Remmer presumption in Connecticut

2018The defendant argues that the bullet hole incident in the present case should be presumed prejudicial. 7 "Under Remmer [v. United States , 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) ], prejudice is not presumed unless the court is implicated in the alleged conduct, or there was an external interference with the jury's deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried." State v. Biggs , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 710 , 171 A.3d 457 ; see also State v. Berrios , supra, 320 Conn. at 292 , 129 A.3d 696 (concluding

2018The defendant argues that the bullet hole incident in the present case should be presumed prejudicial. 7 "Under Remmer [v. United States , 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) ], prejudice is not presumed unless the court is implicated in the alleged conduct, or there was an external interference with the jury's deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried." State v. Biggs , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 710 , 171 A.3d 457 ; see also State v. Berrios , supra, 320 Conn. at 292 , 129 A.3d 696 (concluding

2017The United States Supreme Court later discussed the Remmer presumption in two cases, Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209 , 212, 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), and United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), and some courts have interpreted both to restrict the Remmer presumption, if not to eliminate it entirely.

2017The United States Supreme Court later discussed the Remmer presumption in two cases, Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209 , 212, 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), and United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), and some courts have interpreted both to restrict the Remmer presumption, if not to eliminate it entirely.

2017The United States Supreme Court later discussed the Remmer presumption in two cases, Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209 , 212, 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), and United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), and some courts have interpreted both to restrict the Remmer presumption, if not to eliminate it entirely.

2017The United States Supreme Court later discussed the Remmer presumption in two cases, Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209 , 212, 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), and United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), and some courts have interpreted both to restrict the Remmer presumption, if not to eliminate it entirely.

2018The defendant argues that the bullet hole incident in the present case should be presumed prejudicial. 7 "Under Remmer [v. United States , 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) ], prejudice is not presumed unless the court is implicated in the alleged conduct, or there was an external interference with the jury's deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried." State v. Biggs , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 710 , 171 A.3d 457 ; see also State v. Berrios , supra, 320 Conn. at 292 , 129 A.3d 696 (concluding

2018The defendant argues that the bullet hole incident in the present case should be presumed prejudicial. 7 "Under Remmer [v. United States , 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) ], prejudice is not presumed unless the court is implicated in the alleged conduct, or there was an external interference with the jury's deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried." State v. Biggs , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 710 , 171 A.3d 457 ; see also State v. Berrios , supra, 320 Conn. at 292 , 129 A.3d 696 (concluding

2017The defendant raises this claim pursuant to State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R. , 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2017The defendant raises this claim pursuant to State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R. , 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2016Ed. 2d 925 (2010); Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933 , 936–38 (Ind. 2014); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284 , 317–19, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003); Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554 , 564–65, 80 P.3d 447 (2003); Trice v. Baldwin, 140 Or.

2016Ed. 2d 925 (2010); Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933 , 936–38 (Ind. 2014); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284 , 317–19, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003); Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554 , 564–65, 80 P.3d 447 (2003); Trice v. Baldwin, 140 Or.

2016See Smith v. State, Docket No. A- 5636, 1996 WL 596942 , *4–5 (Alaska App. October 9, 1996); In re Price, 51 Cal. 4th 547, 560 , 247 P.3d 929 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (2011); Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218 , 220–21 and n.8 (Del. 2010); Amazon v. State, 487 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 , 107 S. Ct. 314 , 93 L.

2016See Smith v. State, Docket No. A- 5636, 1996 WL 596942 , *4–5 (Alaska App. October 9, 1996); In re Price, 51 Cal. 4th 547, 560 , 247 P.3d 929 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (2011); Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218 , 220–21 and n.8 (Del. 2010); Amazon v. State, 487 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 , 107 S. Ct. 314 , 93 L.

2016Particularly given its factually and legally inapposite nature, interpreting the Supreme Court’s absolute silence on this point in Phillips as categorically elimi- nating the Remmer presumption contravenes the well established maxim that, ‘‘absent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.’’ Williams v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 , 114 S. Ct. 608 , 126 L.

2016Particularly given its factually and legally inapposite nature, interpreting the Supreme Court’s absolute silence on this point in Phillips as categorically elimi- nating the Remmer presumption contravenes the well established maxim that, ‘‘absent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.’’ Williams v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 , 114 S. Ct. 608 , 126 L.

2016Particularly given its factually and legally inapposite nature, interpreting the Supreme Court’s absolute silence on this point in Phillips as categorically elimi- nating the Remmer presumption contravenes the well established maxim that, ‘‘absent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.’’ Williams v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 , 114 S. Ct. 608 , 126 L.

2016Particularly given its factually and legally inapposite nature, interpreting the Supreme Court’s absolute silence on this point in Phillips as categorically elimi- nating the Remmer presumption contravenes the well established maxim that, ‘‘absent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.’’ Williams v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 , 114 S. Ct. 608 , 126 L.

2016Particularly given its factually and legally inapposite nature, interpreting the Supreme Court’s absolute silence on this point in Phillips as categorically elimi- nating the Remmer presumption contravenes the well established maxim that, ‘‘absent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.’’ Williams v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 , 114 S. Ct. 608 , 126 L.

2016Particularly given its factually and legally inapposite nature, interpreting the Supreme Court’s absolute silence on this point in Phillips as categorically elimi- nating the Remmer presumption contravenes the well established maxim that, ‘‘absent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.’’ Williams v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 , 114 S. Ct. 608 , 126 L.

