intermediate scrutiny test in Georgia

2024Instead, a burden on expression subject to intermediate scrutiny satisfies the fourth prong if it “promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (citation and punctuation omitted).16 As the Ward Court explained, the fourth prong of the O’Brien test does not require that the challenged law be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of “serv[ing] the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests[.]” Id. at 798 ; see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301-302 (explaining that under the intermediate scruti

2024Instead, a burden on expression subject to intermediate scrutiny satisfies the fourth prong if it “promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (citation and punctuation omitted).16 As the Ward Court explained, the fourth prong of the O’Brien test does not require that the challenged law be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of “serv[ing] the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests[.]” Id. at 798 ; see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301-302 (explaining that under the intermediate scruti

2024Instead, a burden on expression subject to intermediate scrutiny satisfies the fourth prong if it “promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (citation and punctuation omitted).16 As the Ward Court explained, the fourth prong of the O’Brien test does not require that the challenged law be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of “serv[ing] the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests[.]” Id. at 798 ; see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301-302 (explaining that under the intermediate scruti

2024Instead, a burden on expression subject to intermediate scrutiny satisfies the fourth prong if it “promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (citation and punctuation omitted).16 As the Ward Court explained, the fourth prong of the O’Brien test does not require that the challenged law be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of “serv[ing] the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests[.]” Id. at 798; see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301-302 (explaining that under the intermediate scrutin

2024And although the Supreme Court has said, in the context of an equal-protection challenge, that “[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statues,” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 ( 103 SCt 1997 , 76 LE2d 129) (1983), I am not convinced that this statement means that a legislature’s discretion is so broad that taxes that expressly impose burdens on expression but are not subject to strict scrutiny because they are content-neutral somehow evade judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment altogether an

2024And although the Supreme Court has said, in the context of an equal-protection challenge, that “[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statues,” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 ( 103 SCt 1997 , 76 LE2d 129) (1983), I am not convinced that this statement means that a legislature’s discretion is so broad that taxes that expressly impose burdens on expression but are not subject to strict scrutiny because they are content-neutral somehow evade judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment altogether an

2024Indeed, the Ward Court was considering a lower court’s decision that had understood 16 Ward considered a time, place, manner restriction on speech, but explained, when considering the tailoring requirement, that the requirements for a time, place, or manner restriction that burdens speech are equivalent to that in O’Brien: “[W]e have held that the O’Brien test ‘in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.’” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 ( 104 SCt 3065 , 82 LE2

2024Indeed, the Ward Court was considering a lower court’s decision that had understood 16 Ward considered a time, place, manner restriction on speech, but explained, when considering the tailoring requirement, that the requirements for a time, place, or manner restriction that burdens speech are equivalent to that in O’Brien: “[W]e have held that the O’Brien test ‘in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.’” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 ( 104 SCt 3065 , 82 LE2

2024See Green v. State, 318 Ga. 610 , 611 ( 898 SE2d 62 scrutiny applies. 29 See Maj.

2024See Green v. State, 318 Ga. 610, 611 (898 SE2d 62 scrutiny applies. 29 See Maj.

2024In light of the Assessment’s content neutrality and aim at secondary effects, I conclude that the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 ( 88 SCt 1673 , 20 LE2d 672) (1968), applies.

2024In light of the Assessment’s content neutrality and aim at secondary effects, I conclude that the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 ( 88 SCt 1673 , 20 LE2d 672) (1968), applies.

2024City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289 ; see also Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 ( 117 SCt 1174 , 137 LE 2d 369) (1997) (describing O’Brien test as “intermediate scrutiny”); Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 192 (III) (citing O’Brien when describing intermediate scrutiny).

2024City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289 ; see also Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 ( 117 SCt 1174 , 137 LE 2d 369) (1997) (describing O’Brien test as “intermediate scrutiny”); Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 192 (III) (citing O’Brien when describing intermediate scrutiny).

2024The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 ( 122 SCt 1728 , 152 LE2d 670) (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that “secondary effects” are “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience,” such as pollution caused by a newspaper factory or an obstructed view caused by a billboard). 28 Although I have my own concerns about pitfalls of the intermediate scrutiny test—including, as noted below, its sometimes blurry connection to strict scrutiny—this Cou

2024The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 ( 122 SCt 1728 , 152 LE2d 670) (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that “secondary effects” are “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience,” such as pollution caused by a newspaper factory or an obstructed view caused by a billboard). 28 Although I have my own concerns about pitfalls of the intermediate scrutiny test—including, as noted below, its sometimes blurry connection to strict scrutiny—this Cou

2013Rev. 1131 , 1145 (2011) (a majority of courts announcing a standard of review since Heller have adopted an intermediate scrutiny test). (c) An as-applied challenge “addresses whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or to a particular party.” Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2003Hunstein, J., disqualified. 1 OCGA § 19-6-15. 2 Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 669 ( 449 SE2d 840 ) (1994). 3 OCGA § 19-6-15 (b). 4 OCGA § 19-6-15 (c). 5 Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 400 ( 517 SE2d 53 ) (1999). 6 The trial court clearly erred in applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis to appellee’s due process and equal protection claims.

2003Hunstein, J., disqualified. 1 OCGA § 19-6-15. 2 Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 669 ( 449 SE2d 840 ) (1994). 3 OCGA § 19-6-15 (b). 4 OCGA § 19-6-15 (c). 5 Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 400 ( 517 SE2d 53 ) (1999). 6 The trial court clearly erred in applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis to appellee’s due process and equal protection claims.

2003Hunstein, J., disqualified. 1 OCGA § 19-6-15. 2 Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 669 ( 449 SE2d 840 ) (1994). 3 OCGA § 19-6-15 (b). 4 OCGA § 19-6-15 (c). 5 Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 400 ( 517 SE2d 53 ) (1999). 6 The trial court clearly erred in applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis to appellee’s due process and equal protection claims.

2003Hunstein, J., disqualified. 1 OCGA § 19-6-15. 2 Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 669 ( 449 SE2d 840 ) (1994). 3 OCGA § 19-6-15 (b). 4 OCGA § 19-6-15 (c). 5 Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 400 ( 517 SE2d 53 ) (1999). 6 The trial court clearly erred in applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis to appellee’s due process and equal protection claims.