intermediate scrutiny standard in California

2004They contend, for the first time on appeal, that this provision is constitutional because it penalizes false and misleading commercial speech which is not constitutionally protected at all. “ ‘[T]he [federal] Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.’ (Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 469 , 103 S.Ct. 2875 ] (Bolger).)” (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 952.) Because regulation of commercial speech based on content is viewed as “less problematic” (Bolger, supra, 463 U.S. at p

2004They contend, for the first time on appeal, that this provision is constitutional because it penalizes false and misleading commercial speech which is not constitutionally protected at all. “ ‘[T]he [federal] Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.’ (Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 469 , 103 S.Ct. 2875 ] (Bolger).)” (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 952.) Because regulation of commercial speech based on content is viewed as “less problematic” (Bolger, supra, 463 U.S. at p

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 [“[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored”]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its “narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville’s compelling interests”].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 ["[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored"]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its "narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compelling interests"].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010The courts have generally recognized those governmental interests served by curfew ordinances are at least substantial within the meaning of the intermediate scrutiny test (see, e.g., Hutchins, supra, 188 F.3d at p. 542 [“there can be no serious dispute that protecting the welfare of minors by reducing juvenile crime and victimization is an important government interest”]) and, indeed, have even been found to be sufficiently compelling to satisfy the most rigorous of the equal protection tests.

2010The courts have generally recognized those governmental interests served by curfew ordinances are at least substantial within the meaning of the intermediate scrutiny test (see, e.g., Hutchins, supra, 188 F.3d at p. 542 ["there can be no serious dispute that protecting the welfare of minors by reducing juvenile crime and victimization is an important government interest"]) and, indeed, have even been found to be sufficiently compelling to satisfy the most rigorous of the equal protection tests.

2010(See, e.g., Nunez, supra, 114 F.3d at p. 947 [concluding city’s interest in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization are compelling interests]; Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 492.) It is the second and third interrelated prongs of the inquiry—whether the particularized provisions of the curfew ordinance directly and materially advance those governmental interests (Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at p. 849) and whether those provisions are substantially broader than necessary to advance those interests (see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 800 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , 109 S.C

2010(See, e.g., Nunez, supra, 114 F.3d at p. 947 [concluding city’s interest in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization are compelling interests]; Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 492.) It is the second and third interrelated prongs of the inquiry—whether the particularized provisions of the curfew ordinance directly and materially advance those governmental interests (Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at p. 849) and whether those provisions are substantially broader than necessary to advance those interests (see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 800 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , 109 S.C

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 [“[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored”]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its “narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville’s compelling interests”].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 ["[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored"]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its "narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compelling interests"].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 ["[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew *1006 is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored"]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its "narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions ... represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compelling interests"].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so be

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 ["[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored"]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its "narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compelling interests"].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010We thus believe intermediate scrutiny to be the most appropriate level of review and must determine whether the ordinance is ‘substantially related’ to ‘important’ governmental interests.” (Schleifer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville (4th Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 843 , 847 (Schleifer).) I agree with the line of authority represented by Schleifer, and conclude the constitutional validity of the San Diego curfew ordinance under an equal protection challenge should be tested under the intermediate scrutiny standard.

2010We thus believe intermediate scrutiny to be the most appropriate level of review and must determine whether the ordinance is `substantially related' to `important' governmental interests." ( Schleifer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville (4th Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 843 , 847 ( Schleifer ).) I agree with the line of authority represented by Schleifer, and conclude the constitutional validity of the San Diego curfew ordinance under an equal protection challenge should be tested under the intermediate scrutiny standard.

2018This council would "propose, receive, evaluate, approve and submit to the Secretary for approval ... budgets, plans, and projects of mushroom promotion, research, consumer information, and industry information...." ( Id ., § 6104(c)(4).) Under the Mushroom Act, "[n]o plan or project of promotion, research, consumer information, or industry information, or budget, shall be implemented prior to its approval by the Secretary." ( Id ., § 6104(d)(3).) 13 The intermediate scrutiny test "asks (1) 'whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment,' which means that the expression 'at least m

