cumulative error in Illinois

2025See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139-40 . ¶ 40 Without a clear and accurate understanding of how to properly evaluate a cumulative error claim, our courts can neither provide the mandated protections nor fairly mete out justice.

2024Under the cumulative error analysis, a new trial may be necessary even if the evidence of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming because the errors create a “pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant’s case.” People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 139 (2000). ¶ 27 A. Security Footage ¶ 28 We review the circuit court’s decision to admit video recordings for an abuse of discretion.

2026Cumulative error doctrine provides that “individual trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate *** ‘deny[] [the] defendant a fair trial.’ ” People v. Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992)).

2026See id. (“Cumulative error can arise only from actual trial errors.”).

2026Cumulative error doctrine provides that “individual trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate *** ‘deny[] [the] defendant a fair trial.’ ” People v. Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992)).

2025The cumulative error doctrine states that “individual trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate, ‘have the cumulative effect of denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’ ” People v. Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992)).

2013App. 3d 890, 904-05 , 581 N.E.2d 310, 320 (1991) (the cumulative error doctrine does not apply when the few errors that occurred during the trial did not prejudice the appellant). ¶ 98 III.

2002App. 3d 890 , 904-OS, 581 N.E.2d 310, 320 (1991) (holding that the cumulative error doctrine did not apply where the “few errors [that] occurred at trial” did not prejudice the defendant).

2025A cumulative error argument within a plain error framework requires the reviewing court to first determine which of the errors actually constitute clear or obvious error and then we determine whether the cumulative impact of those errors “ ‘ “affected the fairness of the 32 trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” ’ ” Id. ¶¶ 55-56 (quoting People v. Darr, 2018 IL App (3d) 150532 , ¶ 51, quoting People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 50 ).

2024People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 (discussing the plain error rule); People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186 (2005). ¶ 49 To hold that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply at all to forfeited errors would turn this understanding of forfeiture on its head.

2025App. 3d 855, 871 (2006), where the court’s cursory rejection of the defendant’s cumulative error claim asserted that “the cumulative errors that warrant such an extreme result must themselves be extreme.” In support, the court cited People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 351 (2000).

2025Id.

2024That doctrine states, in general, that individual trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate, “have the cumulative effect of denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365 , 376 (1992); see People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 83 (1984) (“it is true that trial errors may have a cumulative effect when considered together”); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993) (“a column of errors may sometimes have a logarithmic effect, producing a total impact greater than the ar

2012See People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 82-83 (1984) (the Illinois Supreme Court declined to apply the cumulative error doctrine where defendant failed to establish that anything approaching reversible error occurred), rev’d on other grounds, People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 262-63 (1988). ¶ 72 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County. ¶ 73 Affirmed. -18-

2022See Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 123 ; cf. People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 139-40 (2000) (ordering a new trial where the cumulative error created a pattern of prejudice and encouraged the jury to decide the case based on emotion rather than the evidence).

2022See Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 123 ; cf. People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 139-40 (2000) (ordering a new trial where the cumulative error created a pattern of prejudice and encouraged the jury to decide the case based on emotion rather than the evidence).

2009See Roulette, 141 Ill.

2009See Roulette, 141 Ill.

2025App. 3d 785, 793 (1996)), and People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 118 (2001) (rejecting a cumulative error claim “where no error occurred at all, or any error that may have occurred did not rise to the level of plain error”).

2020See People v. Caffey, - 23 - 205 Ill. 2d 52, 118 , 792 N.E.2d 1163, 1204 (concluding that where “no error occurred at all, or any error that may have occurred did not rise to the level of plain error *** [a] defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative error”); People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 356 , 864 N.E.2d 196, 222 (2007) (finding a cumulative-error analysis unnecessary where the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims had been rejected on the basis “that counsel’s performance was not deficient or, even if deficient, did not result in prejudice under St

2025See Smith, 2012 IL App (4th) 100901, ¶ 139 . ¶ 129 F. Cumulative Errors ¶ 130 Defendant next contends that if the individual errors he raised on appeal were insufficient to support reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors was. ¶ 131 The cumulative-error doctrine provides that “individual trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate, have the cumulative effect of denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 46 .

