Atkins claim in Texas

2014Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State, 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev.2011) (Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky.2005) (applying "miscarriage of justice” exception to proce durally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (2003) (same

2014Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State, 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev.2011) (Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky.2005) (applying "miscarriage of justice” exception to proce durally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (2003) (same

2014App. 2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State, 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev. 2011) (Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky. 2005) (applying “miscarriage of justice” exception to procedurally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (Ga. 2003) (same). 21 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

2010However, appellant does not cite any case from any American jurisdiction that has held that the Atkins rule or rationale applies to the mentally ill.23 We have previously held, albeit in unpublished opinions, that “there is no authority from the Supreme Court or this Court suggesting that mental illness that is a ‘contributing factor’ in the defendant’s actions 21 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 22 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 23 Several state courts have expressly declined to extend the Atkins ruling to the mentally ill in published opinions.

2014See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 11 (“[W]e hold that, when an inmate sentenced to death files a habeas corpus application raising a cognizable Atkins claim, the factual merit of that claim should be determined by the judge of the convicting court.”); Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428 n.6 (citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 for proposition, “[a] jury determination of [intellectual disability] is not required”).

2014See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 11 (“[W]e hold that, when an inmate sentenced to death files a habeas corpus application raising a cognizable Atkins claim, the factual merit of that claim should be determined by the judge of the convicting court.”); Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428 n.6 (citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 for proposition, “[a] jury determination of [intellectual disability] is not required”).

2014App. 2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State , 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev. 2011) ( Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth , 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky. 2005) (applying "miscarriage of justice" exception to procedurally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill , 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (Ga. 2003) (same) . 21.

2014Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State, 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev.2011) (Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky.2005) (applying "miscarriage of justice” exception to proce durally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (2003) (same

2014App. 2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State , 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev. 2011) ( Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth , 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky. 2005) (applying "miscarriage of justice" exception to procedurally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill , 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (Ga. 2003) (same) . 21.

2014Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (petitioner was entitled to merits review of Atkins claim raised for first time in successive petition if he could make threshold showing that no rational juror would have found that he was not mentally retarded); Rogers v. State, 267 P.3d 802, 803 (Nev.2011) (Graham applies retroactively, and so provides good cause to excuse procedural default); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky.2005) (applying "miscarriage of justice” exception to proce durally barred Atkins claim); Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (2003) (same

2009In July 2007, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, among other things, that it could not conclude “that the state court applied Atkins in an objectively unreasonable manner” given “the substantial evidence presented [in the state court proceedings] that [applicant] is not mentally retarded.” See Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 587 (5th Cir.2007) and at 585-87 (summarizing the evidence presented by the parties during the 2004 writ hearing in state court on the issue of applicant’s mental retardation).

2009In July 2007, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, among other things, that it could not conclude “that the state court applied Atkins in an objectively unreasonable manner” given “the substantial evidence presented [in the state court proceedings] that [applicant] is not mentally retarded.” See Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 587 (5th Cir.2007) and at 585-87 (summarizing the evidence presented by the parties during the 2004 writ hearing in state court on the issue of applicant’s mental retardation).

2005The federal district court did not adjudicate the merits of Martinez’ application,, but instead issued a ninety-day stay during which Martinez must submit these to a state court for review. 2 Cf. Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 377 (2d Cir.2001) (federal district judge has discretion to stay habeas application while applicant litigates unexhausted claim in state court); Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7 , 15 n. 5 (1st Cir.2001) (recommending federal district courts follow stay procedure when confronted with claim that has not been previously reviewed by state court); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 6

2004Given the importance and impact of Atkins upon the criminal justice and the mental health and mental retardation systems, that definitional flux may well continue. [30] See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (U.S.Kan. 2002) (noting that "the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law"); Williams, 831 So.2d at 859 (in determining Atkins claim, "the trial court must not rely so extensively upon this expert testimony as t

2015This Court held that, despite the availability of Blue’s claim when he filed his initial application: through Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3), the Legislature has provided a mechanism whereby a subsequent habeas applicant may proceed with an Atkins claim if he is able to demonstrate to this Court that there is evidence that could reasonably show, to a level of confidence by clear and convincing evidence, that no rational finder of fact would fail to find he is mentally retarded. 5 Id. at 154 .

2015This Court held that, despite the availability of Blue’s claim when he filed his initial application: through Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3), the Legislature has provided a mechanism whereby a subsequent habeas applicant may proceed with an Atkins claim if he is able to demonstrate to this Court that there is evidence that could reasonably show, to a level of confidence by clear and convincing evidence, that no rational finder of fact would fail to find he is mentally retarded. 5 Id. at 154 .

