Atkins claim in Ohio

2026As a result of Atkins, Lott filed a successive petition for postconviction relief premised on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Lott, 2002-Ohio-6625 , that adopted the Atkins framework.

2026As a result of Atkins, Lott filed a successive petition for postconviction relief premised on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Lott, 2002-Ohio-6625 , that adopted the Atkins framework.

2025The Court did not dictate a specific standard for determining whether an offender was intellectually disabled but stated that it would “‘leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’” Id. at 317 , quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-417 (1986). {¶33} In State v. Lott, 2002-Ohio-6625 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[t]he procedures for postconviction relief outlined in R.C. 2953.21 et seq. provide a suitable statutory framework for reviewing [a petitioner’s] Atkins claim.” Id. a

2023Hamilton No. C-150619, 2017- Ohio-9282, at ¶ 29 (Where the court reversed the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s Atkins motion because it was “not supported by competent, credible evidence.”). {¶10} In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 , the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of intellectually disabled individuals violates the ban on cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2016Such a right can be recognized only by the United States Supreme Court").6 {¶ 47} In the case at bar, following this court's decision in Waddy IV, 2006-Ohio-2828 , the trial court appointed two attorneys to represent appellant with regard to his Atkins claim.

2008See, also, Waddy , supra, at ¶ 48 (finding that "[b]ecause * * * the documentation provided to the trial court in support of defendant's Atkins petition demonstrates that defendant may be entitled to relief, defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and funding for an expert to develop his Atkins claim"). {¶ 15} Although a narrow exception developed concerning the appointment of experts in a particular type of postconviction proceeding, such an exception does not apply here.

2004See State v. Carter, 157 Ohio App.3d 689 , 2004-Ohio-3372 , 813 N.E.2d 78, at ¶ 12 . {¶ 14} In support of his Atkins claim, Hughbanks offered Social Security Administration records generated in 1995, when he was 29 years old.

2004See State v. Carter, 157 Ohio App.3d 689 , 2004-Ohio-3372 , 813 N.E.2d 78, at ¶ 12 . {¶ 14} In support of his Atkins claim, Hughbanks offered Social Security Administration records generated in 1995, when he was 29 years old.

2006See State v. Carter, 157 Ohio App.3d 689 , 2004-Ohio-3372 , at ¶ 10 (recognizing the Lott court's departure from R.C. 2953.23 by granting a petitioner who was sentenced to death before its decision 180 days to file a petition; "[t]he court softened the R.C. 2953.23 (A)(2) requirement that a petitioner demonstrate prejudicial constitutional error by clear and convincing evidence").

2004See State v. Carter, 157 Ohio App.3d 689 , 2004-Ohio-3372 , 813 N.E.2d 78, at ¶ 12 . {¶ 14} In support of his Atkins claim, Hughbanks offered Social Security Administration records generated in 1995, when he was 29 years old.

2023Id. at 317 . {¶11} Mr. Deloney’s first Atkins hearing, in 2015, was governed by the standard established by the Ohio Supreme Court in Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2002- Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011 .

2017However, I would conclude that Deloney failed to prove that he currently exhibits significant adaptive limitations. {¶32} To succeed on an Atkins claim, Deloney was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he “(1) suffers from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) experienced significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) manifested onset before the age of 18.” Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139 , 2007-Ohio- 5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263 , at ¶ 154, quoting Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2002-Ohio-6625 , 779

2025See State v. Bays, 2005-Ohio-47, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.) (“[a]lthough the expert testimony presented at Bays’s mitigation hearing regarding his intellectual limitations is relevant to Bays’s Atkins claim, it was not developed either to prove or disprove the issue presented by his Atkins claim–whether Bays is so impaired that his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment”). {¶81} The “without more” or “evidence dehors the record” distinguishes the present case from those relied upon by the majority.

2017These experts were necessary even though “[the evidence presented at] Hughbanks’s trial could inform the common pleas court’s postconviction inquiry into his Atkins claim.” Id.