2016We emphasize, however, that the burden remains on the defendant to show prima facie entitlement to the Remmer presumption; evidence, rather than specula- tion, is required to shift the burden of proof to the state.26 See State v. Savage, 161 Conn. 445, 450 , 290 A.2d 221 (1971) (declining to apply Remmer presumption when ‘‘the trial court fully developed the facts by inter- rogating the jurors in question, and as a result of this interrogation the court concluded that there had been no conversation between these jurors, the complainant and her mother’’); State v. Zapata, 119 Conn. App. 660 , 6

2016We emphasize, however, that the burden remains on the defendant to show prima facie entitlement to the Remmer presumption; evidence, rather than specula- tion, is required to shift the burden of proof to the state.26 See State v. Savage, 161 Conn. 445, 450 , 290 A.2d 221 (1971) (declining to apply Remmer presumption when ‘‘the trial court fully developed the facts by inter- rogating the jurors in question, and as a result of this interrogation the court concluded that there had been no conversation between these jurors, the complainant and her mother’’); State v. Zapata, 119 Conn. App. 660 , 6

2016We emphasize, however, that the burden remains on the defendant to show prima facie entitlement to the Remmer presumption; evidence, rather than specula- tion, is required to shift the burden of proof to the state.26 See State v. Savage, 161 Conn. 445, 450 , 290 A.2d 221 (1971) (declining to apply Remmer presumption when ‘‘the trial court fully developed the facts by inter- rogating the jurors in question, and as a result of this interrogation the court concluded that there had been no conversation between these jurors, the complainant and her mother’’); State v. Zapata, 119 Conn. App. 660 , 6

2016We emphasize, however, that the burden remains on the defendant to show prima facie entitlement to the Remmer presumption; evidence, rather than specula- tion, is required to shift the burden of proof to the state.26 See State v. Savage, 161 Conn. 445, 450 , 290 A.2d 221 (1971) (declining to apply Remmer presumption when ‘‘the trial court fully developed the facts by inter- rogating the jurors in question, and as a result of this interrogation the court concluded that there had been no conversation between these jurors, the complainant and her mother’’); State v. Zapata, 119 Conn. App. 660 , 6

2016The burden rests heavily on the government to establish that the contact was harmless.’’ United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 436 , 181 L.

2016The burden rests heavily on the government to establish that the contact was harmless.’’ United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 436 , 181 L.

2016Sabir v. United States, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 833 , 181 L.

2016Ed. 2d 542 (2011); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 , 782–83 (2d Cir.) (government rebutted Remmer presumption with respect to contamination allegations arising from juror bringing accounting textbook excerpt into deliber- ations), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 , 106 S. Ct. 308 , 88 L.

2016Finally, many of our sister states that have considered the issue22 hold that the Remmer presumption remains good law in addressing claims of extrajudicial commu- nications or jury tampering.23 See State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555 , 559 n.2, 875 P.2d 788 (1994); People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68 , 103–104, 917 N.E.2d 940 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1108 , 130 S. Ct. 2402 , 176 L.

2016Finally, many of our sister states that have considered the issue22 hold that the Remmer presumption remains good law in addressing claims of extrajudicial commu- nications or jury tampering.23 See State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555 , 559 n.2, 875 P.2d 788 (1994); People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68 , 103–104, 917 N.E.2d 940 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1108 , 130 S. Ct. 2402 , 176 L.

2016Finally, many of our sister states that have considered the issue22 hold that the Remmer presumption remains good law in addressing claims of extrajudicial commu- nications or jury tampering.23 See State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555 , 559 n.2, 875 P.2d 788 (1994); People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68 , 103–104, 917 N.E.2d 940 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1108 , 130 S. Ct. 2402 , 176 L.

2016Finally, many of our sister states that have considered the issue22 hold that the Remmer presumption remains good law in addressing claims of extrajudicial commu- nications or jury tampering.23 See State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555 , 559 n.2, 875 P.2d 788 (1994); People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68 , 103–104, 917 N.E.2d 940 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1108 , 130 S. Ct. 2402 , 176 L.

2016Ed. 2d 542 (2011); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 , 782–83 (2d Cir.) (government rebutted Remmer presumption with respect to contamination allegations arising from juror bringing accounting textbook excerpt into deliber- ations), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 , 106 S. Ct. 308 , 88 L.

2016Ed. 2d 542 (2011); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 , 782–83 (2d Cir.) (government rebutted Remmer presumption with respect to contamination allegations arising from juror bringing accounting textbook excerpt into deliber- ations), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 , 106 S. Ct. 308 , 88 L.

2016See Smith v. State, Docket No. A- 5636, 1996 WL 596942 , *4–5 (Alaska App. October 9, 1996); In re Price, 51 Cal. 4th 547, 560 , 247 P.3d 929 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (2011); Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218 , 220–21 and n.8 (Del. 2010); Amazon v. State, 487 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 , 107 S. Ct. 314 , 93 L.

2016See Smith v. State, Docket No. A- 5636, 1996 WL 596942 , *4–5 (Alaska App. October 9, 1996); In re Price, 51 Cal. 4th 547, 560 , 247 P.3d 929 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (2011); Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218 , 220–21 and n.8 (Del. 2010); Amazon v. State, 487 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 , 107 S. Ct. 314 , 93 L.

2016Ed. 2d 925 (2010); Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933 , 936–38 (Ind. 2014); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284 , 317–19, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003); Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554 , 564–65, 80 P.3d 447 (2003); Trice v. Baldwin, 140 Or.

2016Ed. 2d 925 (2010); Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933 , 936–38 (Ind. 2014); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284 , 317–19, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003); Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554 , 564–65, 80 P.3d 447 (2003); Trice v. Baldwin, 140 Or.