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25 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Morgergreen2 sentences2021As part of the intermediate-scrutiny analysis, the court found no narrow tailoring, explaining the probation condition “unnecessarily sweeps within its purview those who never used the Internet—much less social media—to commit their offenses and who show no propensity to do so, as well as those whose Internet activities can be supervised and monitored by less restrictive means.” Morger, 2019 IL 123643, ¶ 58 . 2021As part of the intermediate-scrutiny analysis, the court found no narrow tailoring, explaining the probation condition “unnecessarily sweeps within its purview those who never used the Internet—much less social media—to commit their offenses and who show no propensity to do so, as well as those whose Internet activities can be supervised and monitored by less restrictive means.” Morger, 2019 IL 123643, ¶ 58 . | 3 | 4 |
People v. Rossgreen2 sentences2011In Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 , and People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 146 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011), by contrast, this court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard in upholding the constitutionality of the AUUW statute. 2011In Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 , and People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 146 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011), by contrast, this court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard in upholding the constitutionality of the AUUW statute. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Mimesgreen2 sentences2011See Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 . ¶ 67 The intermediate scrutiny inquiry asks whether the challenged law served a significant, substantial or important governmental interest, and, if so, whether the fit between the challenged law and the asserted objective was reasonable, not perfect. 2011See Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 . ¶ 67 The intermediate scrutiny inquiry asks whether the challenged law served a significant, substantial or important governmental interest, and, if so, whether the fit between the challenged law and the asserted objective was reasonable, not perfect. | 2 | 2 |
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of NY v. Foxgreen2 sentences2011Supreme Court decisions "require * * * a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is `in proportion to the interest served.'" Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)). 2011Supreme Court decisions "require * * * a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is `in proportion to the interest served.'" Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mimesgreen2 sentences2011See Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74 . ¶ 67 The intermediate scrutiny inquiry asks whether the challenged law served a significant, substantial or important governmental interest, and, if so, whether the fit between the challenged law and the asserted objective was reasonable, not perfect. 2011See Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 . ¶ 67 The intermediate scrutiny inquiry asks whether the challenged law served a significant, substantial or important governmental interest, and, if so, whether the fit between the challenged law and the asserted objective was reasonable, not perfect. | 2 | 2 |
In Re RMJgreen2 sentences2011Supreme Court decisions "require * * * a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is `in proportion to the interest served.'" Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)). 2011Supreme Court decisions "require * * * a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is `in proportion to the interest served.'" Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)). | 2 | 2 |
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2011In my opinion, under the appropriate intermediate scrutiny standard of review, "[t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions" on the constitutional rights at issue, and "the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). 2011In my opinion, under the appropriate intermediate scrutiny standard of review, "[t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions" on the constitutional rights at issue, and "the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dawsongreen2 sentences2011The majority's adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review directly conflicts with the rational basis standard of review applied in People v. Dawson, 403 Ill.App.3d 499, 510 , 343 Ill.Dec. 274 , 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010), and People v. Williams, 405 Ill.App.3d 958 , 346 Ill.Dec. 95 , 940 N.E.2d 95 (2010). 2011The majority's adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review directly conflicts with the rational basis standard of review applied in People v. Dawson, 403 Ill.App.3d 499, 510 , 343 Ill.Dec. 274 , 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010), and People v. Williams, 405 Ill.App.3d 958 , 346 Ill.Dec. 95 , 940 N.E.2d 95 (2010). | 2 | 2 |
City of Erie v. Pap's A. M.green2 sentences2007See City of Erie v. Pap’s AM., 529 U.S. 277 , 146 L. 2007See City of Erie v. Pap’s AM., 529 U.S. 277 , 146 L. | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Cook Countygreen2 sentences2011Wilson, 407 Ill.App.3d at 767 , 348 Ill.Dec. 160 , 943 N.E.2d 768 . 2011Wilson, 407 Ill.App.3d at 767 , 348 Ill.Dec. 160 , 943 N.E.2d 768 . | 1 | 6 |
United States v. Marzzarellagreen2 sentences2011The Third Circuit framed the intermediate scrutiny inquiry as whether the challenged law served a “significant,” “substantial,” or “important” government interest, and, if so, whether the “fit between the challenged [law] and the asserted objection [was] reasonable, not perfect.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 . 2011The Third Circuit framed the intermediate scrutiny inquiry as whether the challenged law served a "significant," "substantial," or "important" government interest, and, if so, whether the "fit between the challenged [law] and the asserted objection [was] reasonable, not perfect." Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 . | 1 | 5 |
People v. Aguilargreen2 sentences2011In Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 , and People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 146 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011), by contrast, this court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard in upholding the constitutionality of the AUUW statute. 2011In Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 , and People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 146 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011), by contrast, this court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard in upholding the constitutionality of the AUUW statute. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2011App. 3d at 939 (“Recently, this district in Aguilar [citation] applied the intermediate scrutiny standard in upholding the constitutionality of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute and we also find it to be the appropriate standard in the present case” involving the armed habitual criminal statute.); People v. Davis, 408 Ill. 2011See, e.g., Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 145 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (rejecting strict scrutiny), 146 ("we find intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard in the present case" for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Mimes, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d at 75 ("We find that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the second amendment challenge at issue here," the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 ("Recently, this district in Aguilar [cit | 1 | 2 |
