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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilliam v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s 2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s | 2 | 2 |
Donald David Dillbeck v. State of Florida & Donald David Dillbeck v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc.green2 sentences2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s 2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s | 2 | 2 |
William E. Wells, III v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2025See Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597 (rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty (citing Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2 , 15-16 (Fla. 2020))); see also Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015 (finding no constitutional defect with Florida’s death penalty statute based on the number of aggravating factors). 2025See Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597 (rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty (citing Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2 , 15-16 (Fla. 2020))); see also Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015 (finding no constitutional defect with Florida’s death penalty statute based on the number of aggravating factors). | 2 | 2 |
James Terry Colley, Jr. v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2025See Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597 (rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty (citing Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2 , 15-16 (Fla. 2020))); see also Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015 (finding no constitutional defect with Florida’s death penalty statute based on the number of aggravating factors). 2025See Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597 (rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty (citing Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2 , 15-16 (Fla. 2020))); see also Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015 (finding no constitutional defect with Florida’s death penalty statute based on the number of aggravating factors). | 2 | 2 |
Thomas Bevel v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2025See Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597 (rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty (citing Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2 , 15-16 (Fla. 2020))); see also Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015 (finding no constitutional defect with Florida’s death penalty statute based on the number of aggravating factors). 2025See Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597 (rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty (citing Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2 , 15-16 (Fla. 2020))); see also Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015 (finding no constitutional defect with Florida’s death penalty statute based on the number of aggravating factors). | 2 | 2 |
Card v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s 2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s | 2 | 2 |
Christian Cruz v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 104-05 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the Court has consistently rejected as ‘without merit’ challenges that the HAC aggravator is ‘overbroad, vague, and fail[s] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731 (“declin[ing] to revisit” precedent “rejecting as meritless the argument that the jury instruction on HAC is unconstitutionally vague” (citing Gilliam v. State, 582 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991))). - 38 - Finally, we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s 2025See, e.g., Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695 , 723 (Fla. 2021). - 18 - He argues that this comment was an improper attempt to convert mitigating evidence into aggravating evidence in violation of the trial court’s order on Fletcher’s pretrial motion in limine.13 However, the trial court sustained Fletcher’s objection to this comment during the penalty phase and gave a curative instruction. | 2 | 2 |
Caldwell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2025Cf. Caldwell, 980 So. 2d at 1229; Dawson, 300 So. 3d at 251. 2025Cf. Caldwell, 980 So. 2d at 1229 ; Dawson, 300 So. 3d at 251. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fletcher v. State
green
2 sentences1999Fletcher, 619 So.2d at 334 . 1997Fletcher, 619 So.2d at 334 . | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Loran Cole v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 211-13 . 2025To the extent Fletcher challenges the ruling on his motion for a mistrial, a decision on a motion for mistrial “is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should be granted only when Fletcher with antisocial personality disorder, and, given that context, this Court rejected Fletcher’s claim that the State elicited testimony of “future dangerousness” based on Dr. Prichard’s description of antisocial personality disorder as a “chronic disorder.” Id. at 210 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.