first branch rule in Illinois

1983These cannot be called handicaps.” ( 89 Ill. 2d 163, 169 , 432 N.E.2d 270, 273 .) Expressly adopting the first branch of the standard stated in Advocates, the supreme court held that the courts should in each case apply the following definition: “the class of physical and mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions.” “Major life function,” in turn, would include employment and the performance of manual tasks. 89 Ill. 2d 163, 170 , 432 N.E.2d 270, 274 .

1983These cannot be called handicaps.” ( 89 Ill. 2d 163, 169 , 432 N.E.2d 270, 273 .) Expressly adopting the first branch of the standard stated in Advocates, the supreme court held that the courts should in each case apply the following definition: “the class of physical and mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions.” “Major life function,” in turn, would include employment and the performance of manual tasks. 89 Ill. 2d 163, 170 , 432 N.E.2d 270, 274 .

1912(Bennett v. Chicago City Railway Co. 243 Ill. 420 .) There is no basis whatever for the contention that defendant in error and the operator of the elevator were fellow-servants under the first branch of the rule.

1911(Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302 .) The case does not seem to have been tried upon .the theory that the defendant in error and the workmen who laid the bricks which fell and injured the defendant in error were fellow-servants within the first branch of the rule, but rather upon the theory that the relation was such as to make them fellow-servants within the second branch of the rule, and it would seem clear they could not, as a matter of law, be brought within the first branch of the rule, which requires that servants within this feature of the rule “must be direc

1911(Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302 .) The case does not seem to have been tried upon .the theory that the defendant in error and the workmen who laid the bricks which fell and injured the defendant in error were fellow-servants within the first branch of the rule, but rather upon the theory that the relation was such as to make them fellow-servants within the second branch of the rule, and it would seem clear they could not, as a matter of law, be brought within the first branch of the rule, which requires that servants within this feature of the rule “must be direc

1909“To create that relation between servants they must be directly co-operating with each other in a particular work at the time of the injury, or their usual duties must be such as to bring them into such habitual association as will afford them the power and opportunity of exercising an influence, each upon the other, promotive of their mutual safety.” (Indiana, Illinois and Iowa Railroad Co. v. Otstot, 212 Ill. 429 ; Duffy v. Kivilin, 195 id. 630.) To make them fellow-servants under the first branch of the rule they must be directly cooperating with each other in a particular business and in a

1909In Chicago City Railway Co. v. Leach, 208 Ill. 198 , this court said on this subject (p. 205) : “This is the principle underlying the application of the doctrine whether it was adopted on grounds of public policy or because the risk is assumed by the servant in entering the service, and the relation is made to depend upon the existence of association between servants which enables them, better than the employer, to guard against risks or accidents resulting from the negligence of each other.” ' It is not claimed by counsel for appellant that appellee . was a fellow-servant of the motorman on t