Dailey test in District of Columbia

2008This court confronted the Dailey test in Spartin v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 584 A.2d 564 (D.C.1990), a case involving another mental-mental claim.

2008Professor Larson advocates an “objective” standard for such cases that is very similar to the Dailey test: “in order for non-traumatically caused mental injury to be compensable in a workmen’s compensation case, the injury must have resulted from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day mental stress and tensions which all employees must experience.” Id. at 569 (quoting IB A. LaRSOn, WORKMEN’S Compensation Law § 42.28(b) (1987)) (internal citation and footnote omitted).

2008The hearing examiner declined to apply the Dailey test, believing it to be unnecessary in the context of a physical accident, and instead applied the subsequent medical injury causation standard from Whittaker v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., supra note 3, 668 A.2d at 844.

2008The hearing examiner declined to apply the Dailey test, believing it to be unnecessary in the context of a physical accident, and instead applied the subsequent medical injury causation standard from Whittaker v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., supra note 3, 668 A.2d at 844.

2007Finally, the District contends that “D.C.Code § l-612.03(j) does not create a presumptive entitlement to administrative leave — an officer has the burden to establish that the injury/illness for which he seeks administrative leave occurred in the performance of duty.” In reviewing an agency decision under the Act, we “defer[ ] to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the law it is charged with implementing,” Pierce v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 882 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.2005), that is, we accept the agency’s interpretation “as long as it is not plainly wrong

2007Finally, the District contends that “D.C.Code § l-612.03(j) does not create a presumptive entitlement to administrative leave — an officer has the burden to establish that the injury/illness for which he seeks administrative leave occurred in the performance of duty.” In reviewing an agency decision under the Act, we “defer[ ] to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the law it is charged with implementing,” Pierce v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 882 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.2005), that is, we accept the agency’s interpretation “as long as it is not plainly wrong

2007Pierce references McEvily, id., and we observed in Spartin, supra, that McEvily “is also arguably consistent with the Dailey standard.” 584 A.2d at 569 (footnote omitted).

2007Pierce references McEvily, id., and we observed in Spartin, supra, that McEvily “is also arguably consistent with the Dailey standard.” 584 A.2d at 569 (footnote omitted).

1990See, e.g., id. (noting that “[t]he Director adopted a special standard applicable to claimants who had a preexisting arterio-sclerotic condition at the time” they suffer heart attacks). 5 The Dailey test is such a special standard. *569 Viewed generally, insofar as it requires an objective demonstration of job stressors, Dailey fits within the modern trend to compensate workers for emotional injury caused by job stress.

1990See, e.g., id. (noting that “[t]he Director adopted a special standard applicable to claimants who had a preexisting arterio-sclerotic condition at the time” they suffer heart attacks). 5 The Dailey test is such a special standard. *569 Viewed generally, insofar as it requires an objective demonstration of job stressors, Dailey fits within the modern trend to compensate workers for emotional injury caused by job stress.

1990The Director is, of course, free to modify the Dailey standard in subsequent decisions, limited by the legislative purpose that the Workers Compensation Act "is to be construed liberally for the benefit of employees and their dependents.” Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987). 11 .

1990The Director is, of course, free to modify the Dailey standard in subsequent decisions, limited by the legislative purpose that the Workers Compensation Act "is to be construed liberally for the benefit of employees and their dependents.” Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987). 11 .