right to fair warning in Indiana

2024The purpose of our prohibition against ex post facto laws “is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009). [7] Shibli acknowledges that, after he had been convicted in 1998, Indiana law had required him to register as a sex offender in Indiana for ten years and that Florida law had required him to register for life.

2013The policy underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that “persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Armstrong v. State, 848 -N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.2006) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 , 97 S.Ct. 990, 992-93 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260, 265 (1977)). 2 In evaluating an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution we apply what is commonly known as the “intent-effects” test. 3 Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind.2009).

2015Underlying this prohibition is “‘the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-MI-805 | August 21, 2015 Page 5 of 7 penalties.’” Id. at 1093 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977)). [11] In Hernandez, our Supreme Court determined that, under the law as it existed in 1975, those serving life sentences were not eligible for parole.

2012“The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Fact Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind.2009) (citing Armstrong v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.2006)).

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-3035| April 9, 2020 Page 9 of 11 [17] The Tyson Court held that “[t]he principle fundamental to this [ex post facto] prohibition is that people have a right to fair warning of the criminal penalties that may result from their conduct.” Id. at 92 .

2017Likewise, as Justice Mas-sa wrote for our Supreme Court, it is a fundamental principle that “people have a right to fair warning of the criminal penalties that may result from their conduct.” Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 92 (Ind. 2016).

2015Underlying this prohibition is “‘the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-MI-805 | August 21, 2015 Page 5 of 7 penalties.’” Id. at 1093 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977)). [11] In Hernandez, our Supreme Court determined that, under the law as it existed in 1975, those serving life sentences were not eligible for parole.

2013The policy underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that “persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Armstrong v. State, 848 -N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.2006) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 , 97 S.Ct. 990, 992-93 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260, 265 (1977)). 2 In evaluating an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution we apply what is commonly known as the “intent-effects” test. 3 Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind.2009).

2015“The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Id.; see also Blakemore v. State, 925 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). [13] When we evaluate an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution, our courts apply the “intent-effects” test.

2015“The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Id.; see also Blakemore v. State, 925 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). [13] When we evaluate an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution, our courts apply the “intent-effects” test.

2012“The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind. 2009).

2012“The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind.2009).

2016“The policy underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which -will give rise to criminal penalties.” Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 316 (quotation omitted). [10] The Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether the retroactive application of the 2001 amendment,. which changed the registration requirement from ten years to life, violated Indiana’s ex post facto provision in Gonzalez.

2014“The policy underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that ‘persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.’” Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ind. 2013) (citations omitted). 3 In 2006, the General Assembly recodified and moved the Act to Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8.

2014Id. at 1149 .

2009This ex post facto clause gives effect to "the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties." Id. (citing Armstrong v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ind.2006)).

2015Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind.2010) (citing Armstrong v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.2006)). [7] Tyson contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss his charge of failure to register as a sex offender.

2012Our Supreme Court has stated that the “underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Hevner, 919 N.E.2d at 111 .

2023A “judicial alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law” violates the principle of fair warning and must not be given retroactive effect “where it is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’” Id. at 462 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)). [57] The Rogers standard is easily met here.

2015Burton v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

2015The underlying purpose of the ex post facto clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of the type of conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties. [8] Burton v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. 1 Ind. Code ch. 11-8-8.

2012“Generally, a challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute must be raised by a motion to dismiss prior to trial, and the failure to do so waives the issue on appeal.” Adams v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2006This principle — “the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties” — “is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty.” Marks, 430 U.S. at 191, 97 S.Ct. 990 ; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939).

2006This principle — “the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties” — “is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty.” Marks, 430 U.S. at 191, 97 S.Ct. 990 ; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939).