Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineeringgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 347 . ¶ 37 Therefore, in Pasquale, this court confined its inquiry to “whether the elimination of the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for bystander recovery for emotional distress in the area of negligence meaningfully translate[d] into an elimination of the element of physical harm for a bystander’s recovery for emotional distress under strict liability theory.” Id. 2017The language stated that Corgan had “eliminated the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for a direct victim’s recovery for emotional distress based on a theory of negligence.” Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 346 . | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coleman
green
1 sentence2015First, Pasquale was a bystander case, not a direct victim case, as reflected by the court’s issue statement: “we confine our inquiry to whether the elimination of the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for bystander recovery for emotional distress in the area of negligence meaningfully translates into an elimination of the element of physical harm for a bystander's recovery for emotional distress under strict liability theory.” Id. at 347 . ¶ 25 Second, the quoted language is obiter dictum because it is was not essential to the court’s decision (Id. at 346 (“The rule plaintiff challe | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Suvada v. White Motor Co.
red
2 sentences1995In Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612 , 210 N.E.2d 182 , strict lability for unreasonably dangerous products was established as Illinois law, and the court adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 1995In Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612 , strict lability for unreasonably dangerous products was established as Illinois law, and the court adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Corgan v. Muehling
green
2 sentences1995Although not cited by plaintiff, and decided after Rickey, Corgan v. Muehling (1991), 143 Ill.2d 296 , 158 Ill.Dec. 489 , 574 N.E.2d 602 , eliminated the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for a direct victim's recovery for emotional distress on a theory of negligence. 1995Although not cited by plaintiff, and decided after Rickey, Corgan v. Muehling (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 296 , eliminated the contemporaneous injury or impact requirement for a direct victim’s recovery for emotional distress on a theory of negligence. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.