2025Because of the pressing need to rectify the misunderstandings that have arisen from spurious interpretations of cumulative error, I write separately. 13 ¶ 41 I begin with the appellate decision in People v. Desantiago, 365 Ill.

2025See, e.g., People v. White, 2024 IL App (5th) 210103-U, ¶¶ 40-41 ; People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 282 (2001).

2025Cumulative error is applicable only where errors that are not individually considered sufficiently grave to entitle the defendant to a new trial cumulatively “create a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant’s case.” People v. Mendez, 318 Ill.

2024See, e.g., People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 88 (Neville, J., dissenting) (where the court relied on the rule to excuse the State’s forfeiture but did not do so to excuse the defendant’s forfeiture), overruled on other grounds by People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356 . ¶ 76 Based on our plain error doctrine and the logical underpinnings on which it rests, I would find that a cumulative error analysis can only be applied to preserved errors and plain errors.

2024That doctrine states, in general, that individual trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate, “have the cumulative effect of denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365 , 376 (1992); see People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 83 (1984) (“it is true that trial errors may have a cumulative effect when considered together”); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993) (“a column of errors may sometimes have a logarithmic effect, producing a total impact greater than the ar

2024See Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d 917, 935 (10th Cir. 2002) (“This rationale, taken on its face, would render the cumulative error inquiry meaningless, since it indicates that cumulative error may be predicated only upon individual error already requiring reversal.”).

2024See Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d 917, 935 (10th Cir. 2002) (“This rationale, taken on its face, would render the cumulative error inquiry meaningless, since it indicates that cumulative error may be predicated only upon individual error already requiring reversal.”).

2024United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 830 (7th Cir. 2011). ¶ 47 The State does not dispute that the cumulative error doctrine applies to trial errors that have been properly preserved.

2024People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 105 (1990) (where none of the points relied upon by a defendant constitute - 13 - error, “logic dictates that there cannot be cumulative error”).

2024See People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 49 (“An otherwise 19 No. 1-22-1677 meritorious claim has no basis in law if res judicata or forfeiture bar the claim”).

2024See id. at 75 (“Indeed, the predominant feature of this court’s cumulative error analysis in Blue concerned the prosecutors’ relentless appeal to the jurors’ passions and emotions, culminating in a ‘nakedly prejudicial’ closing argument.”). ¶ 84 The unique circumstances in Blue and this court’s analysis in the case do not logically lead to the majority’s conclusion that unpreserved and unprejudicial errors can be aggregated to find cumulative error in all cases.

2024See id. at 117 (noting “Blue does not furnish a license to courts of review to adopt a cursory or skeletal analysis of the facts and issues before them.

2024“The doctrine of cumulative error cannot be applied when there is only one error.” People v. Medley, 111 Ill.

2024The majority avoids that analysis, however, by relying instead on its view of cumulative error, stating “[e]ven if we were to accept the defendant’s contention that admitting the sweatshirt and laboratory results was error, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial because we have found no error in the defendant’s other issues on appeal. ‘The doctrine of cumulative error cannot be applied when there is only one error.’ People v. Medley, 111 Ill.

2024The difficulty with that approach, however, is that it is at odds with the fundamental principle that forfeiture is “an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the reviewing court” (Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224 (1967)), and reviewing courts are not absolutely barred from reviewing procedurally defaulted claims (Ill.

2024The majority rejects this approach, claiming that under Hux “[t]he difficulty with that approach, however, is that it is at odds with the fundamental principle that forfeiture is ‘an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the reviewing court’ (Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224 (1967)), and reviewing courts are not absolutely barred from reviewing procedurally defaulted claims (Ill.

2024See, e.g., People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 88 (Neville, J., dissenting) (where the court relied on the rule to excuse the State’s forfeiture but did not do so to excuse the defendant’s forfeiture), overruled on other grounds by People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356 . ¶ 76 Based on our plain error doctrine and the logical underpinnings on which it rests, I would find that a cumulative error analysis can only be applied to preserved errors and plain errors.

2024People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 (discussing the plain error rule); People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186 (2005). ¶ 49 To hold that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply at all to forfeited errors would turn this understanding of forfeiture on its head.

2024App. 3d 760, 806 , 776 N.E.2d 262, 302 (2002) (indicating that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply where a defendant is not prejudiced by the few errors that occurred in the case). ¶ 77 III.