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5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rabern v. Stategreen2 sentences1998In Thorp v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 275 ; Evans v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 646 ( 458 SE2d 859 ) (1995); and Rabern v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 874, 878 (4) ( 473 SE2d 547 ) (1996), when the trial court did not have the opportunity to render its factual determinations in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Thorp, we remanded the cases to give the trial court an opportunity to apply the Thorp analysis. 1998In Thorp v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 275 ; Evans v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 646 ( 458 SE2d 859 ) (1995); and Rabern v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 874, 878 (4) ( 473 SE2d 547 ) (1996), when the trial court did not have the opportunity to render its factual determinations in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Thorp, we remanded the cases to give the trial court an opportunity to apply the Thorp analysis. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thorp v. State
green
2 sentences1998In Thorp v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 275 ; Evans v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 646 ( 458 SE2d 859 ) (1995); and Rabern v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 874, 878 (4) ( 473 SE2d 547 ) (1996), when the trial court did not have the opportunity to render its factual determinations in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Thorp, we remanded the cases to give the trial court an opportunity to apply the Thorp analysis. 1998In Thorp v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 275 ; Evans v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 646 ( 458 SE2d 859 ) (1995); and Rabern v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 874, 878 (4) ( 473 SE2d 547 ) (1996), when the trial court did not have the opportunity to render its factual determinations in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Thorp, we remanded the cases to give the trial court an opportunity to apply the Thorp analysis. | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Evans v. State
green
2 sentences1998In Thorp v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 275 ; Evans v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 646 ( 458 SE2d 859 ) (1995); and Rabern v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 874, 878 (4) ( 473 SE2d 547 ) (1996), when the trial court did not have the opportunity to render its factual determinations in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Thorp, we remanded the cases to give the trial court an opportunity to apply the Thorp analysis. 1998In Thorp v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 275 ; Evans v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. App. 646 ( 458 SE2d 859 ) (1995); and Rabern v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 874, 878 (4) ( 473 SE2d 547 ) (1996), when the trial court did not have the opportunity to render its factual determinations in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Thorp, we remanded the cases to give the trial court an opportunity to apply the Thorp analysis. | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Thorp v. State of Ga.
green
2 sentences1997Under the second and third of the Thorp factors, the trial court was required to consider the closeness of the property to the criminal activity and whether such closeness was sufficient to render the property itself "guilty,” as well as “whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/ or spatial use.” (Citations omitted.) Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 . 1997Under the second and third of the Thorp factors, the trial court was required to consider the closeness of the property to the criminal activity and whether such closeness was sufficient to render the property itself "guilty,” as well as “whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/ or spatial use.” (Citations omitted.) Thorp, 264 Ga. at 717 . | 2 | 1995–1997 |
Von Hofe v. United States
green
2 sentences2008Although the trial court applied the Thorp standard as well as the standard announced in Bajakajian , our analysis of the proportionality of the forfeiture to the offense on which it was based is a de novo consideration (id., 524 U. S. at 336-337 ) to which we will apply the standard adopted above from von Hofe, supra. Considering the harshness, or gross disproportionality, of the forfeiture in comparison to the gravity of the offense, we note first that the cost to Howell of this forfeiture, so far as the evidence at trial shows, was the $39,000 value of the property, while the offense underl 2008Although the trial court applied the Thorp standard as well as the standard announced in Bajakajian , our analysis of the proportionality of the forfeiture to the offense on which it was based is a de novo consideration (id., 524 U. S. at 336-337 ) to which we will apply the standard adopted above from von Hofe, supra. Considering the harshness, or gross disproportionality, of the forfeiture in comparison to the gravity of the offense, we note first that the cost to Howell of this forfeiture, so far as the evidence at trial shows, was the $39,000 value of the property, while the offense underl | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Bajakajian
red
2 sentences2008The trial court in this case applied the Thorp factors, and found the forfeiture not to be an excessive fine, but it also noted the possibility that the Thorp test has been superseded by the U. S. Supreme Court’s announcement in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321 (118 SC 2028, 141 LE2d 314) (1998), of *26 a standard to be applied in Excessive Fines Clause analyses. 2008The trial court in this case applied the Thorp factors, and found the forfeiture not to be an excessive fine, but it also noted the possibility that the Thorp test has been superseded by the U. S. Supreme Court’s announcement in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321 (118 SC 2028, 141 LE2d 314) (1998), of *26 a standard to be applied in Excessive Fines Clause analyses. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.