permissible area inquiry in Georgia

2023We reach that conclusion in large part because after making the potentially problematic statements referenced above, the trial court expressly stated that “the sentence [wa]s not intended to punish [Taylor] for exercising [his] right to trial,” and that the sentence was based on the court’s finding that Taylor “did not accept any responsibility or show any remorse.” And the record could be viewed as supporting that conclusion: the trial court was authorized to evaluate Taylor’s credibility and the genuineness of 24 his remorse, see Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 723 ( 386 SE2d 316 ) (1989) (“‘[

2023We reach that conclusion in large part because after making the potentially problematic statements referenced above, the trial court expressly stated that “the sentence [wa]s not intended to punish [Taylor] for exercising [his] right to trial,” and that the sentence was based on the court’s finding that Taylor “did not accept any responsibility or show any remorse.” And the record could be viewed as supporting that conclusion: the trial court was authorized to evaluate Taylor’s credibility and the genuineness of 24 his remorse, see Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 723 ( 386 SE2d 316 ) (1989) (“‘[

2023To be sure, if the trial court exercised its discretion to give Taylor the maximum available sentence because it did not, in fact, believe his multiple apologies were genuine, or because his professed acceptance of responsibility was not credible, the better course under these particular circumstances would have been for the trial court to make those findings on the record and make no suggestion— implicit or explicit, cf. Winfrey v. State, 304 Ga. 94, 98 ( 816 SE2d 613 ) (2018)—that the exercise of Taylor’s constitutional right to trial 25 motivated the trial court’s sentence.

2023To be sure, if the trial court exercised its discretion to give Taylor the maximum available sentence because it did not, in fact, believe his multiple apologies were genuine, or because his professed acceptance of responsibility was not credible, the better course under these particular circumstances would have been for the trial court to make those findings on the record and make no suggestion— implicit or explicit, cf. Winfrey v. State, 304 Ga. 94, 98 ( 816 SE2d 613 ) (2018)—that the exercise of Taylor’s constitutional right to trial 25 motivated the trial court’s sentence.

2021Notably, the trial judge 14 by his failure to admit the crime of which he was convicted . . . is a permissible area of inquiry during sentencing.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnotes omitted.) McGuire v. State, 243 Ga. App. 899, 902 (5) ( 534 SE2d 549 ) (2000).

2021Notably, the trial judge 14 by his failure to admit the crime of which he was convicted . . . is a permissible area of inquiry during sentencing.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnotes omitted.) McGuire v. State, 243 Ga. App. 899, 902 (5) ( 534 SE2d 549 ) (2000).

1991See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). (d) The prosecutor did not argue impermissibly by explaining "retribution" as "[w]hat we learned in Sunday School as an `eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'" Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 159 (14), 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 (6), 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983). (e) In addition to the foregoing, Christenson complains about portions of the prosecutor's closing argument not objected to at trial.

1991See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). (d) The prosecutor did not argue impermissibly by explaining "retribution" as "[w]hat we learned in Sunday School as an `eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'" Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 159 (14), 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 (6), 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983). (e) In addition to the foregoing, Christenson complains about portions of the prosecutor's closing argument not objected to at trial.

1991At the sentencing phase, "[s]ound policy reasons exist for allowing a jury to consider the courtroom demeanor of a defendant." U.S. v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978 at 983 (9th Cir.1987) (Hall, J., dissenting). [6] As we pointed out in Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717 at 723 (9), 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989), "the defendant's remorse or lack thereof is a permissible area of inquiry during sentencing." The prosecutor in this case was entitled to comment about the defendant's apparent lack of remorse during the presentation of evidence concerning the death of the victim. (c) We do not find that the prosecutor's li

1991See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). (d) The prosecutor did not argue impermissibly by explaining "retribution" as "[w]hat we learned in Sunday School as an `eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'" Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 159 (14), 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 (6), 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983). (e) In addition to the foregoing, Christenson complains about portions of the prosecutor's closing argument not objected to at trial.

1991See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). (d) The prosecutor did not argue impermissibly by explaining "retribution" as "[w]hat we learned in Sunday School as an `eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'" Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 159 (14), 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 (6), 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983). (e) In addition to the foregoing, Christenson complains about portions of the prosecutor's closing argument not objected to at trial.