R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockfordgreen1 sentence2007See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 , 122 S.Ct. 1728 , 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002); see also R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir.2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Clark
green
2 sentences2021Concerning overbreadth, the court similarly concluded: “ ‘[A] substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s legitimate sweep’ [citation], which is protection of the public.” (Emphasis in original.) Morger, 2019 IL 123643, ¶ 58 (quoting People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 , 6 N.E.3d 154 ). ¶ 16 Defendant argues: “Morger direct[s] the result in this case: a ban on accessing social media for the duration of MSR—which can last as long as natural life—is just as unconstitutional as a ban for the duration of a sex offender registration or probatio 2021Concerning overbreadth, the court similarly concluded: “ ‘[A] substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s legitimate sweep’ [citation], which is protection of the public.” (Emphasis in original.) Morger, 2019 IL 123643, ¶ 58 (quoting People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 , 6 N.E.3d 154 ). ¶ 16 Defendant argues: “Morger direct[s] the result in this case: a ban on accessing social media for the duration of MSR—which can last as long as natural life—is just as unconstitutional as a ban for the duration of a sex offender registration or probatio | 3 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Masciandaro
green
2 sentences2018In Masciandaro, the park at issue was a national park, and the court specifically found that it “need not *** resolve the ambiguity in the ‘sensitive places’ language in this case, because even if [the National Park] is not a sensitive place *** [the statute at issue] still passes constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard.” Id. at 473 . 2018In Masciandaro , the park at issue was a national park, and the court specifically found that it "need not * * * resolve the ambiguity in the 'sensitive places' language in this case, because even if [the National Park] is not a sensitive place * * * [the statute at issue] still passes constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard." Id. at 473 . | 3 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2011The majority's adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review directly conflicts with the rational basis standard of review applied in People v. Dawson, 403 Ill.App.3d 499, 510 , 343 Ill.Dec. 274 , 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010), and People v. Williams, 405 Ill.App.3d 958 , 346 Ill.Dec. 95 , 940 N.E.2d 95 (2010). 2011The majority's adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review directly conflicts with the rational basis standard of review applied in People v. Dawson, 403 Ill.App.3d 499, 510 , 343 Ill.Dec. 274 , 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010), and People v. Williams, 405 Ill.App.3d 958 , 346 Ill.Dec. 95 , 940 N.E.2d 95 (2010). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Clark v. Jeter
green
2 sentences1990Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 100 L. 1990Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 100 L. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Galley
green
1 sentence2023He urges us to follow the holdings of our supreme court in People v. Morger, 2019 IL 123643 , and the Fourth District in People v. Galley, 2021 IL App (4th) 180142 , and to vacate his MSR condition because it is unconstitutional. ¶ 59 The State responds that defendant’s constitutional challenge to his MSR condition is not justiciable. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Skoien
green
1 sentence2011The Seventh Circuit utilized a similar test when it considered the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. §922 (g)(9) in United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Reese
green
1 sentence2011Turning again to analogous First Amendment cases, the Third Circuit framed the intermediate scrutiny inquiry in this way: whether the challenged law served a ‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important’ governmental interest, and, if so, whether the ‘fit between the challenged [law] and the asserted objective [wa]s reasonable, not perfect.’ [Citation.]” Reese, 627 F.3d at 801 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2011App.3d 747, 749 , 349 Ill.Dec. 799 , 947 N.E.2d 813 (2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and the armed habitual criminal statute); Wilson, 407 Ill.App.3d at 768 , 348 Ill.Dec. 160 , 943 N.E.2d 768 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold a statute banning assault weapons). [3] Again, defendant offers us no new argument about why we should depart from our well-established precedent. ¶ 30 Respondent's third argument is that the statute cannot survive any heightened level of scrutiny, whether it be strict scrutiny or an intermediate level of scrutiny. 2011App.3d 747, 749 , 349 Ill.Dec. 799 , 947 N.E.2d 813 (2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and the armed habitual criminal statute); Wilson, 407 Ill.App.3d at 768 , 348 Ill.Dec. 160 , 943 N.E.2d 768 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold a statute banning assault weapons). [3] Again, defendant offers us no new argument about why we should depart from our well-established precedent. ¶ 30 Respondent's third argument is that the statute cannot survive any heightened level of scrutiny, whether it be strict scrutiny or an intermediate level of scrutiny. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 , 122 S.Ct. 1728 , 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002); see also R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir.2004). 2007See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 , 122 S.Ct. 1728 , 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002); see also R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir.2004). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mills v. Habluetzel
green
2 sentences1990Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 ; Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 . • 6-8 In considering whether State legislation violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, different levels of scrutiny apply to different types of classifications. 1990Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 ; Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 . • 6-8 In considering whether State legislation violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, different levels of scrutiny apply to different types of classifications. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.