2023It subsequently updated those standards in State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139 , 2019-Ohio-4539 , 140 N.E.3d 616 . {¶11} In 2003, Mr. Williams filed an Atkins claim in the trial court via a petition for postconviction relief.

2023It subsequently updated those standards in State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139 , 2019-Ohio-4539 , 140 N.E.3d 616 . {¶11} In 2003, Mr. Williams filed an Atkins claim in the trial court via a petition for postconviction relief.

2023It is well-established that “[t]he trial court’s decision on a postconviction Atkins claim should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Williams, 2021-Ohio-241 , 167 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.), citing State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2008-Ohio-1623 , 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 45 .

2023It is well-established that “[t]he trial court’s decision on a postconviction Atkins claim should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Williams, 2021-Ohio-241 , 167 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.), citing State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2008-Ohio-1623 , 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 45 .

2023Id. {¶35} “[A] postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction but, rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment.” State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281 , 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999).

2008Lott , 2002-Ohio-6625, at ¶ 21 (the party asserting an Atkins claim "bears the burden of establishing that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence"); State v. Scott , 92 Ohio St.3d 1 , 4 , 2001-Ohio-148 ("sanity and competence are generally presumed"); Calhoun , 86 Ohio St.3d at 284 ("[u]nlike the summary judgment procedure in civil cases, in postconviction *Page 11 relief proceedings, the trial court has presumably been presented with evidence sufficient to support the original entry of conviction"). {¶ 33} In the present case, Williams has failed to raise a genuine issue a

2017Id. {¶18} Without expert testimony to link perceived deficiencies in adaptive skills, the trial court would be left with only “its own expectations of how a mentally retarded person would behave.” In a case in which the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an Atkins claim, the court noted that while the record contained evidence that could indicate “his limitations in adaptive skills,” neither of the two experts who examined him “found that Frazier has significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two * * * skill areas as Atkins

2017Id. {¶18} Without expert testimony to link perceived deficiencies in adaptive skills, the trial court would be left with only “its own expectations of how a mentally retarded person would behave.” In a case in which the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an Atkins claim, the court noted that while the record contained evidence that could indicate “his limitations in adaptive skills,” neither of the two experts who examined him “found that Frazier has significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two * * * skill areas as Atkins

2026In its merit brief, the State argues that R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(k) prohibits Hill from raising “the exact same [Atkins] claim” that he unsuccessfully raised in 2003. {¶ 32} That the State seeks to foreclose Hill’s ability to have his claim that he is intellectually disabled reviewed under the current legal standard is extremely concerning, especially given the substantial evidence that supports Hill’s claim, see Hill v. Shoop, 597 U.S. __ , 142 S.Ct. 2579 (2022) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). {¶ 33} On habeas corpus review, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Si

2026The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, finding that that court had erred in relying extensively on Moore, because Moore “was not handed down until long after the state-court decisions” in Hill’s case; it remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit with instructions to evaluate Hill’s claim regarding his intellectual disability “based solely on holdings of [the United States Supreme Court] that were clearly established at the relevant time.” Shoop v. Hill, 586 U.S. 45, 46 (2019) (per curiam). {¶ 10} On remand, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit granted Hill relief in habeas co

2025See Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4015, at ¶ 24 (3d Dist.) (“we cannot say that [petitioner] was unavoidably prevented from discovering his intellectual disability as his initial postconviction petition could have raised an Atkins claim”).

2025See Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4015, at ¶ 24 (3d Dist.) (“we cannot say that [petitioner] was unavoidably prevented from discovering his intellectual disability as his initial postconviction petition could have raised an Atkins claim”).

2025State v. Deloney, 2017-Ohio-9282, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.) (“[t]he determination of whether a capital defendant is … mentally retarded presents a factual issue for the trial court”).

2025“The determination as to whether an individual is mentally retarded, and suffers from limitations caused by that condition, is not something within the common knowledge of lay people.” Deloney, 2017-Ohio-9282, at ¶ 17 (1st Dist.).

