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5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.green2 sentences2022See infra Part IV. 24 “The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited to challenge a statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court—those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution.’” Pearson v. United States, 581 A.2d 347, 356 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)). “[A] law may be invalidated as overbroad if a ‘substantial number of its applications are 2010As Justice Ali-to explained in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Stevens, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577 , 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010): The “strong medicine” of overbreadth invalidation need not and generally should not be administered when the statute under attack is unconstitutional as applied to the challenger before the court. | 1 | 2 |
Counterman v. Coloradogreen1 sentence2025In the attorney-client privilege context just as in the First Amendment context, “[t]his Court again must consider the prospect of chilling non-threatening expression, given the ordinary citizen’s predictable tendency to steer ‘wide[] of the unlawful zone’” out of a “fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat,” “fear of the legal system getting that judgment wrong,” and “fear, in any event, of incurring legal costs—all [of which] may lead him to swallow words that are in fact not true threats.” Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. | 1 | 1 |
Speiser v. Randallgreen1 sentence2025In the attorney-client privilege context just as in the First Amendment context, “[t]his Court again must consider the prospect of chilling non-threatening expression, given the ordinary citizen’s predictable tendency to steer ‘wide[] of the unlawful zone’” out of a “fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat,” “fear of the legal system getting that judgment wrong,” and “fear, in any event, of incurring legal costs—all [of which] may lead him to swallow words that are in fact not true threats.” Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. | 1 | 1 |
Jaffee v. Redmondgreen1 sentence2025In the attorney-client privilege context just as in the First Amendment context, “[t]his Court again must consider the prospect of chilling non-threatening expression, given the ordinary citizen’s predictable tendency to steer ‘wide[] of the unlawful zone’” out of a “fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat,” “fear of the legal system getting that judgment wrong,” and “fear, in any event, of incurring legal costs—all [of which] may lead him to swallow words that are in fact not true threats.” Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. | 1 | 1 |
Boos v. Barrygreen1 sentence2022“Due to the severity of the only remedy for overbreadth, namely, complete invalidation of the regulation or statute, courts have a ‘duty to avoid constitutional difficulties’ by applying an appropriate narrowing construction where possible.” Pearson, 581 A.2d at 356 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988)); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”). | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022“Due to the severity of the only remedy for overbreadth, namely, complete invalidation of the regulation or statute, courts have a ‘duty to avoid constitutional difficulties’ by applying an appropriate narrowing construction where possible.” Pearson, 581 A.2d at 356 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988)); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”). 2022See infra Part IV. 24 “The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited to challenge a statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court—those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution.’” Pearson v. United States, 581 A.2d 347, 356 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)). “[A] law may be invalidated as overbroad if a ‘substantial number of its applications are | 1 | 1 |
Gomez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022“Due to the severity of the only remedy for overbreadth, namely, complete invalidation of the regulation or statute, courts have a ‘duty to avoid constitutional difficulties’ by applying an appropriate narrowing construction where possible.” Pearson, 581 A.2d at 356 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988)); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.green1 sentence2022See infra Part IV. 24 “The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited to challenge a statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court—those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution.’” Pearson v. United States, 581 A.2d 347, 356 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)). “[A] law may be invalidated as overbroad if a ‘substantial number of its applications are | 1 | 1 |
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Partygreen1 sentence2022See infra Part IV. 24 “The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited to challenge a statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court—those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution.’” Pearson v. United States, 581 A.2d 347, 356 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)). “[A] law may be invalidated as overbroad if a ‘substantial number of its applications are | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
ANTOINETTE BOLZ v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
green
2 sentences2025In that case, the appellant was convicted under Section 22-1312 after he climbed on top of a wooden structure located on public property during a protest and urinated “in full view of the people on site.” Id. at 1134-36 . 2025Although we have not addressed whether the current version of Section 22-1312 can apply to conduct on private property, in Bolz we discussed the scope of the statute in the context of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge. 149 A.3d 1130 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham
green
2 sentences1995It does not. [5] In addressing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court has stated that "where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and not as it was originally written." Osborne, supra note 4, 495 U.S. at 118, 110 S.Ct. at 1701 [6] (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91-92 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213-214 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176 (1965)). 1995It does not. [5] In addressing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court has stated that "where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and not as it was originally written." Osborne, supra note 4, 495 U.S. at 118, 110 S.Ct. at 1701 [6] (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91-92 , 86 S.Ct. 211, 213-214 , 15 L.Ed.2d 176 (1965)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.