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5 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brake v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The district court also determined that the statute creates an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption in section 787.025(2)(b), which provides that luring a child "without the consent of the child's parent or legal guardian shall be prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose." Brake, 746 So.2d at 529 . 2001See id. at 529 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Franklin
green
2 sentences1990To arrive at the conclusion in Norvell that section 713.34(3) creates an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), a post-Ferrari decision dealing with the constitutionality of jury instructions involving the element of intent in a criminal prosecution. 1990To arrive at the conclusion in Norvell that section 713.34(3) creates an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), a post-Ferrari decision dealing with the constitutionality of jury instructions involving the element of intent in a criminal prosecution. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
Wilhelm v. State
green
1 sentence1990Wilhelm v State, 544 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rolle v. State
green
1 sentence1989This court previously held in Rolle v. State, 528 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), that such instruction creates an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption of impairment in that it offends the requirement of due process by relieving the state of its burden to prove this essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Richard Miller v. C.L. Norvell, Sheriff, St. Lucie County Jail, Dr. Barbara Greadington, Commissioner, Fppc and Louie L. Wainwright
green
1 sentence1988Based upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), and Miller v. Norvell, 775 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir.1985), Rolle contends that the aforesaid statute and instruction thereon given by the court create an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption on the issue of impairment — an issue that must be proven to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt — because they relieve the state of its burden of proof of the essential element of impairment by instructing the jury not that it has a choice to determine whether the defendant was impaired based | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.