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42 California opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2026 35 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co.green2 sentences2013In 12 See also Quevedo, supra, 798 F.Supp.2d at pages 1140-1142 [concluding without analyzing the statutory language that a plaintiff may bring an individual PAGA claim and may be required to arbitrate that claim individually where there is an arbitration agreement with a representative action waiver], and Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at page 509 (conc. and dis. opn. of Kreigler, J.) [suggesting that allowing individual arbitration of a PAGA claim is not inconsistent with PAGA statute]. 35 Brown, the court observed that in Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the vali 2013In 12 See also Quevedo, supra, 798 F.Supp.2d at pages 1140-1142 [concluding without analyzing the statutory language that a plaintiff may bring an individual PAGA claim and may be required to arbitrate that claim individually where there is an arbitration agreement with a representative action waiver], and Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at page 509 (conc. and dis. opn. of Kreigler, J.) [suggesting that allowing individual arbitration of a PAGA claim is not inconsistent with PAGA statute]. 35 Brown, the court observed that in Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the vali | 3 | 4 |
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Morianagreen2 sentences2026In Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 , the United States Supreme Court held that where the FAA applies, the act requires enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim. 2025(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. 649, 656–659, italics omitted.) This latter rule requiring joinder of individual and representative PAGA claims coerced parties into either arbitrating claims they never agreed to arbitrate or “forgo[ing] arbitration altogether,” violating the FAA’s “fundamental principle that ‘arbitration is a matter of consent.’ ” 6 (Viking River, at pp. 659–661.) 6 Viking River went on to suggest that once an individual PAGA claim was sent to arbitration, the plaintiff would lack standing under California law to bring representative PAGA claims in court. | 2 | 19 |
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLCred2 sentences2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379 .) First, many Labor Code provisions were not being enforced because they were punishable only as misdemeanors without civil penalties or other 7 See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 92, footnote 7 (“Kim’s PAGA claim”); ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at page 198 (“employee’s PAGA claim”); Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at page 1012, review granted (“court on remand must order plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim to arbitration”); Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 , 537 (“a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim”); and Seifu v. Lyft, Inc., sup 2025(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1113, 1116.) In Viking, the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted the rule of Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at page 387 , insofar as it precluded division of PAGA actions into individual and nonindividual claims through an agreement to arbitrate, such that Viking was entitled to compel the employee’s individual PAGA claim to arbitration. | 2 | 13 |
Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.green2 sentences2013A plaintiff may not bring a PAGA claim as an individual claim, but rather only ‘as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ (Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-24 ; see also Brown[, supra,] 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 501-502 .) ‘Because the PAGA claim is not an individual claim, it was not within the scope of Defendant’s request that individual claims be submitted to arbitration . . . .’ ( Reyes, supra, at 1123-24 .) [¶] Assuming Plaintiff could bring an individual PAGA claim, then the motion must be denied under Brown, supra. The Court cannot compel ar 2013A plaintiff may not bring a PAGA claim as an individual claim, but rather only ‘as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ (Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-24 ; see also Brown[, supra,] 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 501-502 .) ‘Because the PAGA claim is not an individual claim, it was not within the scope of Defendant’s request that individual claims be submitted to arbitration . . . .’ ( Reyes, supra, at 1123-24 .) [¶] Assuming Plaintiff could bring an individual PAGA claim, then the motion must be denied under Brown, supra. The Court cannot compel ar | 2 | 2 |
Reyes v. Macy's, Inc.green2 sentences2013A plaintiff may not bring a PAGA claim as an individual claim, but rather only ‘as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ (Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-24 ; see also Brown[, supra,] 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 501-502 .) ‘Because the PAGA claim is not an individual claim, it was not within the scope of Defendant’s request that individual claims be submitted to arbitration . . . .’ ( Reyes, supra, at 1123-24 .) [¶] Assuming Plaintiff could bring an individual PAGA claim, then the motion must be denied under Brown, supra. The Court cannot compel ar 2013A plaintiff may not bring a PAGA claim as an individual claim, but rather only ‘as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ (Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-24 ; see also Brown[, supra,] 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 501-502 .) ‘Because the PAGA claim is not an individual claim, it was not within the scope of Defendant’s request that individual claims be submitted to arbitration . . . .’ ( Reyes, supra, at 1123-24 .) [¶] Assuming Plaintiff could bring an individual PAGA claim, then the motion must be denied under Brown, supra. The Court cannot compel ar | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025There, the court stated the second amended complaint “retained the PAGA claim from the original complaint” and that claim “sought PAGA penalties for various Labor Code violations[.]” (Id. at p. 595; see also, Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [“case law suggests that a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim”]; Viking River, supra, at p. 654, fn. 6 .) Individual PAGA claim. 2024A division of this court characterized Iskanian as not having decided the issue: “[W]hile assuming the possibility of such a claim, the Iskanian court did not directly decide whether an ‘individual PAGA claim’ . . . is cognizable.” (Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 677.) After Iskanian, “various courts held that employers may not require employees to ‘split’ PAGA actions in a manner that puts individual and non-individual components of a PAGA claim into bifurcated proceedings. ([Citation]; [see, e.g., ]Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 .)” | 1 | 2 |
ZB, N.A. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379 .) First, many Labor Code provisions were not being enforced because they were punishable only as misdemeanors without civil penalties or other 7 See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 92, footnote 7 (“Kim’s PAGA claim”); ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at page 198 (“employee’s PAGA claim”); Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at page 1012, review granted (“court on remand must order plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim to arbitration”); Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 , 537 (“a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim”); and Seifu v. Lyft, Inc., sup 2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379 .) First, many Labor Code provisions were not being enforced because they were punishable only as misdemeanors without civil penalties or other 7 See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 92, footnote 7 (“Kim’s PAGA claim”); ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at page 198 (“employee’s PAGA claim”); Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at page 1012, review granted (“court on remand must order plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim to arbitration”); Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533 , 537 (“a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim”); and Seifu v. Lyft, Inc., sup | 1 | 1 |
Armuress Sapp v. Rogersgreen1 sentence2025(Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9 .) Finally, Hotel contends “whether Neubecker personally suffered a Labor Code violation” is an arbitrable controversy, and such arbitrability questions—including whether the complaint asserts an arbitrable claim—fall within the arbitrator’s “exclusive authority” under the delegation clause. | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc.green1 sentence2024Citing Franco, the court in Miranda v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 196, 199, 201 , held the death knell doctrine applied to render appealable a trial court order compelling arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim and dismissing a non-individual PAGA claim. | 1 | 1 |
Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLCgreen1 sentence2024(Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592 , 615 [explaining that Viking River does not “prohibit parties from agreeing to exclude all PAGA claims, individual and nonindividual, from the scope of an arbitration agreement”]; see Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236 [“arbitration under the FAA ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion’ ” and “[t]hus, ‘ “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he [or she] has not agreed so to submit” ’ ”].) Defendants further argue, citing Viking River, “that ‘applicable law’ (1) does not permit the wholesale waiver of PAGA cl | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. One2One Learning Foundationgreen1 sentence2024Leeper’s interpretation would have us either excise the language “on behalf of the employee” or interpret the word “and” to mean “and/ or.” (§ 2699, subd. (a).) Doing either would be contrary to fundamental tenets of statutory construction that we assign the “statute’s words . . . their usual and ordinary meanings, and constru[e] them in context” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190 (Wells)), and that we not “render statutory language meaningless” (Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 386 ). | 1 | 1 |
Brandwein v. Butler CA4/1green1 sentence2023(See Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1507 [we “avoid interpretations that render any portion [of a contract] superfluous, void or inexplicable”].) 14 the individual PAGA claim is a Covered Claim to be resolved by arbitration. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Quevedo v. MACY'S, INC.
green
2 sentences2013In Concepcion, the court held that under the FAA, states cannot "condition[] the enforceability of . . . arbitration agreements on the 14 We acknowledge that the court in Quevedo, supra, 798 F.Supp.2d at page 1141 presumed that a plaintiff may bring an individual PAGA claim, without considering whether such a claim is permissible under the statutory language. 2013On this point we part company with Quevedo, supra, 798 F.Supp.2d at page 1141 , in which the federal district court held that a class action waiver had to be enforced as applied to the PAGA claim, which meant that the plaintiff could pursue only an individual PAGA claim in the arbitration. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2013As to the trial court’s first ground for denying the motion—no individual claims under the PAGA—it is unnecessary to determine whether the trial court was correct, because even assuming plaintiff could bring an individual claim under the PAGA, the trial court was bound as a matter of law to follow the majority decision in Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 489 (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 ), which held that an arbitration agreement that would impede an aggrieved employee from pursuing a representative action under the PAGA, as an agent for the state’s lab 2013As to the trial court’s first ground for denying the motion—no individual claims under the PAGA—it is unnecessary to determine whether the trial court was correct, because even assuming plaintiff could bring an individual claim under the PAGA, the trial court was bound as a matter of law to follow the majority decision in Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 489 (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 ), which held that an arbitration agreement that would impede an aggrieved employee from pursuing a representative action under the PAGA, as an agent for the state’s lab | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co.
