two separate burdens on a person seeking to prove the right to an exemption on the ground of "an invasion of personal privacy." Recognizing the interests of the public, Perkins limits the exemption to cases in which the person resisting disclosure proves that the challenged information does not relate to "legitimate matters of public concern." Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 175 .

11997–1997

Where else courts name it

AL 8 (1999–2016) FL 7 (1986–2009) OH 7 (2001–2026) GA 7 (2011–2024) CA 5 (1953–2021) CT 5 (1997–2001) IN 4 (1999–2019) NY 4 (1975–2018) PA 4 (1990–2021) LA 3 (1989–2002) IL 3 (1965–2015) WI 3 (2000–2020) TX 3 (1923–2016) IA 2 (1982–2016) DC 2 (2000–2005) WV 2 (1987–1997) MS 2 (1990–2004) AZ 2 (1969–2018) DE 2 (2015–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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