trial-type hearing in District of Columbia

2002The DCAPA defines a “contested case” as “a proceeding before the Mayor or any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by any law (other than this subchapter), or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before the Mayor or before an agency.” D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (1999). 6 A “contested case” 7 hearing is understood to mean “a trial-type hearing,” which is “implicitly required by either the organic act or constitutional right.” Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 314 (D.C.1974) (en banc).

1994This court has interpreted the nature of the hearing referred to in the contested case definition to be “a trial-type hearing where such is implicitly required by either the organic act or by constitutional right-” Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 277 ; Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 314 (D.C.1973).

1985In accordance with the definition of “contested case” in D.C.Code § 1-1502(8), we have, previously defined a contested case as one involving “a trial-type hearing which is required either by statute or by constitutional right.” Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. Barry, 455 A.2d 417, 422 (D.C.1983); Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 186 (D.C.1979); Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 314 (D.C.1974) (en banc).

1983II The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act provides for a trial-type hearing only where such a hearing is required by an “organic act” or by constitutional right. 4 D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (1973); 5 .Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 187 (D.C.1979); Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 314 (D.C.1974) (en banc).

2019Cf. Singleton , 596 A.2d at 57 ("There is no constitutional right to a full trial-type hearing in prison discipline cases.").

1999Instead, we explained, traditional government contract protests “are decided on the written submissions, coupled on occasion with a ‘conference,’ not a formal hearing, attended by interested parties.” Id.; see also Singleton v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections, 596 A.2d 56, 57 (D.C.1991) (“Because the regulations do not bestow on prisoners the ‘full panoply’ of trial-type procedural rights, we necessarily conclude that the proceeding before the prison housing board at issue here was not a trial-type hearing and hence not a contested case.” (footnotes omitted)).

2015See Jones & Artis, 549 A2d at 317-18 , Our analysis turned on both the absence of statutory language indicating that protest proceedings required a hearing, 33 as well as the failure of the Board to adopt any “regulations whatsoever ... that would suggest the Board might use a trial-type hearing to resolve a protest.” Id. at 317 .

2015See Jones & Artis, 549 A2d at 317-18 , Our analysis turned on both the absence of statutory language indicating that protest proceedings required a hearing, 33 as well as the failure of the Board to adopt any “regulations whatsoever ... that would suggest the Board might use a trial-type hearing to resolve a protest.” Id. at 317 .

1994We have held, however, that “a matter retains its status as a contested case even if there are no disputed 'adjudicative facts’ necessitating a hearing.” District of Columbia v. Douglass, 452 A.2d 329, 331 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted).

1991See D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (1987); District of Columbia v. Douglass, 452 A.2d 329, 331 (D.C.1982); Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y, Inc. v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 186-87 (D.C.1979).

2025Bd., 520 A.2d 270, 277 (D.C. 1987) (even where an agency exercised its discretion to hold a trial-type hearing, the matter is not a contested case in “[t]he absence of a statutorily imposed hearing requirement,” or a regulatory or constitutional mandate requiring one).

2015Cf. id. at 193 n. 7 (explaining that whether an individuál'in fact receives a trial-type hearing is “irrelevant”; the only question is legal entitlement).

2025Department of Corrections, we held that a trial-type hearing within the meaning of the “contested case” requirement is a hearing that contains the “‘full panoply’ of trial-type procedural rights.” 596 12 A.2d 56, 57 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)).

1991Prisoners are entitled to some due process protections, such as the right to receive notice of the charges against them and a written statement of reasons for any disciplinary action, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-565 , 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-2979 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), but other constitutional rights must generally be balanced against the correctional goals of the prison authorities.

2024Dupont Circle Citizen’s Ass’n, 343 A.2d at 299 .

1988See id. §§ 1-1502(8), -1509; Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 343 A.2d 296, 298-99 (D.C.1975) (en banc); Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 313-14 (D.C.1974) (en banc).