2025In so doing, the court of appeals ignores the rationale for allowing untimely petitions which rely on evidence dehors the record: “when a defendant must rely on his attorney to develop the record or use evidence, and the attorney fails to do so, there is no other way for the defendant to establish the attorney’s deficient performance except by presenting evidence outside the trial record.” Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 92 ; compare State v. Howard, 2016-Ohio-504, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.) (“[w]e have concerns … with placing the onus of responsibility to thoroughly investigate a case on the defendant w

2025In so doing, the court of appeals ignores the rationale for allowing untimely petitions which rely on evidence dehors the record: “when a defendant must rely on his attorney to develop the record or use evidence, and the attorney fails to do so, there is no other way for the defendant to establish the attorney’s deficient performance except by presenting evidence outside the trial record.” Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 92 ; compare State v. Howard, 2016-Ohio-504, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.) (“[w]e have concerns … with placing the onus of responsibility to thoroughly investigate a case on the defendant w

2025The Court did not dictate a specific standard for determining whether an offender was intellectually disabled but stated that it would “‘leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’” Id. at 317 , quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-417 (1986). {¶33} In State v. Lott, 2002-Ohio-6625 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[t]he procedures for postconviction relief outlined in R.C. 2953.21 et seq. provide a suitable statutory framework for reviewing [a petitioner’s] Atkins claim.” Id. a

2025Compare State v. Frazier, 2008-Ohio-5027, ¶ 53 (6th Dist.) (petitioner fails to present additional evidence outside the record where the “affidavit [attached to the postconviction petition] does not contain any evidence that was not available at the time of trial”). {¶80} The situation involving an Atkins claim is unique in that, while there may be evidence in the record suggesting the possibility of intellectual disability, further evidence will almost always be necessary to establish actual disability.

2023See State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2008-Ohio-2762 , 890 N.E.2d 263 , ¶ 163-180 (considering, on the merits, the Atkins claim of an “uncooperative” defendant who alleged that he suffered from an intellectual 12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS disability).

2023See State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2008-Ohio-2762 , 890 N.E.2d 263 , ¶ 163-180 (considering, on the merits, the Atkins claim of an “uncooperative” defendant who alleged that he suffered from an intellectual 12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS disability).

2023Hamilton No. C-100554, 2011-Ohio-3920, ¶ 29 (“The determination that a defendant is not * * * mentally retarded will not be disturbed on appeal if it was supported by some competent and credible evidence.”); Deloney, 1st Dist.

2023Hamilton No. C-100554, 2011-Ohio-3920, ¶ 29 (“The determination that a defendant is not * * * mentally retarded will not be disturbed on appeal if it was supported by some competent and credible evidence.”); Deloney, 1st Dist.

2023While the trial court heard the testimony of the “teaching expert” regarding the standards to be applied in analyzing and arriving at conclusions on testing performed during Mr. Williams’ childhood, it appears the trial court failed to heed the admonition of the Sixth Circuit in this case that a court’s “wholesale exclusion of past evidence of intellectual disability from its Atkins analysis [is] 2 Case No. 2023-T-0008 contrary to clearly established Federal law.” Williams v. Mitchell, 792 F.3d 606, 619 (6th Cir.2015). {¶7} Thus, we have no choice but to reverse the trial court’s December 2022

2023The Sixth Circuit previously held this court’s “wholesale exclusion of past evidence of intellectual disability from its Atkins analysis was contrary to clearly established Federal law.” Williams, 792 F.3d at 619 . {¶131} In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in determining Mr. Williams did not prove intellectual-functioning deficits.

2020See Clay, 2018-Ohio-985, at ¶ 12 (“Appellant’s alleged state of being unaware of the law on postconviction relief does not satisfy an exception to the statute’s timeliness requirements.”); State v. Kane, 10th Dist.

2020See Clay, 2018-Ohio-985, at ¶ 12 (“Appellant’s alleged state of being unaware of the law on postconviction relief does not satisfy an exception to the statute’s timeliness requirements.”); State v. Kane, 10th Dist.