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5 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Co.green2 sentences2019Co., 436 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (quoting City of St. 1989In DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Co., noting the distinction between the sword and shield doctrine per se and the privilege against self-incrimination, this court adopted the rationale of a case from the Second District Court of Appeal, Delisi v. Smith, 423 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 434 So.2d 887 (Fla.1983), that, “when a trial court is presented with such a contention, it must exercise its discretion and determine whether it is reasonably possible that answers to either interrogatories or deposition questions could evoke a response ‘forming a link in a chain of ev | 1 | 2 |
Village Inn Restaurant v. Aridigreen2 sentences2019Cf. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1313-14 (Fla. 1981) (explaining that the trial court has discretion to exclude evidence that is not timely disclosed during discovery if the resulting prejudice to the opposing party cannot otherwise be cured); Village Inn Restaurant v. Aridi, 543 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (explaining that sanctions short of dismissal may be imposed under the sword and shield doctrine). 1998In a more recent case, Village Inn Restaurant v. Aridi, 543 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), the first district has concluded that the sword and shield doctrine under Minor should not be read to require a dismissal every time a civil plaintiff invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege. | 1 | 2 |
Binger v. King Pest Controlgreen1 sentence2019Cf. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1313-14 (Fla. 1981) (explaining that the trial court has discretion to exclude evidence that is not timely disclosed during discovery if the resulting prejudice to the opposing party cannot otherwise be cured); Village Inn Restaurant v. Aridi, 543 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (explaining that sanctions short of dismissal may be imposed under the sword and shield doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
Jenney v. Airdata Wiman, Inc.green1 sentence2019See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney."); see also Jenney, 846 So. 2d at 668 ("[B]ecause Jenney's claim does not necessarily require proof through his conversations -7- with his attorney, the sword and shield doctrine does not apply to waive his attorney- client privilege.").3 By finding a waiver, the trial court implicitly concluded that the underlying communications were, in fact, privileged. | 1 | 1 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney."); see also Jenney, 846 So. 2d at 668 ("[B]ecause Jenney's claim does not necessarily require proof through his conversations -7- with his attorney, the sword and shield doctrine does not apply to waive his attorney- client privilege.").3 By finding a waiver, the trial court implicitly concluded that the underlying communications were, in fact, privileged. | 1 | 1 |
Savino v. Lucianogreen1 sentence2003Savino v. Luciano, 92 So.2d 817, 819 (Fla.1957). | 1 | 1 |
Delisi v. Smithgreen1 sentence1989In DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Co., noting the distinction between the sword and shield doctrine per se and the privilege against self-incrimination, this court adopted the rationale of a case from the Second District Court of Appeal, Delisi v. Smith, 423 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 434 So.2d 887 (Fla.1983), that, “when a trial court is presented with such a contention, it must exercise its discretion and determine whether it is reasonably possible that answers to either interrogatories or deposition questions could evoke a response ‘forming a link in a chain of ev | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Long v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2003Cf. Long v. Murphy, 663 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting application of the sword and shield doctrine to waive attorney-client privilege because the plaintiff could rely on his own testimony and cross-examination of the defendants to prove his case and thus had no need to use privileged communications with his attorneys to establish his claims). 2003Cf. Long v. Murphy, 663 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting application of the sword and shield doctrine to waive attorney-client privilege because the plaintiff could rely on his own testimony and cross-examination of the defendants to prove his case and thus had no need to use privileged communications with his attorneys to establish his claims). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Carl D. Wehling and Geraldine D. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System
green
1 sentence1998In reaching its conclusion the court relied to a great extent on Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.1979). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Stockham v. Stockham
green
1 sentence1989Our reading of the DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Co., in conjunction with American Air Transport, Inc. v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 452 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) and Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla.1964), indicates that the sword and shield test is not whether the party raising the privilege is a defendant or a plaintiff, as the wife argues, but whether the person is seeking affirmative relief, no matter what his designation as a party. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
American Air Transport, Inc. v. Seafirst Commercial Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1989Our reading of the DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Co., in conjunction with American Air Transport, Inc. v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 452 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) and Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla.1964), indicates that the sword and shield test is not whether the party raising the privilege is a defendant or a plaintiff, as the wife argues, but whether the person is seeking affirmative relief, no matter what his designation as a party. | 1 | 1989–1989 |