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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence1987See Davis v. State, 474 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Cappetta v. State, 471 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court’s stated basis for extension of speedy trial period not supported on record, defendant discharged), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1296 (Fla.1985); Rico v. State, 463 So.2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Rico v. Stategreen1 sentence1987See Davis v. State, 474 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Cappetta v. State, 471 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court’s stated basis for extension of speedy trial period not supported on record, defendant discharged), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1296 (Fla.1985); Rico v. State, 463 So.2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Dedmon v. Stategreen1 sentence1987But see Wright v. State, 486 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (witness’ labor pains were unforeseeable); Valle v. State, 444 So.2d 534 , 535 (Fla. 3d DCA) (witness’ early departure for vacation prior to trial beginning was unforeseeable), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 851 (Fla.1984); Dedmon v. State, 400 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (prosecutor not told of witness’ anticipated absence until night before trial), disapproved on other grounds, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982); and (3) the defendant was therefore entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule. | 1 | 1 |
Cappetta v. Stategreen1 sentence1987See Davis v. State, 474 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Cappetta v. State, 471 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court’s stated basis for extension of speedy trial period not supported on record, defendant discharged), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1296 (Fla.1985); Rico v. State, 463 So.2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Johnson *918 v. State, 442 So.2d 193, 197 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 , 104 S.Ct. 2181 , 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valle v. Stateyellow1 sentence1987But see Wright v. State, 486 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (witness’ labor pains were unforeseeable); Valle v. State, 444 So.2d 534 , 535 (Fla. 3d DCA) (witness’ early departure for vacation prior to trial beginning was unforeseeable), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 851 (Fla.1984); Dedmon v. State, 400 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (prosecutor not told of witness’ anticipated absence until night before trial), disapproved on other grounds, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982); and (3) the defendant was therefore entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule. | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Stateyellow1 sentence1987But see Wright v. State, 486 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (witness’ labor pains were unforeseeable); Valle v. State, 444 So.2d 534 , 535 (Fla. 3d DCA) (witness’ early departure for vacation prior to trial beginning was unforeseeable), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 851 (Fla.1984); Dedmon v. State, 400 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (prosecutor not told of witness’ anticipated absence until night before trial), disapproved on other grounds, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982); and (3) the defendant was therefore entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Quinn v. State
neutral
1 sentence2007Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court is bound by supreme court precedent. 713 So.2d at 1049 . [7] This unique situation perhaps highlights the difficulty in engrafting the Florida speedy trial rule onto the requirements of the IADA. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Vazquez
green
1 sentence1987But see Wright v. State, 486 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (witness’ labor pains were unforeseeable); Valle v. State, 444 So.2d 534 , 535 (Fla. 3d DCA) (witness’ early departure for vacation prior to trial beginning was unforeseeable), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 851 (Fla.1984); Dedmon v. State, 400 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (prosecutor not told of witness’ anticipated absence until night before trial), disapproved on other grounds, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982); and (3) the defendant was therefore entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Pollard v. United States
green
2 sentences1986Appellee proclaims this to be merely a resentencing procedure which is not integrated with the speedy trial/Sixth Amendment concept and contends that there is nothing in the Florida speedy trial rule nor in the rationale of Barker v. Wingo, a speedy trial situation, that applies to a remand for resentencing and that there is no correlation between the necessity for a speedy trial of a criminal case on the merits where memories fade and evidence can be misplaced, and a mere sentencing procedure. 1 Our research reveals no Florida cases on point and no final answer from the United States Supreme 1986Appellee proclaims this to be merely a resentencing procedure which is not integrated with the speedy trial/Sixth Amendment concept and contends that there is nothing in the Florida speedy trial rule nor in the rationale of Barker v. Wingo, a speedy trial situation, that applies to a remand for resentencing and that there is no correlation between the necessity for a speedy trial of a criminal case on the merits where memories fade and evidence can be misplaced, and a mere sentencing procedure. 1 Our research reveals no Florida cases on point and no final answer from the United States Supreme | 1 | 1986–1986 |
James Gable v. Raymond D. Massey, Superintendent, Union Correctional Institution
green
1 sentence1986Appellee proclaims this to be merely a resentencing procedure which is not integrated with the speedy trial/Sixth Amendment concept and contends that there is nothing in the Florida speedy trial rule nor in the rationale of Barker v. Wingo, a speedy trial situation, that applies to a remand for resentencing and that there is no correlation between the necessity for a speedy trial of a criminal case on the merits where memories fade and evidence can be misplaced, and a mere sentencing procedure. 1 Our research reveals no Florida cases on point and no final answer from the United States Supreme | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Kelly
green
1 sentence1984In State v. Kelly, 407 So.2d 257 , the Second District Court of Appeals held: “The Florida Speedy Trial rule requires that the State bring the defendant to trial within a specified period. | 1 | 1984–1984 |