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5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teoume-Lessane v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025The Teoume-Lessane panel noted the significant nature of its action, explaining that “a division of this court may not overrule the prior decision of another” but a panel also “cannot blindly follow a prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court; a panel decision interpreting the Constitution would undoubtedly yield to a later Supreme Court 26 decision on point.” Id. at 494 (citation modified). 2014See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 10 A.3d 646 , 658 n. 7 (D.C.2010) (“even if we were to disagree with our prior holdings ..., we are bound by those decisions”); Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 494 (D.C.2007) (“a panel cannot blindly follow a prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court”) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Mister Ralpho v. J. Raymond Bell, Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United Statesgreen2 sentences2007However, a “panel cannot blindly follow [a] prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court.” Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 , 379 n. 27 (D.C.1979) (citing Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 390 , 569 F.2d 607, 629 (1977)). 2007However, a “panel cannot blindly follow [a] prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court.” Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 , 379 n. 27 (D.C.1979) (citing Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 390 , 569 F.2d 607, 629 (1977)). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Drewgreen1 sentence2014Moreover, a panel is not obliged “„to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,‟ or by our own supervening rulings en banc.” Lee v. United (…continued) Drew, 489 N.E.2d 1233 , 1241 n.11 (Mass. 1986) (“[T]he credibility of the witness is a question for the jury.”). 11 States, 668 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Frendak, 408 A.2d at 379 n.27); see Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C. 1999) (“[T]he „philosophical basis‟ of Procter and Brewster has been substantially undermined b | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Moreover, a panel is not obliged “ ‘to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,’ or by our own supervening rulings en banc.” Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Frendak, 408 A.2d at 379 n. 27); see Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C. 1999) (“[T]he ‘philosophical basis’ of Procter and Brewster has been substantially undermined by Muniz and its progeny.”). 2014Moreover, a panel is not obliged “„to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,‟ or by our own supervening rulings en banc.” Lee v. United (…continued) Drew, 489 N.E.2d 1233 , 1241 n.11 (Mass. 1986) (“[T]he credibility of the witness is a question for the jury.”). 11 States, 668 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Frendak, 408 A.2d at 379 n.27); see Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C. 1999) (“[T]he „philosophical basis‟ of Procter and Brewster has been substantially undermined b | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 10 A.3d 646 , 658 n. 7 (D.C.2010) (“even if we were to disagree with our prior holdings ..., we are bound by those decisions”); Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 494 (D.C.2007) (“a panel cannot blindly follow a prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court”) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Moreover, a panel is not obliged “ ‘to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,’ or by our own supervening rulings en banc.” Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Frendak, 408 A.2d at 379 n. 27); see Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C. 1999) (“[T]he ‘philosophical basis’ of Procter and Brewster has been substantially undermined by Muniz and its progeny.”). 2014Moreover, a panel is not obliged “„to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,‟ or by our own supervening rulings en banc.” Lee v. United (…continued) Drew, 489 N.E.2d 1233 , 1241 n.11 (Mass. 1986) (“[T]he credibility of the witness is a question for the jury.”). 11 States, 668 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Frendak, 408 A.2d at 379 n.27); see Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C. 1999) (“[T]he „philosophical basis‟ of Procter and Brewster has been substantially undermined b | 1 | 1 |
M.A.S., Inc. v. Van Curler Broadcasting Corp.green2 sentences1979See generally Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 390 , 569 F.2d 607, 629 (1977) (panel cannot blindly follow prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court); M.A.S., Inc. v. Van Curler Broadcasting Corp., 357 F.Supp. 686, 691 (D.D.C.1973) (court need not follow prior ruling if the earlier decision failed to consider facts or law which, had they been dealt with, would have mandated a different result). 1979See generally Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 390 , 569 F.2d 607, 629 (1977) (panel cannot blindly follow prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court); M.A.S., Inc. v. Van Curler Broadcasting Corp., 357 F.Supp. 686, 691 (D.D.C.1973) (court need not follow prior ruling if the earlier decision failed to consider facts or law which, had they been dealt with, would have mandated a different result). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Frendak v. United States
green
2 sentences2014Of course, “a ‘panel cannot blindly follow [a] prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court.’ ” Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 494 (D.C.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 , 379 n. 27 (D.C.1979)). 2014Of course, “a „panel cannot blindly follow [a] prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court.‟” Teoume- Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 494 (D.C. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 , 379 n.27 (D.C. 1979)). | 2 | 2007–2014 |