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5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Piersongreen1 sentence2007As we wrote in the case of In re De Maio, supra, 893 A.2d at 585 , “[T]he Board’s final determinations, whether they are characterized as findings of ultimate fact or conclusions of law, are owed no deference; our review is de novo.” Analogizing the deference standard applicable to the Board (with respect to Hearing Committees) to the deference standard of the Court of Appeals (with respect to the Board), we explained in the case of In re Pierson, 690 A.2d 941, 946-47 (D.C.1997), that no deference is owed with respect to ultimate facts that are really conclusions of law. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Berrymangreen1 sentence2007See also In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 766 (D.C.2000). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Templegreen2 sentences2004Even taking into account the factual distinctions in the development and nature of Mr. Abrahamson’s case and that of Mr. Sims, as well as the deference standard which guides our review of the Board’s report and recommendation, see In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C.1993), I cannot comprehend the difference in the analysis of the cases with regard to conduct involving moral turpitude on the facts, the violation of Rule 8.4(c), and the respective sanctions imposed on Mr. Abra-hamson and Mr. Sims. 2004Even taking into account the factual distinctions in the development and nature of Mr. Abrahamson's case and that of Mr. Sims, as well as the deference standard which guides our review of the Board's report and recommendation, see In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C.1993), I cannot comprehend the difference in the analysis of the cases with regard to conduct involving moral turpitude on the facts, the violation of Rule 8.4(c), and the respective sanctions imposed on Mr. Abrahamson and Mr. Sims. | 1 | 1 |
Flemming v. Nestorgreen2 sentences1980See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S. at 617 , 80 S.Ct. at 1376 . 1980See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S. at 617 , 80 S.Ct. at 1376 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re De Maio
green
1 sentence2007As we wrote in the case of In re De Maio, supra, 893 A.2d at 585 , “[T]he Board’s final determinations, whether they are characterized as findings of ultimate fact or conclusions of law, are owed no deference; our review is de novo.” Analogizing the deference standard applicable to the Board (with respect to Hearing Committees) to the deference standard of the Court of Appeals (with respect to the Board), we explained in the case of In re Pierson, 690 A.2d 941, 946-47 (D.C.1997), that no deference is owed with respect to ultimate facts that are really conclusions of law. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Davies v. United States
green
2 sentences2001In contrast, in Davies, supra, and in all of our cases applying the deference standard, supra note 5, and in Agurs, supra, the judge making the impact determination was the same judge who presided over the trial. 2001In contrast, in Davies, supra, and in all of our cases applying the deference standard, supra note 5, and in Agurs, supra, the judge making the impact determination was the same judge who presided over the trial. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Whalen v. United States
green
2 sentences1988Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688 , 100 S.Ct. at 1435 . 4 We believe John son embodies the premise that, because the 1928 Act merely incorporates the provisions of the Longshore Act, construction of the 1928 Act “cannot be separated” from construction of the Longshore Act, and thus Congress intended the construction of the local law and the federal law to be identical. 1988Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688 , 100 S.Ct. at 1435 . 4 We believe John son embodies the premise that, because the 1928 Act merely incorporates the provisions of the Longshore Act, construction of the 1928 Act “cannot be separated” from construction of the Longshore Act, and thus Congress intended the construction of the local law and the federal law to be identical. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.