2019The applicable regulations also do not provide, or provide in very limited form, other significant "accoutrements of a trial-type hearing." Mathis , 124 A.3d at 1099 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017We conclude that, pursuant to this statutory and regulatory scheme, an owner or occupant who contests a bill for water and sewer services is entitled to a trial-type hearing that adjudicates his or her individual legal rights, and that those proceedings therefore amount to a contested case. 14 See, e.g., Mathis, 124 A.3d at 1099-1100 ; Powell, 818 A.2d at 194 .

2017And because a case is a contested case only if a party has the right to a trial-type hearing, J.C. & Assocs., 778 A.2d at 301 , section 2529 necessarily implies that all applicants, including non-retiree applicants, have a right to a trial-type hearing before the Board.

2003Turning first to the statute authorizing TAP and the regulations implementing it, see J.C. & Assocs. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778 A.2d 296, 304 (D.C.2001) (holding that a right to a trial-type adjudication may arise under either statute or regulation), we find no requirement for a trial-type hearing — and therefore no basis for our jurisdiction.

2025Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 188; see also Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 277 (noting that a statute’s “grant of discretionary authority” to an agency to hold a hearing does not satisfy the contested case requirement).

2025Department of Corrections, we held that a trial-type hearing within the meaning of the “contested case” requirement is a hearing that contains the “‘full panoply’ of trial-type procedural rights.” 596 12 A.2d 56, 57 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)).

2024See In re Herndon, 596 A.2d 592, 595 (D.C. 1991) (“In administrative proceedings . . . parties generally are not entitled to pre-hearing discovery as a matter of constitutional right.”); Acott Ventures, LLC v. D.C.

2019We conclude that, considered as a whole, the procedures afforded by the applicable regulations "do not rise to the level of the full panoply of trial-type procedural rights needed to meet the requirements of a contested case." Farrell , 151 A.3d at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf., e.g. , Singleton , 596 A.2d at 57 (prison-discipline hearing at which prisoner had right to notice, qualified right to call witnesses, and right to be represented by counsel was not contested case, because of limits on rights to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and obtain access to information r

2018See, e.g. , Perry v. Royal Arms Apartments , 729 F.2d 1081 , 1082 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (tenants did not have due-process right to federal administrative hearing before initiation of state eviction proceeding); Johnson v. Tamsberg , 430 F.2d 1125 , 1126 (4th Cir. 1970) (same; "tenants are not actually ejected until basic due process requisites are satisfied" in state judicial proceeding); Roanoke Chowan Reg'l Hous.

2015See Abadie, 916 A.2d at 918 (citing (…continued) solicitation.” D.C.

2015See Abadie, 916 A.2d at 918 (citing Jones & Artis).

2013We require the Superior Court to review the agency decision first because "a finding by OHR of no probable cause [is] not an agency decision in a contested case in which a trial-type hearing is required, and ... such a finding is therefore not reviewable in this court.... [T]he petitioner’s only recourse is a civil action in the Superior Court....” Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 397 (D.C.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). .

2010Workers, etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 , 81 S.Ct. 1743 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)); Shieh, 738 A.2d at 817-18 (explaining that “in the absence of any factual issues as to which sworn testimony might be necessary or even relevant,” sworn testimony about the respondent’s behavior is not required to ensure due process, and concluding that there was no need for sworn testimony about whether respondent or his attorneys should be disciplined for abusive filings) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 In this case, the Referee was “well within his discretion” in not permitting responden

2010Nor does the Fifth Amendment “require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” Finfer v. Caplin, 344 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.1965) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest.

2010A matter is contested where it involves "a trial-type hearing which is required either by statute or by constitutional right." Rones, 500 A.2d at 1000 (quotation marks omitted).

2010See id. at 1001 & n. 5 (noting that a party aggrieved by an agency decision in a non-contested case may seek redress in the Superior Court).

2001By incorporating these requirements of D.C.Code § 1-1509, M.O. 96-27 entitled petitioner to a trial-type hearing in its appeal from the denial of its application for a demolition permit. 6 Accord, Auger v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 477 A.2d 196, 206 (D.C.1984) (petitioner challenging revocation of a permit “had a right” to a contested case hearing before the BAR). 7 We therefore hold that *306 petitioner’s hearing before the BAR was a trial-type hearing required “by law” within the meaning of the definition of a “contested case” set forth in D.C.Code § 1-1502(8).