right to fair warning in Connecticut

2003Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S. Ct. 1242 , 39 L.

2003Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S. Ct. 1242 , 39 L.

2001Ed. 2d 903 (1983); State v. Wilchinski, supra, 242 Conn. 219 ; State v. DeFrancesco, 235 Conn. 426, 443 , 668 A.2d 348 (1995); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 802 , 640 A.2d 986 (1994). “[The doctrine] embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 459-60 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988).

2001Ed. 2d 903 (1983); State v. Wilchinski, supra, 242 Conn. 219 ; State v. DeFrancesco, 235 Conn. 426, 443 , 668 A.2d 348 (1995); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 802 , 640 A.2d 986 (1994). “[The doctrine] embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 459-60 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988).

2001To demonstrate that § 13a-149 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the plaintiff therefore “must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, supra, 322. “[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks om

2001To demonstrate that § 13a-149 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the plaintiff therefore “must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, supra, 322. “[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks om

2022If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness [because] [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753 , 758–59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). ‘‘The United States Supreme Court has set forth stan- dards for evaluating vagueness.

2022If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness [because] [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753 , 758–59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). ‘‘The United States Supreme Court has set forth stan- dards for evaluating vagueness.

2022In Kiyak, Lagnese and Wanzer, the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits. 4 See State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239 , 269–70, 20 A.3d 52 (‘‘[W]e are mindful that [a] statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central pre- cepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . .

2022In Kiyak, Lagnese and Wanzer, the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits. 4 See State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239 , 269–70, 20 A.3d 52 (‘‘[W]e are mindful that [a] statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central pre- cepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . .

2022If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912 , 27 A.3d 371 (2011). 5 The plaintiff neither cited nor analyzed the Mathews factors in his brief to the Superior Court.

2021If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inher- ent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239 , 269–70, 20 A.3d 52 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912 , 27 A.3d 371 (2011).

2015State v. Knybel, 281 Conn. 707, 713 , 916 A.2d 816 (2007). ‘‘[A] penal statute [must] define [a] criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohib- ited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [This concept] embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . . [T]he [most] important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice . . . but . . . the require- ment that a l

2015State v. Knybel, 281 Conn. 707, 713 , 916 A.2d 816 (2007). ‘‘[A] penal statute [must] define [a] criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohib- ited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [This concept] embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . . [T]he [most] important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice . . . but . . . the require- ment that a l

2026If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be State v. Dore void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ares, 345 Conn. 290 , 303–304, 284 A.3d 967 (2022).

2025Laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accord- ingly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Middletown v. Wagner, 228 Conn. App. 265, 281 , 325 A.3d 253 (2024). ‘‘If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained [it] will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . .

2023If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness [because] [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Lori T., 345 Conn. 44, 54 , 282 A.3d 1233 (2022).

2021Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 156 , 947 A.2d 282 (2008) (‘‘[t]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement’’ (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). ‘‘For statutes that do not implicate the especially sensitive concerns embodied in the first amendment, we determine the constitutionality of a statute under attack for vagueness by considering its applicability to the particular facts at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 215 Conn

2021Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 156 , 947 A.2d 282 (2008) (‘‘[t]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement’’ (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). ‘‘For statutes that do not implicate the especially sensitive concerns embodied in the first amendment, we determine the constitutionality of a statute under attack for vagueness by considering its applicability to the particular facts at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 215 Conn

2021Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 156 , 947 A.2d 282 (2008) (‘‘[t]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement’’ (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). ‘‘For statutes that do not implicate the especially sensitive concerns embodied in the first amendment, we determine the constitutionality of a statute under attack for vagueness by considering its applicability to the particular facts at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 215 Conn

2021Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 156 , 947 A.2d 282 (2008) (‘‘[t]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement’’ (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). ‘‘For statutes that do not implicate the especially sensitive concerns embodied in the first amendment, we determine the constitutionality of a statute under attack for vagueness by considering its applicability to the particular facts at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 215 Conn

2015To prove that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the challenging party must establish that an ordinary person is not able to know what conduct is permitted and prohibited under the statute.’’ (Citations omitted.) Bot- tone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652 , 657–58, 553 A.2d 576 (1989). ‘‘To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to [him], the [plaintiff] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vaguenes

2015To prove that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the challenging party must establish that an ordinary person is not able to know what conduct is permitted and prohibited under the statute.’’ (Citations omitted.) Bot- tone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652 , 657–58, 553 A.2d 576 (1989). ‘‘To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to [him], the [plaintiff] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vaguenes

2012To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate *524 notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] .the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Farricielli, 269 Conn. 187, 204 , 848 A.2d 1206 (2004). “[A] scienter

2012To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate *524 notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] .the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Farricielli, 269 Conn. 187, 204 , 848 A.2d 1206 (2004). “[A] scienter

2012To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate *524 notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] .the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Farricielli, 269 Conn. 187, 204 , 848 A.2d 1206 (2004). “[A] scienter

2012To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate *524 notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] .the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Farricielli, 269 Conn. 187, 204 , 848 A.2d 1206 (2004). “[A] scienter

2012If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute wall not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stuart, 113 Conn. App. 541, 560-61 , 967 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009).

2012If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute wall not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stuart, 113 Conn. App. 541, 560-61 , 967 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009).

2012If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute wall not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stuart, 113 Conn. App. 541, 560-61 , 967 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009).

2012If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute wall not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stuart, 113 Conn. App. 541, 560-61 , 967 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009).

2012Ed. 2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S. Ct. 2023 , 72 L.

2012Ed. 2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S. Ct. 2023 , 72 L.

2012Ed. 2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S. Ct. 2023 , 72 L.

2010First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute ... and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement....

2010First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute ... and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement....

2010For that reason ... [i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, [the construction] must not be given retroactive effect." [73] (Citations *71 omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, at 457 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 .

2008If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 709-10 , 905 A.2d 24 (2006).

2008If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 709-10 , 905 A.2d 24 (2006).

2007In fact, aside from citing State v. Hamlin, 90 Conn. App. 445 , 878 A.2d 374 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 914 , 888 A.2d 86 (2005), for the void for vagueness doctrine, the defendant cites no relevant facts and provides no legal analysis in support of his vagueness challenge.

2007In fact, aside from citing State v. Hamlin, 90 Conn. App. 445 , 878 A.2d 374 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 914 , 888 A.2d 86 (2005), for the void for vagueness doctrine, the defendant cites no relevant facts and provides no legal analysis in support of his vagueness challenge.

2007In fact, aside from citing State v. Hamlin, 90 Conn. App. 445 , 878 A.2d 374 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 914 , 888 A.2d 86 (2005), for the void for vagueness doctrine, the defendant cites no relevant facts and provides no legal analysis in support of his vagueness challenge.

2007In fact, aside from citing State v. Hamlin, 90 Conn. App. 445 , 878 A.2d 374 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 914 , 888 A.2d 86 (2005), for the void for vagueness doctrine, the defendant cites no relevant facts and provides no legal analysis in support of his vagueness challenge.

2006If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [mjany statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 158-59 , 778 A.2d 955 (2001). 11 We are also mindful of the petitioner’s status as a parolee. 12 “We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole

2006If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [mjany statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 158-59 , 778 A.2d 955 (2001). 11 We are also mindful of the petitioner’s status as a parolee. 12 “We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole