early rule in Delaware

1935This was conceded, though not decided in General Baking Co. v. Soles, 18 Del. 343 , 162 A. 58 .

1935This *Page 650 was conceded, though not decided in General Baking Co. v. Soles, 18 Del.

1994But see Clark, 347 Pa.Super. 128 , 500 A.2d at 442-43 (subsequent disclosure to a third person by the speaker-spouse of a conversation that otherwise falls within the marital communication privilege does not constitute waiver); Commonwealth v. Ferri, 410 Pa.Super. 67 , 599 A.2d 208, 211-12 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189 , 127 L.Ed.2d 540 (1994) (extending Clark’s nonwaiver rule to the attorney-client privilege).

1994See D.R.E. 510; Wilkinson, 136 N.H. 170 , 612 A.2d at 931 ; Model Code of Evidence 218 cmt. (1942) (elucidating in comment to an early waiver provision that “[t]he theory of the Rule is that a spouse ought not to be able to select for disclosure from among communications upon a given subject those which he deems favorable, and to suppress the rest[ ]”); see also Dutton v. State, Del.Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 145 (1982) (defendant’s subsequent disclosure of matter communicated to him in an attorney-client context constituted waiver of the attorney-client privilege).

1994See D.R.E. 510; Wilkinson, 136 N.H. 170 , 612 A.2d at 931 ; Model Code of Evidence 218 cmt. (1942) (elucidating in comment to an early waiver provision that “[t]he theory of the Rule is that a spouse ought not to be able to select for disclosure from among communications upon a given subject those which he deems favorable, and to suppress the rest[ ]”); see also Dutton v. State, Del.Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 145 (1982) (defendant’s subsequent disclosure of matter communicated to him in an attorney-client context constituted waiver of the attorney-client privilege).

1994But see Clark, 347 Pa.Super. 128 , 500 A.2d at 442-43 (subsequent disclosure to a third person by the speaker-spouse of a conversation that otherwise falls within the marital communication privilege does not constitute waiver); Commonwealth v. Ferri, 410 Pa.Super. 67 , 599 A.2d 208, 211-12 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189 , 127 L.Ed.2d 540 (1994) (extending Clark’s nonwaiver rule to the attorney-client privilege).

1969In the case of Capitol Bakers v. Leahy, 20 Del.Ch. 407 , 178 A. 648 , a case concerned with protecting a baker whose employees would necessarily acquire knowledge of bakery affairs and its customers, as is the case here, this Court noted that Delaware recognized the general validity of restrictive covenants in employment contracts, stating: “Whatever might have been the early rule on the subject, it is now too well settled to be disputed that an agreement by an employee not to follow his trade or business for a limited time and during a limited period is not void as against public policy, when

1969In the case of Original Vincent and Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavone, 36 Del.Ch. 548, 551 , 134 A.2d 843, 845 , the Court stated: “Turning to the present application I am first of all persuaded that courts of equity are less prone to enforce a restriction against competition in the case of a mere employment contract than in a case where such a restriction is part of a contract for the sale of a business, 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1643.” And while this Court evidently once paid lip service to what was referred to as the “blue pencil test” and granted partial enforcement of parts of restrict

1969In the case of Capitol Bakers v. Leahy, 20 Del.Ch. 407 , 178 A. 648 , a case concerned with protecting a baker whose employees would necessarily acquire knowledge of bakery affairs and its customers, as is the case here, this Court noted that Delaware recognized the general validity of restrictive covenants in employment contracts, stating: “Whatever might have been the early rule on the subject, it is now too well settled to be disputed that an agreement by an employee not to follow his trade or business for a limited time and during a limited period is not void as against public policy, when

1969In the case of Original Vincent and Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavone, 36 Del.Ch. 548, 551 , 134 A.2d 843, 845 , the Court stated: “Turning to the present application I am first of all persuaded that courts of equity are less prone to enforce a restriction against competition in the case of a mere employment contract than in a case where such a restriction is part of a contract for the sale of a business, 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1643.” And while this Court evidently once paid lip service to what was referred to as the “blue pencil test” and granted partial enforcement of parts of restrict

1969In the case of Original Vincent and Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavone, 36 Del.Ch. 548, 551 , 134 A.2d 843, 845 , the Court stated: “Turning to the present application I am first of all persuaded that courts of equity are less prone to enforce a restriction against competition in the case of a mere employment contract than in a case where such a restriction is part of a contract for the sale of a business, 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1643.” And while this Court evidently once paid lip service to what was referred to as the “blue pencil test” and granted partial enforcement of parts of restrict

1969In the case of Original Vincent and Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavone, 36 Del.Ch. 548, 551 , 134 A.2d 843, 845 , the Court stated: “Turning to the present application I am first of all persuaded that courts of equity are less prone to enforce a restriction against competition in the case of a mere employment contract than in a case where such a restriction is part of a contract for the sale of a business, 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1643.” And while this Court evidently once paid lip service to what was referred to as the “blue pencil test” and granted partial enforcement of parts of restrict

1969In the case of Original Vincent and Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavone, 36 Del.Ch. 548, 551 , 134 A.2d 843, 845 , the Court stated: “Turning to the present application I am first of all persuaded that courts of equity are less prone to enforce a restriction against competition in the case of a mere employment contract than in a case where such a restriction is part of a contract for the sale of a business, 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1643.” And while this Court evidently once paid lip service to what was referred to as the “blue pencil test” and granted partial enforcement of parts of restrict

1969In the case of Original Vincent and Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavone, 36 Del.Ch. 548, 551 , 134 A.2d 843, 845 , the Court stated: “Turning to the present application I am first of all persuaded that courts of equity are less prone to enforce a restriction against competition in the case of a mere employment contract than in a case where such a restriction is part of a contract for the sale of a business, 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1643.” And while this Court evidently once paid lip service to what was referred to as the “blue pencil test” and granted partial enforcement of parts of restrict

1932Townsend v. Townsend, 5 Harr. 20 ; Staats v. Herbert, 4 Del.