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5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1921–1976 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Freeman v. Browngreen2 sentences1957A fortiori, a new sentence can not be pronounced after the term has passed and the first or original sentence has been either wholly or in part complied with; and no amendment' to the judgment can take place, where to allow it would require the passing of a new sentence.” In Freeman v. Brown, 115 Ga. 23, 27 ( 41 S. E. 385 ) the following appears: “The oral announcement of the judge was no judgment . . . 1957A fortiori, a new sentence can not be pronounced after the term has passed and the first or original sentence has been either wholly or in part complied with; and no amendment' to the judgment can take place, where to allow it would require the passing of a new sentence.” In Freeman v. Brown, 115 Ga. 23, 27 ( 41 S. E. 385 ) the following appears: “The oral announcement of the judge was no judgment . . . | 1 | 1 |
Ruffin v. Stategreen2 sentences1921See Ruffin v. State, 151 Ga. 743 ( 108 S. E. 29 ). 1921See Ruffin v. State, 151 Ga. 743 ( 108 S. E. 29 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Porter v. Garmony
neutral
2 sentences1976Held: Code Ann. § 27-2502 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 352, 354) recites: "After the term of court at which the sentence is imposed by the judge, he shall have no authority to suspend, probate, modify or change the sentence of said prisoner, except as otherwise provided." In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 (1) ( 96 SE 426 ), the Supreme Court held: "Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chain-gang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court wa 1976Held: Code Ann. § 27-2502 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 352, 354) recites: "After the term of court at which the sentence is imposed by the judge, he shall have no authority to suspend, probate, modify or change the sentence of said prisoner, except as otherwise provided." In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 (1) ( 96 SE 426 ), the Supreme Court held: "Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chain-gang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court wa | 3 | 1943–1976 |
Rutland v. State
green
2 sentences1957Dixon v. Baughn, 149 Ga. 86 ( 99 S. E. 34 ).” In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 (1) ( 96 S. E. 426 ) the following appears: “Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chaingang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the trial court was without authority at a subsequent term, upon making the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, to modify and change the sentence formerly imposed; and where h 1957Dixon v. Baughn, 149 Ga. 86 ( 99 S. E. 34 ).” In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 (1) ( 96 S. E. 426 ) the following appears: “Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chaingang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the trial court was without authority at a subsequent term, upon making the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, to modify and change the sentence formerly imposed; and where h | 2 | 1943–1957 |
Dixon v. Baughn
green
2 sentences1957Dixon v. Baughn, 149 Ga. 86 ( 99 S. E. 34 ).” In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 (1) ( 96 S. E. 426 ) the following appears: “Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chaingang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the trial court was without authority at a subsequent term, upon making the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, to modify and change the sentence formerly imposed; and where h 1957Dixon v. Baughn, 149 Ga. 86 ( 99 S. E. 34 ).” In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 (1) ( 96 S. E. 426 ) the following appears: “Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chaingang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the trial court was without authority at a subsequent term, upon making the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, to modify and change the sentence formerly imposed; and where h | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Gobles v. Hayes
green
2 sentences1943The principle of law contained in the decisions of this court, holding that after the adjournment of the term of court at which the sentence is imposed the judge cannot change and modify it, was not altered by the provisions of section 1 of the act relating to the probation of offenders in certain cases, approved August 16, 1913.” In Rutland v. State, 14 Ga. App. 746 ( 82 S. E. 293 ), the ruling was, that “a new sentence can not be pronounced after the term has passed and the first or original sentence has been either wholly or in part complied with; and no amendment to the judgment can take p 1943The principle of law contained in the decisions of this court, holding that after the adjournment of the term of court at which the sentence is imposed the judge cannot change and modify it, was not altered by the provisions of section 1 of the act relating to the probation of offenders in certain cases, approved August 16, 1913.” In Rutland v. State, 14 Ga. App. 746 ( 82 S. E. 293 ), the ruling was, that “a new sentence can not be pronounced after the term has passed and the first or original sentence has been either wholly or in part complied with; and no amendment to the judgment can take p | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Auldridge v. Womble
green
2 sentences1943In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 ( 96 S. E. 426 ), it was said: “Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chain-gang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the trial court was without authority at a subsequent term, upon making the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, to modify and change the sentence formerly imposed; and where he did pass an order modifying and changing the sentence, s 1943In Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261 ( 96 S. E. 426 ), it was said: “Where one accused of a misdemeanor was convicted, and at the term at which the trial took place was sentenced to serve a term in the chain-gang, and the accused carried the case by writ of error to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the trial court was without authority at a subsequent term, upon making the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, to modify and change the sentence formerly imposed; and where he did pass an order modifying and changing the sentence, s | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Mathews v. Swatts
neutral
1 sentence1943The principle of law contained in the decisions of this court, holding that after the adjournment of the term of court at which the sentence is imposed the judge cannot change and modify it, was not altered by the provisions of section 1 of the act relating to the probation of offenders in certain cases, approved August 16, 1913.” In Rutland v. State, 14 Ga. App. 746 ( 82 S. E. 293 ), the ruling was, that “a new sentence can not be pronounced after the term has passed and the first or original sentence has been either wholly or in part complied with; and no amendment to the judgment can take p | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Beasley v. Anderson
neutral
2 sentences1930Beasley v. Anderson, 167 Ga. 470 ( 146 S. E. 22 ). 1930Beasley v. Anderson, 167 Ga. 470 ( 146 S. E. 22 ). | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.