2018This council would "propose, receive, evaluate, approve and submit to the Secretary for approval ... budgets, plans, and projects of mushroom promotion, research, consumer information, and industry information...." ( Id ., § 6104(c)(4).) Under the Mushroom Act, "[n]o plan or project of promotion, research, consumer information, or industry information, or budget, shall be implemented prior to its approval by the Secretary." ( Id ., § 6104(d)(3).) 13 The intermediate scrutiny test "asks (1) 'whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment,' which means that the expression 'at least m

2025(See Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352 , 364–365.) Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a content-neutral regulation of free expression is constitutional if it is “(i) narrowly tailored, (ii) serves a significant government interest, and (iii) leaves open ample alternative avenues of communication.” (Id. at p. 364.) Defendants argue their total ban on leafletting is narrowly tailored because “all leafleting is harmful to the Center[s] and its guests,” and defendants have “a contractual duty to enforce the Centers’ expressive activity policy on beha

2010While the appeal was pending, this court issued its decision in Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 357 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ], which held that an ordinance “that is directed at activity involving public solicitation for the immediate donation or payment of funds should not be considered content based or constitutionally suspect under the California Constitution, and should be evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to time, place, and manner regulations, rather than under the strict scrutiny standard.” The Ninth Ci

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 [“[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored”]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its “narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville’s compelling interests”].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010(See, e.g., Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 493-494; State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at p. 1117 ["[t]he scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored"]; Schleifer, supra, 159 F.3d at pp. 851-852 [upholding curfew because its "narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions . . . represents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compelling interests"].) The courts that have invalidated curfew ordinances, under either the intermediate scrutiny analysis or strict scrutiny analysis, have generally done so becaus

2010Comm'n (1980) 447 U.S. 557 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 341 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 ], examines whether the asserted governmental interest promoted by the law is substantial, whether the law directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether the law is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. ( Id. at p. 566.) "The court has clarified that the last part of the test—determining whether the regulation is not more extensive than `necessary'—does not require the government to adopt the least restrictive means, but instead requires only a `reasonable fit' between the government's purpos

2004They contend, for the first time on appeal, that this provision is constitutional because it penalizes false and misleading commercial speech which is not constitutionally protected at all. “ ‘[T]he [federal] Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.’ (Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 469 , 103 S.Ct. 2875 ] (Bolger).)” (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 952.) Because regulation of commercial speech based on content is viewed as “less problematic” (Bolger, supra, 463 U.S. at p

2003Comm'n (1980) 447 U.S. 530, 540 , 100 S.Ct. 2326 , 65 L.Ed.2d 319 .) "By contrast, regulation of commercial speech based on content is less problematic." ( Bolger, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 65 , 103 S.Ct. 2875 .) To determine the validity of a content-based regulation of commercial speech, the United States Supreme Court has articulated an intermediate-scrutiny test.

2003Comm'n (1980) 447 U.S. 530, 540 , 100 S.Ct. 2326 , 65 L.Ed.2d 319 .) "By contrast, regulation of commercial speech based on content is less problematic." ( Bolger, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 65 , 103 S.Ct. 2875 .) To determine the validity of a content-based regulation of commercial speech, the United States Supreme Court has articulated an intermediate-scrutiny test.

2018This council would "propose, receive, evaluate, approve and submit to the Secretary for approval ... budgets, plans, and projects of mushroom promotion, research, consumer information, and industry information...." ( Id ., § 6104(c)(4).) Under the Mushroom Act, "[n]o plan or project of promotion, research, consumer information, or industry information, or budget, shall be implemented prior to its approval by the Secretary." ( Id ., § 6104(d)(3).) 13 The intermediate scrutiny test "asks (1) 'whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment,' which means that the expression 'at least m

2018This council would "propose, receive, evaluate, approve and submit to the Secretary for approval ... budgets, plans, and projects of mushroom promotion, research, consumer information, and industry information...." ( Id ., § 6104(c)(4).) Under the Mushroom Act, "[n]o plan or project of promotion, research, consumer information, or industry information, or budget, shall be implemented prior to its approval by the Secretary." ( Id ., § 6104(d)(3).) 13 The intermediate scrutiny test "asks (1) 'whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment,' which means that the expression 'at least m

