Jackson-Denno2 hearing (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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Jackson-Denno2 hearing in Georgia

5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2015–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Jackson v. Dennogreen
scotus · 1964 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2019
2 sentences

2019On November 16, 2016, Jerry Whitten’s body was found at his 2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 2 place of work, Springwood Nursery in Columbia County.

2019On November 16, 2016, Jerry Whitten’s body was found at his 2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 2 place of work, Springwood Nursery in Columbia County.

13
Culpepper v. Stategreen
ga · 2011 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 738 (2) (a) motion to suppress evidence, denying his Jackson-Denno2 motion, and refusing to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

11
SOSNIAK v. Stategreen
ga · 2010 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279 (1) ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010) (“‘The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the 2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 3 At trial, before having a law enforcement officer testify about the April 15 interview with appellant, the prosecutor stated that he thought that the defense was waiving appellant’s right to a Jackson-Denno hearing.

2017See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279 (1) ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010) (“‘The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the 2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 3 At trial, before having a law enforcement officer testify about the April 15 interview with appellant, the prosecutor stated that he thought that the defense was waiving appellant’s right to a Jackson-Denno hearing.

11
Colton v. Stategreen
ga · 2014 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Colton v. State, 296 Ga. 172, 178 (1) ( 766 SE2d 38 ) (2014). 2 At the Jackson-Denno2 hearing, Detective Tim Deal of the Catoosa County Sheriff’s Department testified that he conducted a custodial interview of Steele in connection with this case on the evening of September 19, 2012.

2016Colton v. State, 296 Ga. 172, 178 (1) ( 766 SE2d 38 ) (2014). 2 At the Jackson-Denno2 hearing, Detective Tim Deal of the Catoosa County Sheriff’s Department testified that he conducted a custodial interview of Steele in connection with this case on the evening of September 19, 2012.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2017Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 . (a) Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving his right to a Jackson-Denno2 hearing to determine the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement officers.3 However, the testimony of the officers who interviewed appellant would have authorized the trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances, to conclude that the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and that his state

2017Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 . (a) Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving his right to a Jackson-Denno2 hearing to determine the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement officers.3 However, the testimony of the officers who interviewed appellant would have authorized the trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances, to conclude that the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and that his state

12017–2017
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

2017Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 . (a) Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving his right to a Jackson-Denno2 hearing to determine the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement officers.3 However, the testimony of the officers who interviewed appellant would have authorized the trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances, to conclude that the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and that his state

2017Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 . (a) Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving his right to a Jackson-Denno2 hearing to determine the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement officers.3 However, the testimony of the officers who interviewed appellant would have authorized the trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances, to conclude that the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and that his state

12017–2017

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