reversionary clause in Georgia

2010See generally Flaum v. Middlebury, 246 Ga. 682 ( 272 SE2d 695 ) (1980) (deed which contains a reversionary clause provides for automatic reversion of the estate upon the occurrence of the limitation); Moore v. Wells, 212 Ga. 446 ( 93 SE2d 731 ) (1956) (where deed was made upon an express condition or limitation upon the estate conveyed).

2010See generally Flaum v. Middlebury, 246 Ga. 682 ( 272 SE2d 695 ) (1980) (deed which contains a reversionary clause provides for automatic reversion of the estate upon the occurrence of the limitation); Moore v. Wells, 212 Ga. 446 ( 93 SE2d 731 ) (1956) (where deed was made upon an express condition or limitation upon the estate conveyed).

1979At the termination of the life estates and of the failure of the charitable devise to Social Circle Schools under our holdings in Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 (n. 1) ( 232 SE2d 835 ) (1977), the disposition of the estate was controlled by the following reversionary clause in the will: "In the event said property is not accepted by said Social Circle Schools or used for any other purpose that (sic) above indicated and directed, it is to revert to my estate and go to my next of kin.” "Where a will provides that title, on a certain contingency, reverts to testator’s estate, the language means t

1979At the termination of the life estates and of the failure of the charitable devise to Social Circle Schools under our holdings in Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 (n. 1) ( 232 SE2d 835 ) (1977), the disposition of the estate was controlled by the following reversionary clause in the will: "In the event said property is not accepted by said Social Circle Schools or used for any other purpose that (sic) above indicated and directed, it is to revert to my estate and go to my next of kin.” "Where a will provides that title, on a certain contingency, reverts to testator’s estate, the language means t

1979At the termination of the life estates and of the failure of the charitable devise to Social Circle Schools under our holdings in Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 (n. 1) ( 232 SE2d 835 ) (1977), the disposition of the estate was controlled by the following reversionary clause in the will: "In the event said property is not accepted by said Social Circle Schools or used for any other purpose that (sic) above indicated and directed, it is to revert to my estate and go to my next of kin.” "Where a will provides that title, on a certain contingency, reverts to testator’s estate, the language means t

1979At the termination of the life estates and of the failure of the charitable devise to Social Circle Schools under our holdings in Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 (n. 1) ( 232 SE2d 835 ) (1977), the disposition of the estate was controlled by the following reversionary clause in the will: "In the event said property is not accepted by said Social Circle Schools or used for any other purpose that (sic) above indicated and directed, it is to revert to my estate and go to my next of kin.” "Where a will provides that title, on a certain contingency, reverts to testator’s estate, the language means t

1977Other courts which have invoked the cy pres doctrine to strike racial exclusionary clauses from charitable trusts have noted the absence of a reversionary clause or provision for a gift over, see Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchanan, 346 F Supp. 665 (D.C.

1962In Board of Ed. of Appling County v. Hunter, 190 Ga. 767 (1) ( 10 SE2d 749 ), it was held: “Under the language of the *647 deed conveying to a county board of education land for ‘school purposes’ with a reversionary clause as to the title if the land ceased to be used for ‘educational purposes,’ the mere facts that the board built another larger school near by, and had permitted a teacher to live in the school-house on the land in question, ivould not cause a reverter.” See also Fleishel & Kimsey v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 .

1962In Board of Ed. of Appling County v. Hunter, 190 Ga. 767 (1) ( 10 SE2d 749 ), it was held: “Under the language of the *647 deed conveying to a county board of education land for ‘school purposes’ with a reversionary clause as to the title if the land ceased to be used for ‘educational purposes,’ the mere facts that the board built another larger school near by, and had permitted a teacher to live in the school-house on the land in question, ivould not cause a reverter.” See also Fleishel & Kimsey v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 .

1962In Board of Ed. of Appling County v. Hunter, 190 Ga. 767 (1) ( 10 SE2d 749 ), it was held: “Under the language of the *647 deed conveying to a county board of education land for ‘school purposes’ with a reversionary clause as to the title if the land ceased to be used for ‘educational purposes,’ the mere facts that the board built another larger school near by, and had permitted a teacher to live in the school-house on the land in question, ivould not cause a reverter.” See also Fleishel & Kimsey v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 .