2020(See Worman, supra, at p. 38 [collecting cases]; Fyock v. Sunnyvale, supra, at p. 999 [“Consistent with the reasoning of our sister circuit, we also agree that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate”].) “Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the statute must serve an important governmental interest and there should be a reasonable fit between the regulation and the governmental objective.” (People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1374 ; accord U.S. v. Chovan, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 1139 .) “[W]e review the legislative history of the enactment as well as studies in the record or cited in p

2013(People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1374-1375 [applying intermediate scrutiny standard to claim that former section 12020 violates the Second Amendment].) “Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the statute must serve an important governmental interest and there should be a reasonable fit between the regulation and the governmental objective [Citation.] The regulation need not be the least restrictive means of serving the governmental interest, but it should be narrowly tailored to serve the interest, . . . and should leave open ample alternative means of exercising the protected r

2013In Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1 , 11–22 (Gerawan II), we found it ―critical‖ to examine several high court precedents on compelled subsidy of private speech in the course of concluding, partly in reliance on Justice Souter‘s dissenting opinion in Glickman, supra, 521 U.S. 457 , that the proper test for evaluating the California Plum Marketing Program under article I‘s free speech clause was the intermediate scrutiny standard of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.

2013In Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1 , 11–22 (Gerawan II), we found it ―critical‖ to examine several high court precedents on compelled subsidy of private speech in the course of concluding, partly in reliance on Justice Souter‘s dissenting opinion in Glickman, supra, 521 U.S. 457 , that the proper test for evaluating the California Plum Marketing Program under article I‘s free speech clause was the intermediate scrutiny standard of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.

2013We decide only that since the trial court’s order “cannot satisfy this intermediate-scrutiny test, it necessarily fails under a strict scrutiny analysis.” (Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 518 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 ].) *1489 2.

2013We decide only that since the trial court’s order “cannot satisfy this intermediate-scrutiny test, it necessarily fails under a strict scrutiny analysis.” (Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 518 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 ].) *1489 2.

2013If it satisfies that criteria, the court must decide whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial, whether the restraint directly advances that interest and whether it is “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” (Id. at p. 566; see Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263 , 1285 & fn. 7 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 ] (Larsonf, People ex rel.

2013If it satisfies that criteria, the court must decide whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial, whether the restraint directly advances that interest and whether it is “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” (Id. at p. 566; see Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263 , 1285 & fn. 7 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 ] (Larsonf, People ex rel.

2020(See Worman, supra, at p. 38 [collecting cases]; Fyock v. Sunnyvale, supra, at p. 999 [“Consistent with the reasoning of our sister circuit, we also agree that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate”].) “Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the statute must serve an important governmental interest and there should be a reasonable fit between the regulation and the governmental objective.” (People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1374 ; accord U.S. v. Chovan, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 1139 .) “[W]e review the legislative history of the enactment as well as studies in the record or cited in p

2020(See Worman, supra, at p. 38 [collecting cases]; Fyock v. Sunnyvale, supra, at p. 999 [“Consistent with the reasoning of our sister circuit, we also agree that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate”].) “Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the statute must serve an important governmental interest and there should be a reasonable fit between the regulation and the governmental objective.” (People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1374 ; accord U.S. v. Chovan, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 1139 .) “[W]e review the legislative history of the enactment as well as studies in the record or cited in p

2020(See Worman, supra, at p. 38 [collecting cases]; Fyock v. Sunnyvale, supra, at p. 999 [“Consistent with the reasoning of our sister circuit, we also agree that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate”].) “Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the statute must serve an important governmental interest and there should be a reasonable fit between the regulation and the governmental objective.” (People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1374 ; accord U.S. v. Chovan, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 1139 .) “[W]e review the legislative history of the enactment as well as studies in the record or cited in p

2013Application of Central Hudson 5 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, 764 [agency rule banning accountants from engaging in certain solicitation of clients]; Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico (1986) 478 U.S. 328, 340-341 [statute restricting casino advertising]; Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3d 808, 818-820 [statute governing solicitation of day laborers]; World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 676, 684-685 [ordinance banning freeway signs]; PuriTec, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1537-1538 [statutes g

2013Application of Central Hudson 5 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, 764 [agency rule banning accountants from engaging in certain solicitation of clients]; Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico (1986) 478 U.S. 328, 340-341 [statute restricting casino advertising]; Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3d 808, 818-820 [statute governing solicitation of day laborers]; World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 676, 684-685 [ordinance banning freeway signs]; PuriTec, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1537-1538 [statutes g