2015See Flores, 387 S.W.3d at 634-35 ; Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Flores, 387 S.W.3d at 634–35; Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim.

2011See id.

2011See id.

2006Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417-18 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). .

2006Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417-18 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). .

2005The federal district court did not adjudicate the merits of Martinez’ application,, but instead issued a ninety-day stay during which Martinez must submit these to a state court for review. 2 Cf. Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 377 (2d Cir.2001) (federal district judge has discretion to stay habeas application while applicant litigates unexhausted claim in state court); Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7 , 15 n. 5 (1st Cir.2001) (recommending federal district courts follow stay procedure when confronted with claim that has not been previously reviewed by state court); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 6

2003See Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).

2005The federal district court did not adjudicate the merits of Martinez’ application,, but instead issued a ninety-day stay during which Martinez must submit these to a state court for review. 2 Cf. Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 377 (2d Cir.2001) (federal district judge has discretion to stay habeas application while applicant litigates unexhausted claim in state court); Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7 , 15 n. 5 (1st Cir.2001) (recommending federal district courts follow stay procedure when confronted with claim that has not been previously reviewed by state court); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 6

2003See also Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7 , 15 n. 5 (1st Cir.2001) (recommending that federal district courts follow this procedure); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir.2002)(adopting Zarvela approach to treatment of unexhausted Atkins claim and instructing federal district court to dismiss Atkins claim to be considered by state court and to stay his remaining claims pending exhaustion upon condition that petitioner seek relief from state court within 90 days); Nowaczyk v. Warden, N.H.

2023Should 6 See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 (“The clearest cases of nonwaivable, nonforfeitable systemic requirements are laws affecting the jurisdiction of the courts.”).

2023Second, and more fundamentally, this Court has in any event 3 See Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. Crim.

2023Second, and more fundamentally, this Court has in any event 3 See Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. Crim.

2016Apr, 15, 2015) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (concluding that applicant’s claim that his intellectual disability barred his execution should be filed and set for full consideration rather than summarily denied on its merits); Ex parte Campbell, 439 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (Alcala, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom., Campbell v. Texas, — U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2741 , 189 L.Ed.2d 776 (2014) (concluding that applicant had presented enough evidence of intellectual disability to warrant reopening his previous application for writ of habeas corpus to determine if his disability exempted him f

2015The court emphasized the facts of the crime, the defendant’s ability to converse coherently, and the defendant’s classification during his school years as merely “learning disabled.” Id. at *4-9; see also Chester, 666 F.3d at 365 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (Atkins claim denied where “the seventh Briseno factor, and nothing else” was found to be “sufficient by itself to uphold a denial of relief”).

2015Just two days before this scheduled execution, applicant filed this successive habeas corpus application presenting the same Atkins claim that this Court had rejected on the merits more than three years before.” 296 S.W.3d 587, 605 (Tex. Crim.

2015Just two days before this scheduled execution, applicant filed this successive habeas corpus application presenting the same Atkins claim that this Court had rejected on the merits more than three years before.” 296 S.W.3d 587, 605 (Tex. Crim.

2015See id. (noting that the rationale for deference also disappears when the record does not support the ha-beas court’s findings).

2015See Flores, 387 S.W.3d at 634-35 ; Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Cathey, 451 S.W.3d at 26-27 (summarizing the “basic factual nature of the Atkins inquiry”).

2015See Cathey, 451 S.W.3d at 26-27 (summarizing the “basic factual nature of the Atkins inquiry”).

2015See, e.g., Van Tran, 764 F.3d at 605 (“The reliable and professionally vetted methods presented by … experts, from which the legal standards draw their substance, must guide the court’s inquiry.”); id. at 612 (“Tennessee law does not permit the state trial court to use its independent judgment to disregard uncontroverted expert analyses, consider factors that the experts have testified are unreliable, or declare to be dispositive a factor irrelevant to the clinical definitions employed by the experts.”).

2015See, e.g., Van Tran, 764 F.3d at 605 (“The reliable and professionally vetted methods presented by … experts, from which the legal standards draw their substance, must guide the court’s inquiry.”); id. at 612 (“Tennessee law does not permit the state trial court to use its independent judgment to disregard uncontroverted expert analyses, consider factors that the experts have testified are unreliable, or declare to be dispositive a factor irrelevant to the clinical definitions employed by the experts.”).