Dailey rule in California

2022Proc, § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 .) “A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” (Regents, at p. 618; see Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 116 , 122.) “Only after the defendant carries that initial burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff ‘to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action . . . .’” (Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020) 59

2022Proc, § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 .) “A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” (Regents, at p. 618; see Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 116 , 122.) “Only after the defendant carries that initial burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff ‘to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action . . . .’” (Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020) 59

2022(See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 672.) 11 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 570 ), the trial court erred in granting Dailey’s motion for summary judgment.

2022(See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 672.) 11 “presented a substantial risk of injury” (Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 570 ), the trial court erred in granting Dailey’s motion for summary judgment.

1992We believe that the 60-day period is now sufficient for defendants, including those in prison or other custody, who desire to take the appeal personally and without counsel, particularly in view of the notification of appeal rights ....’” (People v. Casillas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1370 , citing In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) Casillas thus interpreted Benoit as standing for the proposition that a prisoner—like the nonprisoner—has the responsibility of ensuring that his or her notice of appeal is received by the county clerk prior to expiration of the 60-day filing period. ( 21

1992We believe that the 60-day period is now sufficient for defendants, including those in prison or other custody, who desire to take the appeal personally and without counsel, particularly in view of the notification of appeal rights ....’” (People v. Casillas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1370 , citing In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) Casillas thus interpreted Benoit as standing for the proposition that a prisoner—like the nonprisoner—has the responsibility of ensuring that his or her notice of appeal is received by the county clerk prior to expiration of the 60-day filing period. ( 21

2015There is nothing remotely similar in this case. *1064 In Dailey, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 974 , in a “brief order, the trial court granted Sears’s motion to preclude and denied Dailey’s motion to certify the class, concluding that ‘the individual facts and issues unique to each member of the alleged class and requiring separate adjudication are more numerous and significant than the common issues.’ ” (Id. at p. 978.) In Dailey , the trial court “did state its reasons, i.e., the predominance of individual issues and the ability to bring individual claims before the court.” (Id. at p. 986.) Furthe

2015There is nothing remotely similar in this case. *1064 In Dailey, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 974 , in a “brief order, the trial court granted Sears’s motion to preclude and denied Dailey’s motion to certify the class, concluding that ‘the individual facts and issues unique to each member of the alleged class and requiring separate adjudication are more numerous and significant than the common issues.’ ” (Id. at p. 978.) In Dailey , the trial court “did state its reasons, i.e., the predominance of individual issues and the ability to bring individual claims before the court.” (Id. at p. 986.) Furthe

2008They claim that they did not address the litigation privilege sooner “because they believe that the difference between an appraisal and an arbitration is sufficiently clear so as to make the extension of either of the drastic shields of arbitral immunity or the litigation privilege to an appraiser in an appraisal so wholly inappropriate and unjustified as to merit no finer a point or further discussion.” We disagree with appellants’ analysis, but nonetheless provided Dailey the opportunity to brief the issue pursuant to Government Code section 68081. 8 Although not specifically addressed in Ma

1992We believe that the 60-day period is now sufficient for defendants, including those in prison or other custody, who desire to take the appeal personally and without counsel, particularly in view of the notification of appeal rights ....’” (People v. Casillas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1370 , citing In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) Casillas thus interpreted Benoit as standing for the proposition that a prisoner—like the nonprisoner—has the responsibility of ensuring that his or her notice of appeal is received by the county clerk prior to expiration of the 60-day filing period. ( 21

1992We believe that the 60-day period is now sufficient for defendants, including those in prison or other custody, who desire to take the appeal personally and without counsel, particularly in view of the notification of appeal rights ....’” (People v. Casillas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1370 , citing In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) Casillas thus interpreted Benoit as standing for the proposition that a prisoner—like the nonprisoner—has the responsibility of ensuring that his or her notice of appeal is received by the county clerk prior to expiration of the 60-day filing period. ( 21

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990The Dailey court reasoned that insistence on actual receipt by the county clerk within that time unfairly penalized incarcerated defendants, since their time to act was effectively reduced to eight or nine days, whereas those not in custody had the benefit of the full ten days. ( 175 Cal.App.2d at p. 105 .) Therefore, Dailey held, “delivery by defendant of his notice of appeal to the prison authorities on the tenth day was a constructive filing in the county clerk’s office as of that day.” (Id. at p. 107.) The Dailey rule was followed in numerous cases decided prior to the 1972 amendment to Ru

1990The Dailey court reasoned that insistence on actual receipt by the county clerk within that time unfairly penalized incarcerated defendants, since their time to act was effectively reduced to eight or nine days, whereas those not in custody had the benefit of the full ten days. ( 175 Cal.App.2d at p. 105 .) Therefore, Dailey held, “delivery by defendant of his notice of appeal to the prison authorities on the tenth day was a constructive filing in the county clerk’s office as of that day.” (Id. at p. 107.) The Dailey rule was followed in numerous cases decided prior to the 1972 amendment to Ru

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990That case is People v. Wychocki, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1065 , which simply cites People v. Milton (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 408, 410 , footnote 1 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 803 ], and invokes the Dailey rule without further discussion.

1990That case is People v. Wychocki, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1065 , which simply cites People v. Milton (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 408, 410 , footnote 1 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 803 ], and invokes the Dailey rule without further discussion.

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe

1990(See, e.g., People v. Wise (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 57 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 343 ]; People v. Spencer (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 13 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 881 ]; People v. Mauldin (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 184 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 243 ]; People v. Flores (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 610 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 363 ].) In Benoit, supra, the Supreme Court noted the expansion of the constructive filing doctrine effected by Dailey , but did not comment on its continuing validity. ( 10 Cal. 3d at p. 82 .) To our knowledge, only one decision issued after the 1972 amendment to Rule 31 suggests that, without more, the mere delivery of a notice of appe