green
1 sentence2026(Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co. (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 212 , 213–214 [request for dismissal in open court, “and order thereon,” as effective as written request for dismissal]; Richards & Knox v. Bradley (1900) 129 Cal. 670, 672 .) O’Brien’s complaint alleges an individual PAGA claim and no dismissal of the individual PAGA claim has been entered, and therefore, the trial court erred by denying the motion to compel arbitration. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Richards & Knox v. Bradley
green
1 sentence2026(Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co. (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 212 , 213–214 [request for dismissal in open court, “and order thereon,” as effective as written request for dismissal]; Richards & Knox v. Bradley (1900) 129 Cal. 670, 672 .) O’Brien’s complaint alleges an individual PAGA claim and no dismissal of the individual PAGA claim has been entered, and therefore, the trial court erred by denying the motion to compel arbitration. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
red
1 sentence2025Proc., § 30.) And the complaint in a civil action “serves to frame and limit the issues.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197 , 211–212.) The Leeper court overlooked these principles by construing Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (a) as requiring an individual PAGA claim, and not only declaring that the complaint “necessarily” included such a claim but also requiring the plaintiff to arbitrate a claim she had never chosen to assert. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re CH
red
1 sentence2025(Cf. In re C.H., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 102-103 [“courts will sometimes substitute ‘or’ for ‘and,’ and vice versa, when necessary to accomplish the evident intent of the statute, but doing so is an exceptional rule of construction” (italics added)].) Thus, both the plain language and the legislative history of section 2699(a) support the conclusion that a PAGA action must include an individual PAGA claim.7 Medina asserts that, regardless of the statutory language, a PAGA action may be maintained without individual PAGA claims so long as the plaintiff has standing as an “aggrieved employee.” | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon
green
2 sentences2024Of relevance here, Sorroza argued he belonged to a “‘class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’” under section 1, citing Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at page 455 , and 3 thus he was exempt from the FAA’s coverage. 2024Of relevance here, Sorroza argued he belonged to a “‘class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’” under section 1, citing Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at page 455 , and 3 thus he was exempt from the FAA’s coverage. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moss Development Co. v. Geary
green
1 sentence2024Co. v. Geary (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 .) Because the unambiguous contractual language demonstrates the parties agreed the individual PAGA claim would be resolved in arbitration, the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of that aspect of her claim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Plantier v. Ramona Mun. Water Dist.
green
1 sentence2024Leeper’s interpretation would have us either excise the language “on behalf of the employee” or interpret the word “and” to mean “and/ or.” (§ 2699, subd. (a).) Doing either would be contrary to fundamental tenets of statutory construction that we assign the “statute’s words . . . their usual and ordinary meanings, and constru[e] them in context” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190 (Wells)), and that we not “render statutory language meaningless” (Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 386 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mountain Air Enters., LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC
green
1 sentence2023“The word ‘proceeding’ can take on ‘different meanings in different contexts,’ ” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 754 ), but it is not necessarily synonymous with a “lawsuit in court,” and it is capacious enough to encompass arbitration. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara
green
1 sentence2023Morehart involved an analysis of whether a judgment was appealable when it did not resolve all of the plaintiff’s causes of action, but the appellant nevertheless contended that the appealable claims had been severed from those still pending. ( Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 731-732.) Morehart did not assess or apply severance principles to issues of standing or arbitration of PAGA claims. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Keene v. Harling
green
1 sentence2023(See Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1924; cf. Keene, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 320–321.) Critically, however, the clause is divisible inasmuch as it can be construed to refer to representative actions in the sense that plaintiff represents fellow aggrieved employees (i.e., nonindividual PAGA claims) while permitting the arbitrator to decide a representative action in the sense that plaintiff acts as an agent or proxy for the state (i.e., an individual PAGA claim). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.
green
1 sentence2019Iskanian held that 3 Although plaintiff initially alleged his entitlement to “all underpaid wages recovered” under PAGA, that allegation does not bear on his election to pursue a solitary PAGA claim because he elected not to plead a separate claim for individual damages, because his legally incorrect allegation is a nullity (Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 951, 955 ), and because he retracted that allegation in his appellate brief. 19 arbitration of a PAGA claim is “contrary to public policy” and that contracts purporting to mandate arbitration of PAGA claims are “un | 1 | 2019–2019 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
green
2 sentences2013As we have already explained, we believe that the Quevedo court's presumption is correct. 38 availability of classwide arbitration procedures" (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1744 ]), and concluded that the FAA preempted "state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives" of "promot[ing] arbitration" and " 'ensur[ing] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 1748, 1749, italics added.) The Concepcion court concluded that requiring class arbitration when an arbitration agre 2013(Id. at pp. 498-503.) Concluding that the PAGA waiver provision in the 13 A dissenting judge in Brown was of the view that under Concepcion, the PAGA waiver in the arbitration agreement at issue was enforceable and that the plaintiff was therefore precluded from pursuing a representative PAGA action, stating: "Given the consistent line of Supreme Court cases mandating enforcement of arbitration clauses under the FAA, even in the face of California statutory or decisional law requiring court or administrative action rather than arbitration, I cannot join the majority's conclusion that the arbit | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.